Narrative:

I was PIC of a king air B200 engaged in a deadhead (empty) return leg from a cpr passenger transportation flight to cgx. On the ground at cgx, I was issued a departure IFR clearance to climb to 6000 ft and expect FL190. I read this back and was given a 'readback correct' by the tower controller, who was also handling ground control and clearance delivery on the same frequency. After engine start, we were holding short of runway 36 for departure. After about 10 mins of holding, the tower controller advised us that the lengthy delay was due to traffic in the chicago area (no surprise here). After about another 5 mins, we were given clearance to take off with a right turn to 090 degrees, and clearance void if not off in 30 seconds. We were ready to go, and executed the takeoff immediately. I began the right turn to 090 degrees as soon as practicable and the tower instructed us to contact the chicago departure controller. The departure frequency was very busy and it was not until we were climbing through about 3400 ft MSL that the right seat pilot (see note below) was able to check in with the departure controller. This controller radioed, 'radar contact, your altitude was supposed to be 2000 ft, but climb and maintain 6000 ft.' I was very disconcerted by this, and after being passed on to ZAU, I asked the right seat pilot to monitor center so that I could call the meigs tower controller and inquire about what had happened. At that time, to the best of my recollection, the meigs tower controller stated that the strip did state climb to 6000 ft, but that 2000 ft was 'the standard altitude for departure from runway 36,' or words to that effect. At this point I was confused on just what had gone on, so I returned to monitoring ZAU's frequency and planned on calling meigs tower by phone after landing. After an otherwise uneventful landing back at home base, I did call the tower controller at cgx to discuss the incident. I told him it appeared that I had been involved in an operational error and that I wanted to figure out what had gone wrong in order to prevent a repeat in the future. Controller, in this phone conversation, stated that he was the tower controller I had talked to after departure, but that our clearance had been issued by another controller. Said that the clearance strip in fact stated that the initial altitude was 2000 ft, not 6000 ft. When I told him I had read back 6000 ft, he said that the controller might have misheard the readback due to interference from other frequencys he was simultaneously monitoring. Upon reflection, I probably should have wondered about an initial clearance altitude that would take us into the chicago O'hare class B airspace, but the lengthy delay for takeoff made me think that coordination was being made to enable us to climb to what I thought was the cleared altitude -- 6000 ft. I can't do anything about controller workload at cgx, but it seems obvious to me that one person monitoring several frequencys and performing clearance delivery on a local control frequency isn't very desirable. I remain convinced that I heard a clearance of 6000 ft, read back a clearance of 6000 ft, and got a 'readback correct' from this controller. I believe this incident shows that an idp (a departure, not just the IFR departure procedure on the takeoff data page) should be published for cgx. This was the first time I had operated there, and I had no way of knowing that 2000 ft was some kind of local-knowledge standard altitude for departing traffic. If an idp were published, it would not only relieve controller workload, but enable pilots to have a charted procedure available. I am very concerned with what happened today, and I want to find some way to prevent a recurrence. Thank you for your attention to this event. Note: the right seat pilot was not a required crew member of the king air 200, but was an aviation program student at a university, participating in the king air copilot program operated by the university's corporate flight department.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A BE200 KING AIR PIC CLBS ABOVE HIS ASSIGNED ALT WHEN HE MISINTERPS THE CLRNC OUT OF CGX, IL.

