Narrative:

Cleared for takeoff from T 10 on runway 32L at O'hare, chicago. Had to abort takeoff roll at 75 KTS. First officer told tower of abort right away. Tower told us to taxi to the end. Seconds later tower clears a B767 going to brussels (heavy) for takeoff on same runway. We were still on runway downfield. Unsafe! Ord controllers are good, but capacity problems is pushing them to unsafe situations. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: callback revealed that the controller did not give an opportunity for readback of the clearance to exit at the end of the runway. No break in the transmission was made before issuing a takeoff clearance to the heavy air carrier that was next for takeoff. Hearing the issuance of the takeoff clearance, the reporter used maximum braking and a higher than normal turn off taxi speed in order to make a runway exit at a taxiway prior to the end of the runway. There was no comment from the aircraft that had been cleared for takeoff. The reporter questions that crew's level of situational awareness. When questioned, the controller said that there was adequate spacing. He did not appear, to the reporter, to be concerned. The reporter alleges that there seems to be a deteriorating level of professional attitude and compliance with standard phraseology and procedures in the effort to move the maximum amount of traffic.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR ABORTS HIS TAKEOFF, ADVISES THE LOCAL CTLR WHO ACKNOWLEDGES, ISSUES CLRNC TO CONTINUE TO THE END OF THE RWY. WITHOUT A BREAK IN THE CLRNC TRANSMISSION, A HEAVY ACR WAS CLRED FOR TAKEOFF ON THE SAME RWY.

Narrative: CLRED FOR TAKEOFF FROM T 10 ON RWY 32L AT O'HARE, CHICAGO. HAD TO ABORT TAKEOFF ROLL AT 75 KTS. FO TOLD TWR OF ABORT RIGHT AWAY. TWR TOLD US TO TAXI TO THE END. SECONDS LATER TWR CLEARS A B767 GOING TO BRUSSELS (HEAVY) FOR TAKEOFF ON SAME RWY. WE WERE STILL ON RWY DOWNFIELD. UNSAFE! ORD CTLRS ARE GOOD, BUT CAPACITY PROBS IS PUSHING THEM TO UNSAFE SITUATIONS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: CALLBACK REVEALED THAT THE CTLR DID NOT GIVE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR READBACK OF THE CLRNC TO EXIT AT THE END OF THE RWY. NO BREAK IN THE TRANSMISSION WAS MADE BEFORE ISSUING A TAKEOFF CLRNC TO THE HEAVY ACR THAT WAS NEXT FOR TAKEOFF. HEARING THE ISSUANCE OF THE TAKEOFF CLRNC, THE RPTR USED MAXIMUM BRAKING AND A HIGHER THAN NORMAL TURN OFF TAXI SPEED IN ORDER TO MAKE A RWY EXIT AT A TXWY PRIOR TO THE END OF THE RWY. THERE WAS NO COMMENT FROM THE ACFT THAT HAD BEEN CLRED FOR TAKEOFF. THE REPORTER QUESTIONS THAT CREW'S LEVEL OF SITUATIONAL AWARENESS. WHEN QUESTIONED, THE CTLR SAID THAT THERE WAS ADEQUATE SPACING. HE DID NOT APPEAR, TO THE RPTR, TO BE CONCERNED. THE RPTR ALLEGES THAT THERE SEEMS TO BE A DETERIORATING LEVEL OF PROFESSIONAL ATTITUDE AND COMPLIANCE WITH STANDARD PHRASEOLOGY AND PROCEDURES IN THE EFFORT TO MOVE THE MAXIMUM AMOUNT OF TFC.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.