Narrative:

This afternoon's rush resulted in an overload to the bdf hi sector. I signed in on the position to learn the howard MOA was active. We had 12 aircraft on the frequency and 25 strips. Within mins, the strips filled over 4 bays, which is approximately 60 strips. I strongly suggested to the radar controller that we needed a handoff controller. His reply was, 'if you need a handoff, get one for you, not me.' a quick evaluation of the strips showed we were going to have 20+ aircraft on the frequency in 20 mins. We then had an aircraft enter an active MOA. By that time, we were at about 5 bays of strips. I turned to the supervisor and stated, 'we should have a handoff.' the radar controller had an indignant response of, 'I will not use a handoff person.' the supervisor did not override the radar controller. Within mins we had 20-25 aircraft on the frequency. The complexity and communication volume exceeded what can or should be allowed. My workload just managing strips and point outs allowed me little time for assistance to the radar. We ended up with a vector problem that was in my opinion 'dangerous' and preventable. Even when I made separation suggestions to the radar controller, he refused to implement them. In one case, we had 2 aircraft 25 mi apart with an 800 KT closure rate that he would not use vertical separation between. Somehow, he was able to turn the 2 aircraft and maintain separation at the minima. We passed at least 2 aircraft to another sector aimed for one another with no positive separation. The next sector had less than 1 min to recognize the problem and correct it. This sector was operating way beyond any reasonable traffic volume, yet flow control did nothing to assist. Team interaction at the sector had completely broken down. It seems within part of the work force, that an attitude of 'I must take the traffic and work it alone' has established itself. Reliance of a team concept has broken down. Positive and assertive action by flow control, or supervisors, has disappeared in relation to real time traffic. Tactical assistance is unavailable. This is not the first time I have observed it. Today's event is a weekly occurrence now, and it is a recipe for disaster. We may have had a loss of separation between aircraft, but we're too busy to observe it. Someone needs to look at team action, and provide some training. Someone needs to lead a change in this macho attitude before it is too late. We were out of control today! Supplemental information from acn 503932: aircraft entered an active MOA at FL250. Aircraft had been issued a clearance which should have prevented the aircraft from entering the MOA. Radar controller attempted to turn the aircraft away without success. Limited coverage on guard frequency prevented us from contacting aircraft. Sector was no direct line to the controling facility, even though the MOA's active on a daily basis. Contact was not made with the aircraft until we coordinated with pia ATCT on 243.0. The aircraft had become NORDO after checking on our frequency. A direct communications link from our sector to the MOA would make operations much safer. Callback conversation with reporter acn 503931 revealed the following information: facility specialist advised that 2 tracons adjoining the howard MOA operate directly into and out, with direct coordination with ZKC. ZAU traffic are cleared into the MOA by ZKC after ZAU effects an automated handoff. ZAU has direct communication with ZKC -- the howard MOA controling authority/authorized. The specialist advised that there are multiple frequencys available to the bdf hi sector center. The specialist advised that it is uncommon for bdf hi to have any military aircraft rted into the MOA from the sector. Though uncommon, procedures are established for handoff and coordination with ZKC to accommodate these occurrences.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZAU CTLR CONCERNED WITH HDOF PROBS WITH MIL ACFT ENTERING ZKC -- HOWARD MOA AND PERCEIVED ZAU CTLR ATTITUDE FOR WORKING HVY, COMPLEX TFC SITS.

