Narrative:

My copilot and myself began a crash fire rescue equipment part 91 IFR flight from ptk to grr in an EMB110 turboprop. Around XA45 we were handed off to grr approach control and were being sequenced for an approach to runway 17. On the downwind we were asked to keep our speed up for traffic that was to follow. We told approach we had the airport in sight and were cleared for the visual, told to aim right for the numbers and again asked to keep our speed up. On about a 2 or 3 mi final (the distance is just an estimate) we were handed over to tower and advised them we were cleared for the visual. Tower advised us that there was traffic on runway 8L and that we were cleared to land. My copilot answered there was traffic on runway 8L and that we were cleared to land. My copilot answered that we were looking for the traffic. Tower again advised that traffic was departing runway 8L and my copilot again advised that we were looking for the traffic and I asked if we could execute a 230 degree turn. Tower did not answer the request. I began to execute a missed approach on about a 3/4 mi final when tower told me to climb to 3000 ft and maintain runway heading and contact departure and we were resequenced for landing. On the ground, I contacted tower to make sure that I had not erred. They informed me that there was no problem and that no action was to be taken. They said that they were training a controller and that he had erred. The next day I received a call from the pilot of the aircraft that was departing runway 8L and he informed me that we were less than 500 ft apart. He informed me that he would be making a near miss report with the FAA. I informed him that I never saw him and told him what the tower had said to me. Supplemental information from acn 504997: I was the PIC of a C340A. I was cleared to 'position and hold' on runway 8L. Traffic was landing on runway 17, since runway 8R/26L was closed for construction. At grr, the departure end of runway 8L is almost contiguous with the arrival end of runway 17. I was 'cleared for takeoff without delay' and directed to turn to 255 degrees after takeoff. I interpreted this to mean 'immediate' and immediately started a roll. The pilot asked if he should do a 360 degree turn, and the controller told him 'no.' I interpreted this conversation to mean that the landing plane was far enough out for me to depart safely. I observed a turboprop plane on a 1/2 mi final in a normal descent. It took per perhaps 2 seconds to see and analyze the situation. I spotted the other plane, 2 planes at the same or similar altitude on a collision course, not more that 1/4 mi apart and took immediate evasive action, a steep turn to the left. I chose a turn to the left so that I could keep the other plane in sight. Soon after initiating the left turn, the controller told me to 'turn right immediately.' however, I was already committed to the left turn and ignored the late, untimely request in light of the impending emergency. Turning right would have been a poor choice despite the decreased closure rate. It was my plan to turn inside of the other plane, which I successfully did. My plane and the landing plane passed within 500 and 1000 ft of each other. We passed as my plane was almost headed north, at almost the same altitude. I called the tower, asking 'who screwed up? Me?' as if I didn't know. I was trying to regain my composure. The controller responded with 'negative.' in a subsequent conversation with the tower supervisor, who I called the next morning, I found out that the controller was a trainee. The supervisor also offered that the trainer did not take over the situation soon enough. A better request would have been to have the other plane turn to the east as I was asked, however late, to turn to the south. In retrospect, the controller was way behind the situation. The trainer was also way behind the situation. In a subsequent conversation with the other pilot, I was told that he, on his own, initiated a go around at, from 1/2 - 1/4 mi because he was uncomfortable with the situation. He said that when looking to the west, the sun was shining in their eyes and could not see well. It was late in the afternoon and the sun could easily be a factor. The controller supervisor told me that he was 4 mi out on final when he was cleared to land and told of my departure, right after I was cleared 'without delay.' there is something wrong with this information. In the 3 conversations, lasting a total of about 2 hours that I have had with the controllers the 'facts' have changed several times. It is clear to me that they still did not have a good grasp of the situation and the timing 2 days after the incident.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: C340 CPR PLT TURNS IMMEDIATELY AFTER DEP, GRR RWY 8L, TO AVOID AN E110 ON MISSED APCH TO RWY 17. SUPVR ADVISED C340 THAT TRAINING IN PROGRESS.

