Narrative:

Departed mci, climbed to 10000 ft on a departure vector heading west. TCASII alerted us to a descending aircraft heading east at our 2 O'clock position through 11000 ft. We visually acquired the aircraft and watched it pass down our right wing within 3 NM of our aircraft, descending through 10000 ft. Shortly thereafter, we believed to have received a climb to 15000 ft and to contact ZKC on 123.8. At approximately 13000 ft, we received an RA at approximately 10 O'clock position and a little high, heading northeast and 15000 ft estimated. The first officer and I visually acquired the aircraft and first officer complied with the RA to the extent necessary to deconflict. I checked in with ZKC and told them we were given a climb to 15000 ft from kansas city departure, received an RA during the climb, and the whole picture seemed 'a little weird.' center remarked 'no harm, no foul' and said he would check into it. ZKC came back and said something to the effect that the climb clearance was not for us. I replied rather assuredly that we both heard climb to 15000 ft and contact ZKC on 123.8. I then told center that if it was a mistake on our part, that we apologize for any confusion. A couple of frequencys down the road, high sector ATC gave us a phone number to contact departure upon arrival to pdx. Looking back at this situation, both the first officer and I were well rested. It had not been a long duty day, the WX was clear and kansas city departure frequency did not sound unusually saturated, nor did we hear or get the impression that we stepped on someone else during our readback and took their clearance. We did not hear a correction from departure nor the intended aircraft whose clearance we supposedly mistook for our own, prior to us switching to 123.8. We still believe we heard air carrier XXX. Having said that, the lesson here is for increased diligence in all areas of the flight. If unsure of a clearance, or an ATC transmission is a little weak in reception, verify it again. This incident has made me more aware of just what can happen during an otherwise routine flight if just 1 facet of a series between point a and point B is not executed properly. As professionals, we strive for that perfect flight. I will use this incident to become better at my trade and to strive to listen more closely to ATC xmissions. Supplemental information from acn 498130: we departed mci on the wildcat departure, climbed to 10000 ft on a departure vector heading 270 degrees to intercept the departure radial. Then the captain and I both believe we heard instructions from kansas city departure to 'climb to 15000 ft and contact ZKC on 123.8.' at approximately 13000 ft we got a TCASII RA to descend and the other aircraft was displayed on TCASII at 10 O'clock position, slightly high, and descending. The first officer (me) initiated the initial descent maneuver and visually picked up the other aircraft at approximately 10 O'clock, approximately 1 mi, heading the opposite direction. The captain then checked in with ZKC and stated we had just received an RA, and center said he would check into it. ZKC later informed us that we had mistakenly taken the clearance for another company aircraft. The captain politely replied that we both believed that the call was for us, but if it was a mistake on our part, we sincerely apologize. Approximately 15 mins later, ZKC gave us a phone number to call when we landed in portland in order to discuss a possible pilot violation. Looking back on the situation, the captain and I were both well rested. The departure frequency was not saturated. We both were listening attentively to the radio. We did not get any sort of corrective call from kansas city departure, nor did we step on another aircraft trying to answer the clearance call. Having said that, the lesson here is for increased diligence on the radios and if any question remains regarding an assigned clearance, get a clarification! This situation has made me even more aware that there is no phase of flight that will allow even the slightest bit of complacency. In the future, I will ensure that I monitor all ATC radio xmissions even more carefully. Supplemental information from acn 497831: multiple aircraft on frequency. Both air carrier Y and air carrier X were restr to 10000 ft for crossing arrival traffic (air carrier Z at 12000 ft). I climbed air carrier Y to 15000 ft and told him to contact ZKC on frequency 123.8. Multiple xmissions occurred, and I observed air carrier xx 5 NM south mci, a departure. I contacted air carrier xx and he acknowledged. I then observed air carrier X climbing into the altitude of air carrier Z and immediately attempted to contact him and remind him of his altitude restr of 10000 ft. Air carrier Z was on the arrival frequency.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-700 AND A B737-300 HAD LESS THAN LEGAL SPACING IN MCI CLASS E AIRSPACE.

