Narrative:

We were leaving phl :24 late, I had been to phl once in the last two years. Out pushback and engine start were 'normal.' we were told by ground to taxi to runway 27L via the ramp, H,east, and hold short of runway 27R. I saw the taxi route and the first officer was taking a very long look a the 10-9 chart because he had never had taxi instructions from our alleyway like this. We started our taxi and I looked at the brake temperatures and I was thinking of using the right brake only since the left temperatures were higher and we were heavy and had a long taxi to go. As we approached taxiway H on the ramp, there was a 737-700 waiting for us to come around the corner and turn onto taxiway H. As we rounded the corner I was looking out to make sure we had wingtip clearance. Taxiway east is a quick turn after getting onto taxiway H and when I looked out, we were looking at hold short lines for runway 17/35. I asked the first officer if we are clear to cross all runways with a taxi clearance. At this point I cleared the finals for the runways and crossed the runway. I did slow before crossing and had a sinking feeling there in my stomach. I have told myself before, that in that situation, I would stop and straighten things out. I don't know why I did not. Factors low taxi experience, not realizing how quick the turn to taxiway east would come up, and giving too much attention to the B737. Supplemental information from acn 511237: assigned to taxi J,H,east, hold short runway 27R. Missed the east taxiway, believed D was east and crossed runway 17/35 without clearance. 1)captain on first trip after IOE and first officer unfamiliar with taxi routing. 2) had charts out and thoroughly reviewed the routing before taxi. Even discussed using taxiway south to get to runway 27L for takeoff. 3) first officer monitored turn on H then went heads down with co-pilot duties. 4) first officer came heads up to help find right turn on east, but east was already behind us. 5) both pilots channeled scan to find east and mutually agreed we could cross runway 17 to get to runway 27R. 6) first officer should have prevented incident and did not. 7) review of taxi instructions should specifically include crossing intervening runways 8. If intervening runways were not part of the review (as in this case), stop!! Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter, who is a new captain with limited experience, said that he was paying too much attention to clearing the aircraft waiting on the ramp for him to pass and not on the taxi route. The taxiway has non standard surface painted signs, including hold short lines and directional signs, which contributed to lessening his situational awareness. The first officer was using the ACARS at the time to retrieve performance and loading numbers. After the incident occurred, the ATCT local controller approved continuing on taxiway H to the end of the runway. There was no traffic conflict even through the runway that was crossed without clearance was active.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN AIR CARRIER CREW CROSSES AN ACTIVE RWY WITHOUT CLRNC WHEN THEY MISS A TURN TO A POORLY MARKED TXWY THAT RAN PARALLEL TO THE RWY.

Narrative: WE WERE LEAVING PHL :24 LATE, I HAD BEEN TO PHL ONCE IN THE LAST TWO YEARS. OUT PUSHBACK AND ENGINE START WERE 'NORMAL.' WE WERE TOLD BY GND TO TAXI TO RWY 27L VIA THE RAMP, H,E, AND HOLD SHORT OF RWY 27R. I SAW THE TAXI ROUTE AND THE FO WAS TAKING A VERY LONG LOOK A THE 10-9 CHART BECAUSE HE HAD NEVER HAD TAXI INSTRUCTIONS FROM OUR ALLEYWAY LIKE THIS. WE STARTED OUR TAXI AND I LOOKED AT THE BRAKE TEMPS AND I WAS THINKING OF USING THE R BRAKE ONLY SINCE THE L TEMPS WERE HIGHER AND WE WERE HEAVY AND HAD A LONG TAXI TO GO. AS WE APPROACHED TXWY H ON THE RAMP, THERE WAS A 737-700 WAITING FOR US TO COME AROUND THE CORNER AND TURN ONTO TXWY H. AS WE ROUNDED THE CORNER I WAS LOOKING OUT TO MAKE SURE WE HAD WINGTIP CLRNC. TXWY E IS A QUICK TURN AFTER GETTING ONTO TXWY H AND WHEN I LOOKED OUT, WE WERE LOOKING AT HOLD SHORT LINES FOR RWY 17/35. I ASKED THE FO IF WE ARE CLEAR TO CROSS ALL RWYS WITH A TAXI CLRNC. AT THIS POINT I CLRED THE FINALS FOR THE RWYS AND CROSSED THE RWY. I DID SLOW BEFORE CROSSING AND HAD A SINKING FEELING THERE IN MY STOMACH. I HAVE TOLD MYSELF BEFORE, THAT IN THAT SITUATION, I WOULD STOP AND STRAIGHTEN THINGS OUT. I DON'T KNOW WHY I DID NOT. FACTORS LOW TAXI EXPERIENCE, NOT REALIZING HOW QUICK THE TURN TO TXWY E WOULD COME UP, AND GIVING TOO MUCH ATTENTION TO THE B737. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 511237: ASSIGNED TO TAXI J,H,E, HOLD SHORT RWY 27R. MISSED THE E TXWY, BELIEVED D WAS E AND CROSSED RWY 17/35 WITHOUT CLRNC. 1)CAPT ON FIRST TRIP AFTER IOE AND FO UNFAMILIAR WITH TAXI ROUTING. 2) HAD CHARTS OUT AND THOROUGHLY REVIEWED THE ROUTING BEFORE TAXI. EVEN DISCUSSED USING TXWY S TO GET TO RWY 27L FOR TAKEOFF. 3) FO MONITORED TURN ON H THEN WENT HEADS DOWN WITH CO-PILOT DUTIES. 4) FO CAME HEADS UP TO HELP FIND R TURN ON E, BUT E WAS ALREADY BEHIND US. 5) BOTH PLTS CHANNELED SCAN TO FIND E AND MUTUALLY AGREED WE COULD CROSS RWY 17 TO GET TO RWY 27R. 6) FO SHOULD HAVE PREVENTED INCIDENT AND DID NOT. 7) REVIEW OF TAXI INSTRUCTIONS SHOULD SPECIFICALLY INCLUDE CROSSING INTERVENING RWYS 8. IF INTERVENING RWYS WERE NOT PART OF THE REVIEW (AS IN THIS CASE), STOP!! CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR, WHO IS A NEW CAPT WITH LIMITED EXPERIENCE, SAID THAT HE WAS PAYING TOO MUCH ATTENTION TO CLEARING THE ACFT WAITING ON THE RAMP FOR HIM TO PASS AND NOT ON THE TAXI ROUTE. THE TXWY HAS NON STANDARD SURFACE PAINTED SIGNS, INCLUDING HOLD SHORT LINES AND DIRECTIONAL SIGNS, WHICH CONTRIBUTED TO LESSENING HIS SITUATIONAL AWARENESS. THE FO WAS USING THE ACARS AT THE TIME TO RETRIEVE PERFORMANCE AND LOADING NUMBERS. AFTER THE INCIDENT OCCURRED, THE ATCT LOCAL CTLR APPROVED CONTINUING ON TXWY H TO THE END OF THE RWY. THERE WAS NO TFC CONFLICT EVEN THROUGH THE RWY THAT WAS CROSSED WITHOUT CLRNC WAS ACTIVE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.