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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 489022 |
Time | |
Date | 200010 |
Day | Thu |
Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : zzz.airport |
State Reference | US |
Altitude | agl single value : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tower : lan.tower |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Regional Jet CL65, Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | ground : preflight ground : parked |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : multi engine pilot : instrument pilot : cfi pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 105 flight time total : 3500 flight time type : 1650 |
ASRS Report | 489022 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : commercial pilot : instrument pilot : multi engine |
Events | |
Anomaly | aircraft equipment problem : critical maintenance problem : non compliance with mel non adherence : published procedure non adherence : far |
Independent Detector | aircraft equipment other aircraft equipment : generator caution light other flight crewa other flight crewb |
Resolutory Action | none taken : anomaly accepted |
Consequence | other |
Factors | |
Maintenance | contributing factor : manuals performance deficiency : logbook entry performance deficiency : non compliance with legal requirements |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Company Aircraft Flight Crew Human Performance |
Narrative:
While on a continuous duty trip to ZZZ, upon reaching aircraft for the morning return flight to cvg, I discovered that the integrated drive generator (idg) had been deferred the previous night due to an idg caution message. The previous crew had performed the QRH procedure which included disconnection of the idg for the #2 engine. The idg was deferred (I don't know by whom)/(maintenance control) per the proper MEL (24-11-1), but the wrong sub-part of the MEL was used, which is part B which refers to the generator portion of the idg. The system should have been deferred by 24-11-1 sub-part a, which refers to the constant speed drive portion of the idg. I reviewed the MEL and referenced the CL65 flight standards manual for the MEL (24-11-1) operating procedures (as well as the 6 other MEL's on this). Unfortunately, I did not realize that the wrong sub-part of the MEL was used. In-flight, I reviewed the MEL again with the first officer, and realized the error. The first officer had mentioned, after pushback, that he thought the sub-part (B) of the MEL, might have been wrong. We reviewed the system and determined that at that point the MEL was proper. I believe the contributing factors to this situation were the high number of MEL's for this aircraft, (a very high number of MEL's is common for our fleet) the improper deferral of this item by maintenance control, which we are seeing a lot of.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A CANADAIR CL65 WAS DISPATCHED IN NON COMPLIANCE WITH #2 GENERATOR DEFERRED INOP PER THE MEL USING THE WRONG REF AND SPECIAL PROCS.
Narrative: WHILE ON A CONTINUOUS DUTY TRIP TO ZZZ, UPON REACHING ACFT FOR THE MORNING RETURN FLT TO CVG, I DISCOVERED THAT THE INTEGRATED DRIVE GENERATOR (IDG) HAD BEEN DEFERRED THE PREVIOUS NIGHT DUE TO AN IDG CAUTION MESSAGE. THE PREVIOUS CREW HAD PERFORMED THE QRH PROC WHICH INCLUDED DISCONNECTION OF THE IDG FOR THE #2 ENG. THE IDG WAS DEFERRED (I DON'T KNOW BY WHOM)/(MAINT CTL) PER THE PROPER MEL (24-11-1), BUT THE WRONG SUB-PART OF THE MEL WAS USED, WHICH IS PART B WHICH REFERS TO THE GENERATOR PORTION OF THE IDG. THE SYS SHOULD HAVE BEEN DEFERRED BY 24-11-1 SUB-PART A, WHICH REFERS TO THE CONSTANT SPD DRIVE PORTION OF THE IDG. I REVIEWED THE MEL AND REFED THE CL65 FLT STANDARDS MANUAL FOR THE MEL (24-11-1) OPERATING PROCS (AS WELL AS THE 6 OTHER MEL'S ON THIS). UNFORTUNATELY, I DID NOT REALIZE THAT THE WRONG SUB-PART OF THE MEL WAS USED. INFLT, I REVIEWED THE MEL AGAIN WITH THE FO, AND REALIZED THE ERROR. THE FO HAD MENTIONED, AFTER PUSHBACK, THAT HE THOUGHT THE SUB-PART (B) OF THE MEL, MIGHT HAVE BEEN WRONG. WE REVIEWED THE SYS AND DETERMINED THAT AT THAT POINT THE MEL WAS PROPER. I BELIEVE THE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO THIS SIT WERE THE HIGH NUMBER OF MEL'S FOR THIS ACFT, (A VERY HIGH NUMBER OF MEL'S IS COMMON FOR OUR FLEET) THE IMPROPER DEFERRAL OF THIS ITEM BY MAINT CTL, WHICH WE ARE SEEING A LOT OF.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.