Narrative: DEPARTED MCI, CLBED TO 10000 FT ON A DEP VECTOR HDG W. TCASII ALERTED US TO A DSNDING ACFT HDG E AT OUR 2 O'CLOCK POS THROUGH 11000 FT. WE VISUALLY ACQUIRED THE ACFT AND WATCHED IT PASS DOWN OUR R WING WITHIN 3 NM OF OUR ACFT, DSNDING THROUGH 10000 FT. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, WE BELIEVED TO HAVE RECEIVED A CLB TO 15000 FT AND TO CONTACT ZKC ON 123.8. AT APPROX 13000 FT, WE RECEIVED AN RA AT APPROX 10 O'CLOCK POS AND A LITTLE HIGH, HDG NE AND 15000 FT ESTIMATED. THE FO AND I VISUALLY ACQUIRED THE ACFT AND FO COMPLIED WITH THE RA TO THE EXTENT NECESSARY TO DECONFLICT. I CHKED IN WITH ZKC AND TOLD THEM WE WERE GIVEN A CLB TO 15000 FT FROM KANSAS CITY DEP, RECEIVED AN RA DURING THE CLB, AND THE WHOLE PICTURE SEEMED 'A LITTLE WEIRD.' CTR REMARKED 'NO HARM, NO FOUL' AND SAID HE WOULD CHK INTO IT. ZKC CAME BACK AND SAID SOMETHING TO THE EFFECT THAT THE CLB CLRNC WAS NOT FOR US. I REPLIED RATHER ASSUREDLY THAT WE BOTH HEARD CLB TO 15000 FT AND CONTACT ZKC ON 123.8. I THEN TOLD CTR THAT IF IT WAS A MISTAKE ON OUR PART, THAT WE APOLOGIZE FOR ANY CONFUSION. A COUPLE OF FREQS DOWN THE ROAD, HIGH SECTOR ATC GAVE US A PHONE NUMBER TO CONTACT DEP UPON ARR TO PDX. LOOKING BACK AT THIS SIT, BOTH THE FO AND I WERE WELL RESTED. IT HAD NOT BEEN A LONG DUTY DAY, THE WX WAS CLR AND KANSAS CITY DEP FREQ DID NOT SOUND UNUSUALLY SATURATED, NOR DID WE HEAR OR GET THE IMPRESSION THAT WE STEPPED ON SOMEONE ELSE DURING OUR READBACK AND TOOK THEIR CLRNC. WE DID NOT HEAR A CORRECTION FROM DEP NOR THE INTENDED ACFT WHOSE CLRNC WE SUPPOSEDLY MISTOOK FOR OUR OWN, PRIOR TO US SWITCHING TO 123.8. WE STILL BELIEVE WE HEARD ACR XXX. HAVING SAID THAT, THE LESSON HERE IS FOR INCREASED DILIGENCE IN ALL AREAS OF THE FLT. IF UNSURE OF A CLRNC, OR AN ATC XMISSION IS A LITTLE WEAK IN RECEPTION, VERIFY IT AGAIN. THIS INCIDENT HAS MADE ME MORE AWARE OF JUST WHAT CAN HAPPEN DURING AN OTHERWISE ROUTINE FLT IF JUST 1 FACET OF A SERIES BTWN POINT A AND POINT B IS NOT EXECUTED PROPERLY. AS PROFESSIONALS, WE STRIVE FOR THAT PERFECT FLT. I WILL USE THIS INCIDENT TO BECOME BETTER AT MY TRADE AND TO STRIVE TO LISTEN MORE CLOSELY TO ATC XMISSIONS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 498130: WE DEPARTED MCI ON THE WILDCAT DEP, CLBED TO 10000 FT ON A DEP VECTOR HDG 270 DEGS TO INTERCEPT THE DEP RADIAL. THEN THE CAPT AND I BOTH BELIEVE WE HEARD INSTRUCTIONS FROM KANSAS CITY DEP TO 'CLB TO 15000 FT AND CONTACT ZKC ON 123.8.' AT APPROX 13000 FT WE GOT A TCASII RA TO DSND AND THE OTHER ACFT WAS DISPLAYED ON TCASII AT 10 O'CLOCK POS, SLIGHTLY HIGH, AND DSNDING. THE FO (ME) INITIATED THE INITIAL DSCNT MANEUVER AND VISUALLY PICKED UP THE OTHER ACFT AT APPROX 10 O'CLOCK, APPROX 1 MI, HDG THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION. THE CAPT THEN CHKED IN WITH ZKC AND STATED WE HAD JUST RECEIVED AN RA, AND CTR SAID HE WOULD CHK INTO IT. ZKC LATER INFORMED US THAT WE HAD MISTAKENLY TAKEN THE CLRNC FOR ANOTHER COMPANY ACFT. THE CAPT POLITELY REPLIED THAT WE BOTH BELIEVED THAT THE CALL WAS FOR US, BUT IF IT WAS A MISTAKE ON OUR PART, WE SINCERELY APOLOGIZE. APPROX 15 MINS LATER, ZKC GAVE US A PHONE NUMBER TO CALL WHEN WE LANDED IN PORTLAND IN ORDER TO DISCUSS A POSSIBLE PLT VIOLATION. LOOKING BACK ON THE SIT, THE CAPT AND I WERE BOTH WELL RESTED. THE DEP FREQ WAS NOT SATURATED. WE BOTH WERE LISTENING ATTENTIVELY TO THE RADIO. WE DID NOT GET ANY SORT OF CORRECTIVE CALL FROM KANSAS CITY DEP, NOR DID WE STEP ON ANOTHER ACFT TRYING TO ANSWER THE CLRNC CALL. HAVING SAID THAT, THE LESSON HERE IS FOR INCREASED DILIGENCE ON THE RADIOS AND IF ANY QUESTION REMAINS REGARDING AN ASSIGNED CLRNC, GET A CLARIFICATION! THIS SIT HAS MADE ME EVEN MORE AWARE THAT THERE IS NO PHASE OF FLT THAT WILL ALLOW EVEN THE SLIGHTEST BIT OF COMPLACENCY. IN THE FUTURE, I WILL ENSURE THAT I MONITOR ALL ATC RADIO XMISSIONS EVEN MORE CAREFULLY. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 497831: MULTIPLE ACFT ON FREQ. BOTH ACR Y AND ACR X WERE RESTR TO 10000 FT FOR XING ARR TFC (ACR Z AT 12000 FT). I CLBED ACR Y TO 15000 FT AND TOLD HIM TO CONTACT ZKC ON FREQ 123.8. MULTIPLE XMISSIONS OCCURRED, AND I OBSERVED ACR XX 5 NM S MCI, A DEP. I CONTACTED ACR XX AND HE ACKNOWLEDGED. I THEN OBSERVED ACR X CLBING INTO THE ALT OF ACR Z AND IMMEDIATELY ATTEMPTED TO CONTACT HIM AND REMIND HIM OF HIS ALT RESTR OF 10000 FT. ACR Z WAS ON THE ARR FREQ.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.