Narrative: THIS AFTERNOON'S RUSH RESULTED IN AN OVERLOAD TO THE BDF HI SECTOR. I SIGNED IN ON THE POS TO LEARN THE HOWARD MOA WAS ACTIVE. WE HAD 12 ACFT ON THE FREQ AND 25 STRIPS. WITHIN MINS, THE STRIPS FILLED OVER 4 BAYS, WHICH IS APPROX 60 STRIPS. I STRONGLY SUGGESTED TO THE RADAR CTLR THAT WE NEEDED A HDOF CTLR. HIS REPLY WAS, 'IF YOU NEED A HDOF, GET ONE FOR YOU, NOT ME.' A QUICK EVALUATION OF THE STRIPS SHOWED WE WERE GOING TO HAVE 20+ ACFT ON THE FREQ IN 20 MINS. WE THEN HAD AN ACFT ENTER AN ACTIVE MOA. BY THAT TIME, WE WERE AT ABOUT 5 BAYS OF STRIPS. I TURNED TO THE SUPVR AND STATED, 'WE SHOULD HAVE A HDOF.' THE RADAR CTLR HAD AN INDIGNANT RESPONSE OF, 'I WILL NOT USE A HDOF PERSON.' THE SUPVR DID NOT OVERRIDE THE RADAR CTLR. WITHIN MINS WE HAD 20-25 ACFT ON THE FREQ. THE COMPLEXITY AND COM VOLUME EXCEEDED WHAT CAN OR SHOULD BE ALLOWED. MY WORKLOAD JUST MANAGING STRIPS AND POINT OUTS ALLOWED ME LITTLE TIME FOR ASSISTANCE TO THE RADAR. WE ENDED UP WITH A VECTOR PROB THAT WAS IN MY OPINION 'DANGEROUS' AND PREVENTABLE. EVEN WHEN I MADE SEPARATION SUGGESTIONS TO THE RADAR CTLR, HE REFUSED TO IMPLEMENT THEM. IN ONE CASE, WE HAD 2 ACFT 25 MI APART WITH AN 800 KT CLOSURE RATE THAT HE WOULD NOT USE VERT SEPARATION BTWN. SOMEHOW, HE WAS ABLE TO TURN THE 2 ACFT AND MAINTAIN SEPARATION AT THE MINIMA. WE PASSED AT LEAST 2 ACFT TO ANOTHER SECTOR AIMED FOR ONE ANOTHER WITH NO POSITIVE SEPARATION. THE NEXT SECTOR HAD LESS THAN 1 MIN TO RECOGNIZE THE PROB AND CORRECT IT. THIS SECTOR WAS OPERATING WAY BEYOND ANY REASONABLE TFC VOLUME, YET FLOW CTL DID NOTHING TO ASSIST. TEAM INTERACTION AT THE SECTOR HAD COMPLETELY BROKEN DOWN. IT SEEMS WITHIN PART OF THE WORK FORCE, THAT AN ATTITUDE OF 'I MUST TAKE THE TFC AND WORK IT ALONE' HAS ESTABLISHED ITSELF. RELIANCE OF A TEAM CONCEPT HAS BROKEN DOWN. POSITIVE AND ASSERTIVE ACTION BY FLOW CTL, OR SUPVRS, HAS DISAPPEARED IN RELATION TO REAL TIME TFC. TACTICAL ASSISTANCE IS UNAVAILABLE. THIS IS NOT THE FIRST TIME I HAVE OBSERVED IT. TODAY'S EVENT IS A WKLY OCCURRENCE NOW, AND IT IS A RECIPE FOR DISASTER. WE MAY HAVE HAD A LOSS OF SEPARATION BTWN ACFT, BUT WE'RE TOO BUSY TO OBSERVE IT. SOMEONE NEEDS TO LOOK AT TEAM ACTION, AND PROVIDE SOME TRAINING. SOMEONE NEEDS TO LEAD A CHANGE IN THIS MACHO ATTITUDE BEFORE IT IS TOO LATE. WE WERE OUT OF CTL TODAY! SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 503932: ACFT ENTERED AN ACTIVE MOA AT FL250. ACFT HAD BEEN ISSUED A CLRNC WHICH SHOULD HAVE PREVENTED THE ACFT FROM ENTERING THE MOA. RADAR CTLR ATTEMPTED TO TURN THE ACFT AWAY WITHOUT SUCCESS. LIMITED COVERAGE ON GUARD FREQ PREVENTED US FROM CONTACTING ACFT. SECTOR WAS NO DIRECT LINE TO THE CTLING FACILITY, EVEN THOUGH THE MOA'S ACTIVE ON A DAILY BASIS. CONTACT WAS NOT MADE WITH THE ACFT UNTIL WE COORDINATED WITH PIA ATCT ON 243.0. THE ACFT HAD BECOME NORDO AFTER CHKING ON OUR FREQ. A DIRECT COMS LINK FROM OUR SECTOR TO THE MOA WOULD MAKE OPS MUCH SAFER. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR ACN 503931 REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: FACILITY SPECIALIST ADVISED THAT 2 TRACONS ADJOINING THE HOWARD MOA OPERATE DIRECTLY INTO AND OUT, WITH DIRECT COORD WITH ZKC. ZAU TFC ARE CLRED INTO THE MOA BY ZKC AFTER ZAU EFFECTS AN AUTOMATED HDOF. ZAU HAS DIRECT COM WITH ZKC -- THE HOWARD MOA CTLING AUTH. THE SPECIALIST ADVISED THAT THERE ARE MULTIPLE FREQS AVAILABLE TO THE BDF HI SECTOR CTR. THE SPECIALIST ADVISED THAT IT IS UNCOMMON FOR BDF HI TO HAVE ANY MIL ACFT RTED INTO THE MOA FROM THE SECTOR. THOUGH UNCOMMON, PROCS ARE ESTABLISHED FOR HDOF AND COORD WITH ZKC TO ACCOMMODATE THESE OCCURRENCES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.