Narrative: I WAS PIC OF A KING AIR B200 ENGAGED IN A DEADHEAD (EMPTY) RETURN LEG FROM A CPR PAX TRANSPORTATION FLT TO CGX. ON THE GND AT CGX, I WAS ISSUED A DEP IFR CLRNC TO CLB TO 6000 FT AND EXPECT FL190. I READ THIS BACK AND WAS GIVEN A 'READBACK CORRECT' BY THE TWR CTLR, WHO WAS ALSO HANDLING GND CTL AND CLRNC DELIVERY ON THE SAME FREQ. AFTER ENG START, WE WERE HOLDING SHORT OF RWY 36 FOR DEP. AFTER ABOUT 10 MINS OF HOLDING, THE TWR CTLR ADVISED US THAT THE LENGTHY DELAY WAS DUE TO TFC IN THE CHICAGO AREA (NO SURPRISE HERE). AFTER ABOUT ANOTHER 5 MINS, WE WERE GIVEN CLRNC TO TAKE OFF WITH A R TURN TO 090 DEGS, AND CLRNC VOID IF NOT OFF IN 30 SECONDS. WE WERE READY TO GO, AND EXECUTED THE TKOF IMMEDIATELY. I BEGAN THE R TURN TO 090 DEGS AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE AND THE TWR INSTRUCTED US TO CONTACT THE CHICAGO DEP CTLR. THE DEP FREQ WAS VERY BUSY AND IT WAS NOT UNTIL WE WERE CLBING THROUGH ABOUT 3400 FT MSL THAT THE R SEAT PLT (SEE NOTE BELOW) WAS ABLE TO CHK IN WITH THE DEP CTLR. THIS CTLR RADIOED, 'RADAR CONTACT, YOUR ALT WAS SUPPOSED TO BE 2000 FT, BUT CLB AND MAINTAIN 6000 FT.' I WAS VERY DISCONCERTED BY THIS, AND AFTER BEING PASSED ON TO ZAU, I ASKED THE R SEAT PLT TO MONITOR CTR SO THAT I COULD CALL THE MEIGS TWR CTLR AND INQUIRE ABOUT WHAT HAD HAPPENED. AT THAT TIME, TO THE BEST OF MY RECOLLECTION, THE MEIGS TWR CTLR STATED THAT THE STRIP DID STATE CLB TO 6000 FT, BUT THAT 2000 FT WAS 'THE STANDARD ALT FOR DEP FROM RWY 36,' OR WORDS TO THAT EFFECT. AT THIS POINT I WAS CONFUSED ON JUST WHAT HAD GONE ON, SO I RETURNED TO MONITORING ZAU'S FREQ AND PLANNED ON CALLING MEIGS TWR BY PHONE AFTER LNDG. AFTER AN OTHERWISE UNEVENTFUL LNDG BACK AT HOME BASE, I DID CALL THE TWR CTLR AT CGX TO DISCUSS THE INCIDENT. I TOLD HIM IT APPEARED THAT I HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN AN OPERROR AND THAT I WANTED TO FIGURE OUT WHAT HAD GONE WRONG IN ORDER TO PREVENT A REPEAT IN THE FUTURE. CTLR, IN THIS PHONE CONVERSATION, STATED THAT HE WAS THE TWR CTLR I HAD TALKED TO AFTER DEP, BUT THAT OUR CLRNC HAD BEEN ISSUED BY ANOTHER CTLR. SAID THAT THE CLRNC STRIP IN FACT STATED THAT THE INITIAL ALT WAS 2000 FT, NOT 6000 FT. WHEN I TOLD HIM I HAD READ BACK 6000 FT, HE SAID THAT THE CTLR MIGHT HAVE MISHEARD THE READBACK DUE TO INTERFERENCE FROM OTHER FREQS HE WAS SIMULTANEOUSLY MONITORING. UPON REFLECTION, I PROBABLY SHOULD HAVE WONDERED ABOUT AN INITIAL CLRNC ALT THAT WOULD TAKE US INTO THE CHICAGO O'HARE CLASS B AIRSPACE, BUT THE LENGTHY DELAY FOR TKOF MADE ME THINK THAT COORD WAS BEING MADE TO ENABLE US TO CLB TO WHAT I THOUGHT WAS THE CLRED ALT -- 6000 FT. I CAN'T DO ANYTHING ABOUT CTLR WORKLOAD AT CGX, BUT IT SEEMS OBVIOUS TO ME THAT ONE PERSON MONITORING SEVERAL FREQS AND PERFORMING CLRNC DELIVERY ON A LCL CTL FREQ ISN'T VERY DESIRABLE. I REMAIN CONVINCED THAT I HEARD A CLRNC OF 6000 FT, READ BACK A CLRNC OF 6000 FT, AND GOT A 'READBACK CORRECT' FROM THIS CTLR. I BELIEVE THIS INCIDENT SHOWS THAT AN IDP (A DEP, NOT JUST THE IFR DEP PROC ON THE TKOF DATA PAGE) SHOULD BE PUBLISHED FOR CGX. THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME I HAD OPERATED THERE, AND I HAD NO WAY OF KNOWING THAT 2000 FT WAS SOME KIND OF LCL-KNOWLEDGE STANDARD ALT FOR DEPARTING TFC. IF AN IDP WERE PUBLISHED, IT WOULD NOT ONLY RELIEVE CTLR WORKLOAD, BUT ENABLE PLTS TO HAVE A CHARTED PROC AVAILABLE. I AM VERY CONCERNED WITH WHAT HAPPENED TODAY, AND I WANT TO FIND SOME WAY TO PREVENT A RECURRENCE. THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTN TO THIS EVENT. NOTE: THE R SEAT PLT WAS NOT A REQUIRED CREW MEMBER OF THE KING AIR 200, BUT WAS AN AVIATION PROGRAM STUDENT AT A UNIVERSITY, PARTICIPATING IN THE KING AIR COPLT PROGRAM OPERATED BY THE UNIVERSITY'S CORPORATE FLT DEPT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.