Narrative: MY COPLT AND MYSELF BEGAN A CFR PART 91 IFR FLT FROM PTK TO GRR IN AN EMB110 TURBOPROP. AROUND XA45 WE WERE HANDED OFF TO GRR APCH CTL AND WERE BEING SEQUENCED FOR AN APCH TO RWY 17. ON THE DOWNWIND WE WERE ASKED TO KEEP OUR SPD UP FOR TFC THAT WAS TO FOLLOW. WE TOLD APCH WE HAD THE ARPT IN SIGHT AND WERE CLRED FOR THE VISUAL, TOLD TO AIM RIGHT FOR THE NUMBERS AND AGAIN ASKED TO KEEP OUR SPD UP. ON ABOUT A 2 OR 3 MI FINAL (THE DISTANCE IS JUST AN ESTIMATE) WE WERE HANDED OVER TO TWR AND ADVISED THEM WE WERE CLRED FOR THE VISUAL. TWR ADVISED US THAT THERE WAS TFC ON RWY 8L AND THAT WE WERE CLRED TO LAND. MY COPLT ANSWERED THERE WAS TFC ON RWY 8L AND THAT WE WERE CLRED TO LAND. MY COPLT ANSWERED THAT WE WERE LOOKING FOR THE TFC. TWR AGAIN ADVISED THAT TFC WAS DEPARTING RWY 8L AND MY COPLT AGAIN ADVISED THAT WE WERE LOOKING FOR THE TFC AND I ASKED IF WE COULD EXECUTE A 230 DEG TURN. TWR DID NOT ANSWER THE REQUEST. I BEGAN TO EXECUTE A MISSED APCH ON ABOUT A 3/4 MI FINAL WHEN TWR TOLD ME TO CLB TO 3000 FT AND MAINTAIN RWY HDG AND CONTACT DEP AND WE WERE RESEQUENCED FOR LNDG. ON THE GND, I CONTACTED TWR TO MAKE SURE THAT I HAD NOT ERRED. THEY INFORMED ME THAT THERE WAS NO PROB AND THAT NO ACTION WAS TO BE TAKEN. THEY SAID THAT THEY WERE TRAINING A CTLR AND THAT HE HAD ERRED. THE NEXT DAY I RECEIVED A CALL FROM THE PLT OF THE ACFT THAT WAS DEPARTING RWY 8L AND HE INFORMED ME THAT WE WERE LESS THAN 500 FT APART. HE INFORMED ME THAT HE WOULD BE MAKING A NEAR MISS RPT WITH THE FAA. I INFORMED HIM THAT I NEVER SAW HIM AND TOLD HIM WHAT THE TWR HAD SAID TO ME. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 504997: I WAS THE PIC OF A C340A. I WAS CLRED TO 'POS AND HOLD' ON RWY 8L. TFC WAS LNDG ON RWY 17, SINCE RWY 8R/26L WAS CLOSED FOR CONSTRUCTION. AT GRR, THE DEP END OF RWY 8L IS ALMOST CONTIGUOUS WITH THE ARR END OF RWY 17. I WAS 'CLRED FOR TKOF WITHOUT DELAY' AND DIRECTED TO TURN TO 255 DEGS AFTER TKOF. I INTERPED THIS TO MEAN 'IMMEDIATE' AND IMMEDIATELY STARTED A ROLL. THE PLT ASKED IF HE SHOULD DO A 360 DEG TURN, AND THE CTLR TOLD HIM 'NO.' I INTERPED THIS CONVERSATION TO MEAN THAT THE LNDG PLANE WAS FAR ENOUGH OUT FOR ME TO DEPART SAFELY. I OBSERVED A TURBOPROP PLANE ON A 1/2 MI FINAL IN A NORMAL DSCNT. IT TOOK PER PERHAPS 2 SECONDS TO SEE AND ANALYZE THE SIT. I SPOTTED THE OTHER PLANE, 2 PLANES AT THE SAME OR SIMILAR ALT ON A COLLISION COURSE, NOT MORE THAT 1/4 MI APART AND TOOK IMMEDIATE EVASIVE ACTION, A STEEP TURN TO THE L. I CHOSE A TURN TO THE L SO THAT I COULD KEEP THE OTHER PLANE IN SIGHT. SOON AFTER INITIATING THE L TURN, THE CTLR TOLD ME TO 'TURN R IMMEDIATELY.' HOWEVER, I WAS ALREADY COMMITTED TO THE L TURN AND IGNORED THE LATE, UNTIMELY REQUEST IN LIGHT OF THE IMPENDING EMER. TURNING R WOULD HAVE BEEN A POOR CHOICE DESPITE THE DECREASED CLOSURE RATE. IT WAS MY PLAN TO TURN INSIDE OF THE OTHER PLANE, WHICH I SUCCESSFULLY DID. MY PLANE AND THE LNDG PLANE PASSED WITHIN 500 AND 1000 FT OF EACH OTHER. WE PASSED AS MY PLANE WAS ALMOST HEADED N, AT ALMOST THE SAME ALT. I CALLED THE TWR, ASKING 'WHO SCREWED UP? ME?' AS IF I DIDN'T KNOW. I WAS TRYING TO REGAIN MY COMPOSURE. THE CTLR RESPONDED WITH 'NEGATIVE.' IN A SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATION WITH THE TWR SUPVR, WHO I CALLED THE NEXT MORNING, I FOUND OUT THAT THE CTLR WAS A TRAINEE. THE SUPVR ALSO OFFERED THAT THE TRAINER DID NOT TAKE OVER THE SIT SOON ENOUGH. A BETTER REQUEST WOULD HAVE BEEN TO HAVE THE OTHER PLANE TURN TO THE E AS I WAS ASKED, HOWEVER LATE, TO TURN TO THE S. IN RETROSPECT, THE CTLR WAS WAY BEHIND THE SIT. THE TRAINER WAS ALSO WAY BEHIND THE SIT. IN A SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATION WITH THE OTHER PLT, I WAS TOLD THAT HE, ON HIS OWN, INITIATED A GAR AT, FROM 1/2 - 1/4 MI BECAUSE HE WAS UNCOMFORTABLE WITH THE SIT. HE SAID THAT WHEN LOOKING TO THE W, THE SUN WAS SHINING IN THEIR EYES AND COULD NOT SEE WELL. IT WAS LATE IN THE AFTERNOON AND THE SUN COULD EASILY BE A FACTOR. THE CTLR SUPVR TOLD ME THAT HE WAS 4 MI OUT ON FINAL WHEN HE WAS CLRED TO LAND AND TOLD OF MY DEP, RIGHT AFTER I WAS CLRED 'WITHOUT DELAY.' THERE IS SOMETHING WRONG WITH THIS INFO. IN THE 3 CONVERSATIONS, LASTING A TOTAL OF ABOUT 2 HRS THAT I HAVE HAD WITH THE CTLRS THE 'FACTS' HAVE CHANGED SEVERAL TIMES. IT IS CLR TO ME THAT THEY STILL DID NOT HAVE A GOOD GRASP OF THE SIT AND THE TIMING 2 DAYS AFTER THE INCIDENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.