B737-700 crew, when presented with a master caution warning of problems with the electronic engine c...

Attributes
ACN	574997
Time
Date	200302
Day	Fri
Local Time Of Day	0601 To 1200
Place
Locale Reference	airport : bwi.airport
State Reference	MD
Altitude	agl single value : 0
Environment
Flight Conditions	VMC
Weather Elements	Snow
Light	Daylight
Aircraft 1
Operator	common carrier : air carrier
Make Model Name	B737-700
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 121
Flight Phase	ground : takeoff roll
Flight Plan	IFR
Person 1
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : captain oversight : pic
Qualification	pilot : atp
Experience	flight time last 90 days : 150 flight time total : 11000 flight time type : 6000
ASRS Report	574997
Person 2
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : first officer
Events
Anomaly	aircraft equipment problem : less severe other anomaly other
Independent Detector	aircraft equipment other aircraft equipment : eicas other flight crewa
Resolutory Action	aircraft : equipment problem dissipated
Consequence	other
Supplementary
Problem Areas	Maintenance Human Performance Flight Crew Human Performance Aircraft Company
Primary Problem	Company

Narrative:

Prior to V1, both alternate lights/IMC/engine annunciator came on. Pushed back/deiced/takeoff roll. Just prior to V1 mc/engine -- annunciator with both alternate lights on eecs. After cleanup, consulted QRH-B19. Checklist applies only if alternate and associated on light is on. We only had alternate light(south). Called bwi maintenance and mechanic said he thought it was a software failure, and we should only lose a few parameters. His thought was more if mco would have parts to fix. Called dispatch and talked with maintenance. They only said we can only advise that you follow the QRH. I think that was a result of a company notice on communications that came out recently. I wasn't really looking to trouble-shoot, but more for an operational considerations standpoint. A little guidance on if they wanted to return to bwi or continue to mco. With no QRH guidance, I wasn't really sure if a software failure was a problem or not. I probably should have asked a better question to dispatch/maintenance. I admit to being a bit startled by their abrupt response and wasn't able to formulate a better follow-up question for what I was asking. Lights stayed on the entire way with only noticeable hindrance being the N1's maxed out at 95.1 on the climb. Stayed at FL350 instead of going to FL390. Crosschecked all numbers with opc, including go around N1's if needed. Lights went out. (Don't they always, going into a maintenance base?) passing through 10000 ft going into mco. Wrote it up in the logbook, and mechanics met the airplane. First officer was in agreement with actions, and we discussed all possibilities. I had flown with this first officer previously and was glad to have him with me on this. Highly competent and a good communicator. That was a plus. I never felt that safety was compromised. It was more an issue of communications. With no QRH guidance, and having never seen this before, I was looking for information from maintenance on the nature of the situation, and if they had a preference on where they wanted the airplane.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-700 CREW, WHEN PRESENTED WITH A MASTER CAUTION WARNING OF PROBS WITH THE ELECTRONIC ENG CTL SYS THAT HAD NO GUIDANCE OFFERED IN THE QRH, A PLT RPTS LITTLE ASSISTANCE WAS OBTAINED FROM THE DISPATCHER OR COMPANY MAINT CTL ALSO.

Narrative: PRIOR TO V1, BOTH ALTERNATE LIGHTS/IMC/ENG ANNUNCIATOR CAME ON. PUSHED BACK/DEICED/TKOF ROLL. JUST PRIOR TO V1 MC/ENG -- ANNUNCIATOR WITH BOTH ALTERNATE LIGHTS ON EECS. AFTER CLEANUP, CONSULTED QRH-B19. CHKLIST APPLIES ONLY IF ALTERNATE AND ASSOCIATED ON LIGHT IS ON. WE ONLY HAD ALTERNATE LIGHT(S). CALLED BWI MAINT AND MECH SAID HE THOUGHT IT WAS A SOFTWARE FAILURE, AND WE SHOULD ONLY LOSE A FEW PARAMETERS. HIS THOUGHT WAS MORE IF MCO WOULD HAVE PARTS TO FIX. CALLED DISPATCH AND TALKED WITH MAINT. THEY ONLY SAID WE CAN ONLY ADVISE THAT YOU FOLLOW THE QRH. I THINK THAT WAS A RESULT OF A COMPANY NOTICE ON COMS THAT CAME OUT RECENTLY. I WASN'T REALLY LOOKING TO TROUBLE-SHOOT, BUT MORE FOR AN OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS STANDPOINT. A LITTLE GUIDANCE ON IF THEY WANTED TO RETURN TO BWI OR CONTINUE TO MCO. WITH NO QRH GUIDANCE, I WASN'T REALLY SURE IF A SOFTWARE FAILURE WAS A PROB OR NOT. I PROBABLY SHOULD HAVE ASKED A BETTER QUESTION TO DISPATCH/MAINT. I ADMIT TO BEING A BIT STARTLED BY THEIR ABRUPT RESPONSE AND WASN'T ABLE TO FORMULATE A BETTER FOLLOW-UP QUESTION FOR WHAT I WAS ASKING. LIGHTS STAYED ON THE ENTIRE WAY WITH ONLY NOTICEABLE HINDRANCE BEING THE N1'S MAXED OUT AT 95.1 ON THE CLB. STAYED AT FL350 INSTEAD OF GOING TO FL390. XCHKED ALL NUMBERS WITH OPC, INCLUDING GAR N1'S IF NEEDED. LIGHTS WENT OUT. (DON'T THEY ALWAYS, GOING INTO A MAINT BASE?) PASSING THROUGH 10000 FT GOING INTO MCO. WROTE IT UP IN THE LOGBOOK, AND MECHS MET THE AIRPLANE. FO WAS IN AGREEMENT WITH ACTIONS, AND WE DISCUSSED ALL POSSIBILITIES. I HAD FLOWN WITH THIS FO PREVIOUSLY AND WAS GLAD TO HAVE HIM WITH ME ON THIS. HIGHLY COMPETENT AND A GOOD COMMUNICATOR. THAT WAS A PLUS. I NEVER FELT THAT SAFETY WAS COMPROMISED. IT WAS MORE AN ISSUE OF COMS. WITH NO QRH GUIDANCE, AND HAVING NEVER SEEN THIS BEFORE, I WAS LOOKING FOR INFO FROM MAINT ON THE NATURE OF THE SIT, AND IF THEY HAD A PREFERENCE ON WHERE THEY WANTED THE AIRPLANE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.

B737-700 crew, when presented with a master caution warning of problems with the electronic engine control system that had no guidance offered in the QRH, a pilot reports little assistance was obtained from the dispatcher or company maintenance control also.