Narrative:

Upon landing in ZZZ, we received inboard and outboard ground spoiler fault status messages. They did not display. Contract maintenance was contacted and under the direction of company maintenance reset the relevant circuit breakers and then actuated the ground spoilers until they operated properly (4 times). The onboard maintenance data computer recorded no fault had occurred. Not satisfied with this solution, I talked to our maintenance department who then directed the contract mechanic to check the spoiler electronic control unit computer, in the avionics bay. It too failed to record any faults. I then contacted our program manager for the CL65. He suggested conducting the first flight of the day procedures for the hydraulic and ground lift dumping system, and then conducting a low speed abort. The pilot's manual defines high speed abort as anything over 100 KIAS, so the first officer and I agreed on 80 KIAS. After conducting the checks and the abort, I called maintenance to inform them of the results in regards to ground lift dumping deployment. Maintenance then informed me that an abort at 80 KIAS would require a brake inspection that could ground the aircraft for an entire day. I have 2 points to make. The pressure to accept a 'fix' which only entails resetting a system until you get the result you want without any knowledge of what caused the problem is unacceptable, especially given that no relief for both inboard and outboard ground spoilers inoperative is given in our MEL. We do not have performance data for this scenario. Second, the obvious discrepancy between maintenance's definition of a high speed abort and the pilot's manual definition is without excuse. It came to my attention during subsequent conversations with company officials that this discrepancy has been known for at least 6 months. In fact, they have been trying to get this relief from the 80 KIAS definition. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter stated the flight and ground spoilers were not an MEL allowable deferred item and the maintenance controller was pushing hard to move the airplane. The reporter said spoiler deployment problems are a continuous problem on the regional jets. The reporter stated the repeated testing of a system until it self-tests ok is unsatisfactory. The reporter said the system was tested 4 times and tested ok on the 4TH attempt. The reporter said the maintenance recorder and the spoiler electronic control unit did not record any fault when checked by the contract technician. The reporter stated an operations program manager suggested a ground test and a low speed abort at 80 KTS to test the spoilers which resulted in a required brake check per the maintenance manual that grounded the airplane. The reporter stated the whole situation was completely mismanaged.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CANADAIR CL65 ON LNDG THE FLT AND GND SPOILERS FAILED TO DEPLOY. NEITHER MAINT DATA NOR SPOILER ELECTRONIC CTL UNIT RECORDED A FAULT.

Narrative: UPON LNDG IN ZZZ, WE RECEIVED INBOARD AND OUTBOARD GND SPOILER FAULT STATUS MESSAGES. THEY DID NOT DISPLAY. CONTRACT MAINT WAS CONTACTED AND UNDER THE DIRECTION OF COMPANY MAINT RESET THE RELEVANT CIRCUIT BREAKERS AND THEN ACTUATED THE GND SPOILERS UNTIL THEY OPERATED PROPERLY (4 TIMES). THE ONBOARD MAINT DATA COMPUTER RECORDED NO FAULT HAD OCCURRED. NOT SATISFIED WITH THIS SOLUTION, I TALKED TO OUR MAINT DEPT WHO THEN DIRECTED THE CONTRACT MECH TO CHK THE SPOILER ELECTRONIC CTL UNIT COMPUTER, IN THE AVIONICS BAY. IT TOO FAILED TO RECORD ANY FAULTS. I THEN CONTACTED OUR PROGRAM MGR FOR THE CL65. HE SUGGESTED CONDUCTING THE FIRST FLT OF THE DAY PROCS FOR THE HYD AND GND LIFT DUMPING SYS, AND THEN CONDUCTING A LOW SPD ABORT. THE PLT'S MANUAL DEFINES HIGH SPD ABORT AS ANYTHING OVER 100 KIAS, SO THE FO AND I AGREED ON 80 KIAS. AFTER CONDUCTING THE CHKS AND THE ABORT, I CALLED MAINT TO INFORM THEM OF THE RESULTS IN REGARDS TO GND LIFT DUMPING DEPLOYMENT. MAINT THEN INFORMED ME THAT AN ABORT AT 80 KIAS WOULD REQUIRE A BRAKE INSPECTION THAT COULD GND THE ACFT FOR AN ENTIRE DAY. I HAVE 2 POINTS TO MAKE. THE PRESSURE TO ACCEPT A 'FIX' WHICH ONLY ENTAILS RESETTING A SYS UNTIL YOU GET THE RESULT YOU WANT WITHOUT ANY KNOWLEDGE OF WHAT CAUSED THE PROB IS UNACCEPTABLE, ESPECIALLY GIVEN THAT NO RELIEF FOR BOTH INBOARD AND OUTBOARD GND SPOILERS INOP IS GIVEN IN OUR MEL. WE DO NOT HAVE PERFORMANCE DATA FOR THIS SCENARIO. SECOND, THE OBVIOUS DISCREPANCY BTWN MAINT'S DEFINITION OF A HIGH SPD ABORT AND THE PLT'S MANUAL DEFINITION IS WITHOUT EXCUSE. IT CAME TO MY ATTN DURING SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATIONS WITH COMPANY OFFICIALS THAT THIS DISCREPANCY HAS BEEN KNOWN FOR AT LEAST 6 MONTHS. IN FACT, THEY HAVE BEEN TRYING TO GET THIS RELIEF FROM THE 80 KIAS DEFINITION. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THE FLT AND GND SPOILERS WERE NOT AN MEL ALLOWABLE DEFERRED ITEM AND THE MAINT CTLR WAS PUSHING HARD TO MOVE THE AIRPLANE. THE RPTR SAID SPOILER DEPLOYMENT PROBS ARE A CONTINUOUS PROB ON THE REGIONAL JETS. THE RPTR STATED THE REPEATED TESTING OF A SYS UNTIL IT SELF-TESTS OK IS UNSATISFACTORY. THE RPTR SAID THE SYS WAS TESTED 4 TIMES AND TESTED OK ON THE 4TH ATTEMPT. THE RPTR SAID THE MAINT RECORDER AND THE SPOILER ELECTRONIC CTL UNIT DID NOT RECORD ANY FAULT WHEN CHKED BY THE CONTRACT TECHNICIAN. THE RPTR STATED AN OPS PROGRAM MGR SUGGESTED A GND TEST AND A LOW SPD ABORT AT 80 KTS TO TEST THE SPOILERS WHICH RESULTED IN A REQUIRED BRAKE CHK PER THE MAINT MANUAL THAT GNDED THE AIRPLANE. THE RPTR STATED THE WHOLE SIT WAS COMPLETELY MISMANAGED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.