Narrative:

I taxied from ramp to runup area and was informed that a twin otter was on final for runway 29. I proceeded with my runup then taxied to the hold short lines. The twin otter called his position as clam clove for runway 29. At that point the FSS person asked me if I was going to takeoff in front of the otter or wait for him to land. I took this as an indication that enough separation existed for me to depart. I visually checked final and concurred, the otter appeared to be at least 3 miles out. When I taxied out for departure the pilot of the otter said he had to make a left turn for spacing insinuating that I had infringed on his right of way. If I did taxi out too close to the traffic on final it was because I was mislead by the question from the FSS person. This situation could have been avoided if the FSS advisor had suggested I hold for the landing traffic. The callback conversation with the reporter revealed the following information: the reporter commented that there was never any real conflict. It was mostly a difference in perception as to the spacing. He later learned that there was a training situation going on in the approaching aircraft with an FAA certification in progress and the call could have been made as a precaution. The part 93 operation requires contact with FSS which operates in a tower like facility, but is restricted to advisories only. The runway has only one taxiway access. This requires taxi back after landing, thus the motivation to depart ahead of the arriving aircraft based on his determination of adequate spacing.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACFT ON APCH TO KTN, AK COMMENTS OF SPACING AS ANOTHER ACFT TAKES THE RWY FOR TAKE OFF PRIOR TO HIS LNDG. FOR PART 93 OPERATION IS IN USE WITH TFC ADVISORIES FOR FLT SERVICE.

Narrative: I TAXIED FROM RAMP TO RUNUP AREA AND WAS INFORMED THAT A TWIN OTTER WAS ON FINAL FOR RWY 29. I PROCEEDED WITH MY RUNUP THEN TAXIED TO THE HOLD SHORT LINES. THE TWIN OTTER CALLED HIS POSITION AS CLAM CLOVE FOR RWY 29. AT THAT POINT THE FSS PERSON ASKED ME IF I WAS GOING TO TKOF IN FRONT OF THE OTTER OR WAIT FOR HIM TO LAND. I TOOK THIS AS AN INDICATION THAT ENOUGH SEPARATION EXISTED FOR ME TO DEPART. I VISUALLY CHECKED FINAL AND CONCURRED, THE OTTER APPEARED TO BE AT LEAST 3 MILES OUT. WHEN I TAXIED OUT FOR DEPARTURE THE PILOT OF THE OTTER SAID HE HAD TO MAKE A LEFT TURN FOR SPACING INSINUATING THAT I HAD INFRINGED ON HIS RIGHT OF WAY. IF I DID TAXI OUT TOO CLOSE TO THE TFC ON FINAL IT WAS BECAUSE I WAS MISLEAD BY THE QUESTION FROM THE FSS PERSON. THIS SITUATION COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED IF THE FSS ADVISOR HAD SUGGESTED I HOLD FOR THE LANDING TFC. THE CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH THE RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR COMMENTED THAT THERE WAS NEVER ANY REAL CONFLICT. IT WAS MOSTLY A DIFFERENCE IN PERCEPTION AS TO THE SPACING. HE LATER LEARNED THAT THERE WAS A TRAINING SIT GOING ON IN THE APCHING ACFT WITH AN FAA CERTIFICATION IN PROGRESS AND THE CALL COULD HAVE BEEN MADE AS A PRECAUTION. THE PART 93 OPERATION REQUIRES CONTACT WITH FSS WHICH OPERATES IN A TOWER LIKE FACILITY, BUT IS RESTRICTED TO ADVISORIES ONLY. THE RWY HAS ONLY ONE TAXIWAY ACCESS. THIS REQUIRES TAXI BACK AFTER LNDG, THUS THE MOTIVATION TO DEPART AHEAD OF THE ARRIVING ACFT BASED ON HIS DETERMINATION OF ADEQUATE SPACING.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.