Narrative:

Event: runway incursion. We taxied approximately 10-16 ft onto kpvd runway 05R at taxiway D just as an aircraft Y airbus was cleared for takeoff. The captain stopped our slow taxi at the same time the aircraft Y pilot announced his abort (XC03ET). The airbus slowed to a very slow taxi speed and passed in front of us by about 20 ft (he pulled to the right of the runway centerline) and continued to the end of the runway. We turned right (after stopping for 1-2 min) onto runway 05R, taxied onto S1 an south, then followed a 'follow me' truck back to the ramp/gate to off load some weight. Chain of events/ contributing factors: ATIS (xc:35Z) 04A/9, 1SM, lt snow, 700 sct, 1200 ovc, 8/20 29.72. Actual weather was deteriorating rapidly and may have been 1/4 - 1/2 SM visibility with blowing (heavy) snow. RVR reported 2600 at xb:55L. We pushed at xb:44L, began de-ice at xb:46. On board computer computations for a wet/good runway (the condition at push) were completed and the on board computer was placed on the console prior to our xb:55L taxi from the de-ice pad. RVR was then reported 2600 so the captain coordinated for a takeoff alternate. Taxi instructions were taxiway T,C runways 23R,05R. The weather was getting worse. The captain told me we'd need to inspect the wings before takeoff since we'd been de-iced with type 1 fluid. I informed the tower of this as we approached the end of runway 23R and were turning onto taxiway D. The captain and I discussed the accumulating snow (1-3') and I began looking at the on board computer with a 'thin cluttered' runway and discovered we were too heavy. I informed the captain and we were discussing this when the runway incursion occurred. How to prevent a reoccurrence: with the weather conditions we had, I should have been looking outside during the taxi. The captain was taxiing extremely slow and I mistakenly assumed he still had sight of and was following the airbus to runway 05R. Complacency was not a factor as the captain insured we were methodical in accomplishing cockpit tasks. We had taken a 2 1/2 hour delay earlier in leaving islip due to extreme snow conditions, very slow de-ice procedures, and problems with holdover times and coordinating this with an open runway. The de-ice time had to be timed perfectly with a freshly plowed runway. Perhaps the urgency to avoid another delay led me to not prioritize my tasks correctly. I had the airfield diagram on my clipboard and had discussed the taxi routing with the captain, but left it out of my crosscheck once we were following the airbus and turned left on taxiway D. In the future, I will not go heads down when taxiing in adverse weather. The captain asked me to do this for a memory prompt to reset the flaps/trim which were out of takeoff position due to taxiing thru slush. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: during callback the reporter said that their clearance for taxi was to follow the airbus to the runway. He let the distraction of his other duties leave the taxiing to the captain with no backup and did not realize that aircraft 'Y' had gotten so far ahead or that the captain may have lost sight of it in the low visibility conditions. Callback comments from the captain: he lost sight of the airbus, but had been issued the taxi route so he continued, missed a 90 degree turn on the taxi route, did not see the hold short line which was snow covered, did not see any directional signs or the installed wig-wag lights. He assumes with snow removal operations and blowing snow conditions at the time that they were obscured. Snow was up to 4 ft deep along the txwys. When sighting the airbus on the runway he did not realize until the reject was announced that he was seeing the front of the aircraft and not the back so he could continue following.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR MISSES A TURN ENDING UP ON THE RWY AS ANOTHER ACR BEGINS TAKE OFF IN LIMITED VISIBILITY CONDITIONS. TAKEOFF IS REJECTED WITH A MISS DISTANCE OF APPROX 20 FT AS THE INTRUDING ACFT IS PASSED.

