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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 490876 |
Time | |
Date | 200010 |
Day | Sun |
Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : zzz.airport |
State Reference | US |
Altitude | agl single value : 0 |
Environment | |
Light | Dawn |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Regional Jet CL65, Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | climbout : takeoff cruise : level descent : approach ground : preflight landing : roll |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp pilot : cfi pilot : multi engine |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 200 flight time total : 6800 flight time type : 3000 |
ASRS Report | 490876 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : commercial pilot : instrument pilot : multi engine |
Events | |
Anomaly | non adherence : company policies non adherence : published procedure |
Independent Detector | other other : 3 |
Resolutory Action | none taken : detected after the fact |
Consequence | other |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Flight Crew Human Performance Aircraft Company |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Narrative:
Our hotel van was running 15 mins late for our ride to the airport. Upon arrival at the airport, the station personnel said we had 7100 pounds of fuel on board. I looked at the dispatch release to check the minimum fuel (5200 pounds) and told the fueler that we were 'negative fuel.' the station personnel informed me that the aircraft was at the gate and that the mechanics had the APU running. Our crew went to the gate, boarded the aircraft and spent the next 20N mins performing 4 checklists, reviewing the WX, preparing a load manifest, doing a crew briefing, programming the FMS, running all of the first flight of the day system tests, and performed an exhaustive check of the aircraft maintenance logbook (we have been having problems with improper deferrals). During this 20 min period, we had to move passenger who were incorrectly assigned seats in the exit row. Upon landing at our destination, I received a message to contact our flight dispatcher. My dispatcher informed me that I had just flown the wrong airplane for this flight and the correct airplane was listed on the dispatch release. The dispatcher amended the dispatch release to show the n-number for the aircraft flown and then put the dispatch supervisor on the phone. The supervisor said that I need to pay more attention to my job and that he (supervisor) was concerned that I was just 'blowing off' my responsibilities as the aircraft's PIC. Instead of 'discussing' my responsibilities, I elected to end this 'conversation.' everyone involved in this situation believes that I am entirely to blame. Ultimately I am responsible and I do accept and acknowledge that fact. Pilots simply have too much work to do and not enough time to do it. I believe CRM should be required for all airline employees. I also believe, non FAA certificated airline employees should be held accountable for their role in a chain of events which leads to this type of situation.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: FLC OF A CL65 OPERATED THE WRONG ACFT DUE TO NOT OBSERVING DURING PREFLT THAT THE ACFT N-NUMBER WAS NOT THE SAME AS THE NUMBER SHOWN ON THEIR TRIP DISPATCH DOCUMENT.
Narrative: OUR HOTEL VAN WAS RUNNING 15 MINS LATE FOR OUR RIDE TO THE ARPT. UPON ARR AT THE ARPT, THE STATION PERSONNEL SAID WE HAD 7100 LBS OF FUEL ON BOARD. I LOOKED AT THE DISPATCH RELEASE TO CHK THE MINIMUM FUEL (5200 LBS) AND TOLD THE FUELER THAT WE WERE 'NEGATIVE FUEL.' THE STATION PERSONNEL INFORMED ME THAT THE ACFT WAS AT THE GATE AND THAT THE MECHS HAD THE APU RUNNING. OUR CREW WENT TO THE GATE, BOARDED THE ACFT AND SPENT THE NEXT 20N MINS PERFORMING 4 CHKLISTS, REVIEWING THE WX, PREPARING A LOAD MANIFEST, DOING A CREW BRIEFING, PROGRAMMING THE FMS, RUNNING ALL OF THE FIRST FLT OF THE DAY SYS TESTS, AND PERFORMED AN EXHAUSTIVE CHK OF THE ACFT MAINT LOGBOOK (WE HAVE BEEN HAVING PROBS WITH IMPROPER DEFERRALS). DURING THIS 20 MIN PERIOD, WE HAD TO MOVE PAX WHO WERE INCORRECTLY ASSIGNED SEATS IN THE EXIT ROW. UPON LNDG AT OUR DEST, I RECEIVED A MESSAGE TO CONTACT OUR FLT DISPATCHER. MY DISPATCHER INFORMED ME THAT I HAD JUST FLOWN THE WRONG AIRPLANE FOR THIS FLT AND THE CORRECT AIRPLANE WAS LISTED ON THE DISPATCH RELEASE. THE DISPATCHER AMENDED THE DISPATCH RELEASE TO SHOW THE N-NUMBER FOR THE ACFT FLOWN AND THEN PUT THE DISPATCH SUPVR ON THE PHONE. THE SUPVR SAID THAT I NEED TO PAY MORE ATTN TO MY JOB AND THAT HE (SUPVR) WAS CONCERNED THAT I WAS JUST 'BLOWING OFF' MY RESPONSIBILITIES AS THE ACFT'S PIC. INSTEAD OF 'DISCUSSING' MY RESPONSIBILITIES, I ELECTED TO END THIS 'CONVERSATION.' EVERYONE INVOLVED IN THIS SIT BELIEVES THAT I AM ENTIRELY TO BLAME. ULTIMATELY I AM RESPONSIBLE AND I DO ACCEPT AND ACKNOWLEDGE THAT FACT. PLTS SIMPLY HAVE TOO MUCH WORK TO DO AND NOT ENOUGH TIME TO DO IT. I BELIEVE CRM SHOULD BE REQUIRED FOR ALL AIRLINE EMPLOYEES. I ALSO BELIEVE, NON FAA CERTIFICATED AIRLINE EMPLOYEES SHOULD BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE FOR THEIR ROLE IN A CHAIN OF EVENTS WHICH LEADS TO THIS TYPE OF SIT.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.