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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 500149 |
Time | |
Date | 200102 |
Day | Sat |
Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : atl.airport |
State Reference | GA |
Altitude | agl bound lower : 200 agl bound upper : 1500 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tower : atl.tower |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | B737-500 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Navigation In Use | ils localizer & glide slope : 26r other |
Flight Phase | descent : approach |
Route In Use | approach : instrument precision |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Controlling Facilities | tower : atl.tower |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | descent : approach |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : flight engineer pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 200 flight time total : 13000 flight time type : 6000 |
ASRS Report | 500149 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : commercial pilot : atp pilot : instrument |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 220 flight time total : 6500 flight time type : 1700 |
ASRS Report | 500158 |
Events | |
Anomaly | conflict : airborne less severe non adherence : clearance non adherence : published procedure non adherence : required legal separation |
Independent Detector | other controllera other flight crewa other flight crewb |
Resolutory Action | controller : issued advisory flight crew : landed as precaution flight crew : returned to original clearance |
Consequence | faa : reviewed incident with flight crew |
Miss Distance | horizontal : 12000 |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Flight Crew Human Performance Airport ATC Human Performance |
Primary Problem | ATC Human Performance |
Situations | |
ATC Facility | procedure or policy : atl.tower |
Narrative:
The approach controller's vectors and speed assignments put us (aircraft X) on final for runway 26R at atl, 2 mi behind an MD80 (aircraft Y) and closing. After 2 calls to the tower were ignored, we s-turned for spacing. We were approaching 1000 ft AGL and decided either the s-turn or a missed approach were our only options. The MD80 cleared the runway when we were about 200 ft AGL. Without the s-turn, a missed approach would have occurred. The tower controller chewed us out because he had to land the aircraft (aircraft Z) behind us on runway 26L, delaying 1 departure. I realize that today's environment requires us to maximize the use of our facilities. However, I feel the controller's failure to provide adequate spacing and their lack of response to our calls placed us in an extremely poor position with few options. Their emphasis on expediting departures and arrs pushed the limits of the safety envelope too far.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: ATL LCL CTLR ADMONISHES B737 FLC FOR S-TURNS ON FINAL. B737 CHALLENGES ATL SPACING AND RESPONSIVENESS TO FLC CONCERNS.
Narrative: THE APCH CTLR'S VECTORS AND SPD ASSIGNMENTS PUT US (ACFT X) ON FINAL FOR RWY 26R AT ATL, 2 MI BEHIND AN MD80 (ACFT Y) AND CLOSING. AFTER 2 CALLS TO THE TWR WERE IGNORED, WE S-TURNED FOR SPACING. WE WERE APCHING 1000 FT AGL AND DECIDED EITHER THE S-TURN OR A MISSED APCH WERE OUR ONLY OPTIONS. THE MD80 CLRED THE RWY WHEN WE WERE ABOUT 200 FT AGL. WITHOUT THE S-TURN, A MISSED APCH WOULD HAVE OCCURRED. THE TWR CTLR CHEWED US OUT BECAUSE HE HAD TO LAND THE ACFT (ACFT Z) BEHIND US ON RWY 26L, DELAYING 1 DEP. I REALIZE THAT TODAY'S ENVIRONMENT REQUIRES US TO MAXIMIZE THE USE OF OUR FACILITIES. HOWEVER, I FEEL THE CTLR'S FAILURE TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE SPACING AND THEIR LACK OF RESPONSE TO OUR CALLS PLACED US IN AN EXTREMELY POOR POS WITH FEW OPTIONS. THEIR EMPHASIS ON EXPEDITING DEPS AND ARRS PUSHED THE LIMITS OF THE SAFETY ENVELOPE TOO FAR.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.