Narrative: EVENT: RWY INCURSION. WE TAXIED APPROX 10-16 FT ONTO KPVD RWY 05R AT TXWY D JUST AS AN ACFT Y AIRBUS WAS CLRED FOR TAKEOFF. THE CAPT STOPPED OUR SLOW TAXI AT THE SAME TIME THE ACFT Y PLT ANNOUNCED HIS ABORT (XC03ET). THE AIRBUS SLOWED TO A VERY SLOW TAXI SPEED AND PASSED IN FRONT OF US BY ABOUT 20 FT (HE PULLED TO THE R OF THE RWY CTRLINE) AND CONTINUED TO THE END OF THE RWY. WE TURNED R (AFTER STOPPING FOR 1-2 MIN) ONTO RWY 05R, TAXIED ONTO S1 AN S, THEN FOLLOWED A 'FOLLOW ME' TRUCK BACK TO THE RAMP/GATE TO OFF LOAD SOME WEIGHT. CHAIN OF EVENTS/ CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: ATIS (XC:35Z) 04A/9, 1SM, LT SNOW, 700 SCT, 1200 OVC, 8/20 29.72. ACTUAL WEATHER WAS DETERIORATING RAPIDLY AND MAY HAVE BEEN 1/4 - 1/2 SM VIS WITH BLOWING (HEAVY) SNOW. RVR REPORTED 2600 AT XB:55L. WE PUSHED AT XB:44L, BEGAN DE-ICE AT XB:46. ON BOARD COMPUTER COMPUTATIONS FOR A WET/GOOD RWY (THE CONDITION AT PUSH) WERE COMPLETED AND THE ON BOARD COMPUTER WAS PLACED ON THE CONSOLE PRIOR TO OUR XB:55L TAXI FROM THE DE-ICE PAD. RVR WAS THEN REPORTED 2600 SO THE CAPT COORDINATED FOR A TAKEOFF ALTERNATE. TAXI INSTRUCTIONS WERE TXWY T,C RWYS 23R,05R. THE WEATHER WAS GETTING WORSE. THE CAPT TOLD ME WE'D NEED TO INSPECT THE WINGS BEFORE TAKEOFF SINCE WE'D BEEN DE-ICED WITH TYPE 1 FLUID. I INFORMED THE TWR OF THIS AS WE APCHED THE END OF RWY 23R AND WERE TURNING ONTO TXWY D. THE CAPT AND I DISCUSSED THE ACCUMULATING SNOW (1-3') AND I BEGAN LOOKING AT THE ON BOARD COMPUTER WITH A 'THIN CLUTTERED' RWY AND DISCOVERED WE WERE TOO HEAVY. I INFORMED THE CAPT AND WE WERE DISCUSSING THIS WHEN THE RWY INCURSION OCCURRED. HOW TO PREVENT A REOCCURRENCE: WITH THE WEATHER CONDITIONS WE HAD, I SHOULD HAVE BEEN LOOKING OUTSIDE DURING THE TAXI. THE CAPT WAS TAXIING EXTREMELY SLOW AND I MISTAKENLY ASSUMED HE STILL HAD SIGHT OF AND WAS FOLLOWING THE AIRBUS TO RWY 05R. COMPLACENCY WAS NOT A FACTOR AS THE CAPT INSURED WE WERE METHODICAL IN ACCOMPLISHING COCKPIT TASKS. WE HAD TAKEN A 2 1/2 HOUR DELAY EARLIER IN LEAVING ISLIP DUE TO EXTREME SNOW CONDITIONS, VERY SLOW DE-ICE PROCEDURES, AND PROBLEMS WITH HOLDOVER TIMES AND COORDINATING THIS WITH AN OPEN RWY. THE DE-ICE TIME HAD TO BE TIMED PERFECTLY WITH A FRESHLY PLOWED RWY. PERHAPS THE URGENCY TO AVOID ANOTHER DELAY LED ME TO NOT PRIORITIZE MY TASKS CORRECTLY. I HAD THE AIRFIELD DIAGRAM ON MY CLIPBOARD AND HAD DISCUSSED THE TAXI ROUTING WITH THE CAPT, BUT LEFT IT OUT OF MY CROSSCHECK ONCE WE WERE FOLLOWING THE AIRBUS AND TURNED L ON TXWY D. IN THE FUTURE, I WILL NOT GO HEADS DOWN WHEN TAXIING IN ADVERSE WEATHER. THE CAPT ASKED ME TO DO THIS FOR A MEMORY PROMPT TO RESET THE FLAPS/TRIM WHICH WERE OUT OF TAKEOFF POS DUE TO TAXIING THRU SLUSH. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: DURING CALLBACK THE RPTR SAID THAT THEIR CLRNC FOR TAXI WAS TO FOLLOW THE AIRBUS TO THE RWY. HE LET THE DISTRACTION OF HIS OTHER DUTIES LEAVE THE TAXIING TO THE CAPT WITH NO BACKUP AND DID NOT REALIZE THAT ACFT 'Y' HAD GOTTEN SO FAR AHEAD OR THAT THE CAPT MAY HAVE LOST SIGHT OF IT IN THE LOW VISIBILITY CONDITIONS. CALLBACK COMMENTS FROM THE CAPT: HE LOST SIGHT OF THE AIRBUS, BUT HAD BEEN ISSUED THE TAXI ROUTE SO HE CONTINUED, MISSED A 90 DEGREE TURN ON THE TAXI ROUTE, DID NOT SEE THE HOLD SHORT LINE WHICH WAS SNOW COVERED, DID NOT SEE ANY DIRECTIONAL SIGNS OR THE INSTALLED WIG-WAG LIGHTS. HE ASSUMES WITH SNOW REMOVAL OPS AND BLOWING SNOW CONDITIONS AT THE TIME THAT THEY WERE OBSCURED. SNOW WAS UP TO 4 FT DEEP ALONG THE TXWYS. WHEN SIGHTING THE AIRBUS ON THE RWY HE DID NOT REALIZE UNTIL THE REJECT WAS ANNOUNCED THAT HE WAS SEEING THE FRONT OF THE AIRCRAFT AND NOT THE BACK SO HE COULD CONTINUE FOLLOWING.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.