Narrative:

The flight was a training cross country flight from chattanooga, tn, to raleigh/durham, nc. The flight to the raleigh area was uneventful. Our request to approach control was for a VOR approach but were told we should expect an ILS approach to runway 23L. At that time we thought we had been told runway 23R and flew our approach accordingly. We then set up the localizer frequency for runway 23R and continued following approach's instructions. We had been given dscnts from our intermediate altitudes and headings of 350 degrees, then 320 degrees and finally 260 degrees at 6000 ft. There was a large amount of traffic, as could be expected at XC00 on friday. We think this was a factor, as some radio calls were stepped on and at least one was completely missed. We continued our approach to ILS runway 23R. The pilot commented to our crew that we seemed to be a bit high for our distance out, and about that time we received the call to continue our descent to 2000 ft. This made us believe that we had missed a previous call to descend, otherwise the controller would have said 'descend to' and not 'continue to' 2000 ft. We were then told to intercept the localizer for our full stop landing. The next in the sequence (at about 7 or so mi) was a call from the controller to 'turn an additional 20 degrees right for the localizer.' this further confirmed in our minds that we were going to runway 23R. Shortly after this call, we were switched to tower (this was at approximately 4-5 mi and without the field in sight). We contacted tower and were immediately told that we were lined up for the right runway but we were cleared for the left runway and that we had another aircraft just behind us on approach to runway 23R. At this time, we were probably 3-4 mi on final and were finally able to see the runway environment. I called in 'field in sight, sidestepping to the left.' I made an immediate left turn and lined up visually with the left runway and continued to land uneventfully on the left. Contributing factors: 1) large amount of friday XC00 traffic contributed to radio communication problems, including missed calls from approach. We felt we missed some calls that the approach controller made to us due to other aircraft stepping on the controller's calls. 2) we understood that we were cleared for an approach to the ILS runway 23R. We never acknowledged (confirmed by rdu's approach control tape recorder) that we were ever cleared to the left runway. 3) on a modified base leg, we were vectored to a final approach intercept angle of 50 degrees. The point of intercept was at approximately 7 mi, which was outside of visual range of the runway. Note: far aim, chapter 5-4-14, paragraph B1, states that 'aircraft will not be vectored to intercept the final approach at an angle greater than 30 degrees.' 4) at a critical point in flight (on the 50 degree vector) we were switched (frequency) to tower with an overshoot imminent. Note: far aim manual, chapter 5-4-14, paragraph B4 states that the radar monitor controller will provide the following: 'aircraft observed to overshoot the turn-on or to continue on a track which will penetrate the ntz (an area of 2000 ft wide located equidistant between parallel final approach courses) will be instructed to return to the correct final approach course immediately.' no such call was made by approach control. Instead, we were switched to tower after overshooting on an approach assigned heading to intercept the localizer. Conclusion: the factors are that the air crew mistakenly thought they were cleared to runway 23R when in fact they were cleared for runway 23L. For safely of flight reasons, the controling agency should receive acknowledgement from the pilot (in the case of simultaneous parallel approachs) as to the landing runway. If no such confirmation call has been made, approach control should query the pilot 'you are cleared runway 23L, acknowledge.' confirmation of the correct runway should be a responsibility of both the pilot and the approach controller, especially during dual runway operations with other aircraft less than 1 mi abeam.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A MIL TRAINING FLT MAKES AN INITIAL APCH TO THE WRONG RWY AT RDU, NC.

Narrative: THE FLT WAS A TRAINING XCOUNTRY FLT FROM CHATTANOOGA, TN, TO RALEIGH/DURHAM, NC. THE FLT TO THE RALEIGH AREA WAS UNEVENTFUL. OUR REQUEST TO APCH CTL WAS FOR A VOR APCH BUT WERE TOLD WE SHOULD EXPECT AN ILS APCH TO RWY 23L. AT THAT TIME WE THOUGHT WE HAD BEEN TOLD RWY 23R AND FLEW OUR APCH ACCORDINGLY. WE THEN SET UP THE LOC FREQ FOR RWY 23R AND CONTINUED FOLLOWING APCH'S INSTRUCTIONS. WE HAD BEEN GIVEN DSCNTS FROM OUR INTERMEDIATE ALTS AND HDGS OF 350 DEGS, THEN 320 DEGS AND FINALLY 260 DEGS AT 6000 FT. THERE WAS A LARGE AMOUNT OF TFC, AS COULD BE EXPECTED AT XC00 ON FRIDAY. WE THINK THIS WAS A FACTOR, AS SOME RADIO CALLS WERE STEPPED ON AND AT LEAST ONE WAS COMPLETELY MISSED. WE CONTINUED OUR APCH TO ILS RWY 23R. THE PLT COMMENTED TO OUR CREW THAT WE SEEMED TO BE A BIT HIGH FOR OUR DISTANCE OUT, AND ABOUT THAT TIME WE RECEIVED THE CALL TO CONTINUE OUR DSCNT TO 2000 FT. THIS MADE US BELIEVE THAT WE HAD MISSED A PREVIOUS CALL TO DSND, OTHERWISE THE CTLR WOULD HAVE SAID 'DSND TO' AND NOT 'CONTINUE TO' 2000 FT. WE WERE THEN TOLD TO INTERCEPT THE LOC FOR OUR FULL STOP LNDG. THE NEXT IN THE SEQUENCE (AT ABOUT 7 OR SO MI) WAS A CALL FROM THE CTLR TO 'TURN AN ADDITIONAL 20 DEGS R FOR THE LOC.' THIS FURTHER CONFIRMED IN OUR MINDS THAT WE WERE GOING TO RWY 23R. SHORTLY AFTER THIS CALL, WE WERE SWITCHED TO TWR (THIS WAS AT APPROX 4-5 MI AND WITHOUT THE FIELD IN SIGHT). WE CONTACTED TWR AND WERE IMMEDIATELY TOLD THAT WE WERE LINED UP FOR THE R RWY BUT WE WERE CLRED FOR THE L RWY AND THAT WE HAD ANOTHER ACFT JUST BEHIND US ON APCH TO RWY 23R. AT THIS TIME, WE WERE PROBABLY 3-4 MI ON FINAL AND WERE FINALLY ABLE TO SEE THE RWY ENVIRONMENT. I CALLED IN 'FIELD IN SIGHT, SIDESTEPPING TO THE L.' I MADE AN IMMEDIATE L TURN AND LINED UP VISUALLY WITH THE L RWY AND CONTINUED TO LAND UNEVENTFULLY ON THE L. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) LARGE AMOUNT OF FRIDAY XC00 TFC CONTRIBUTED TO RADIO COM PROBS, INCLUDING MISSED CALLS FROM APCH. WE FELT WE MISSED SOME CALLS THAT THE APCH CTLR MADE TO US DUE TO OTHER ACFT STEPPING ON THE CTLR'S CALLS. 2) WE UNDERSTOOD THAT WE WERE CLRED FOR AN APCH TO THE ILS RWY 23R. WE NEVER ACKNOWLEDGED (CONFIRMED BY RDU'S APCH CTL TAPE RECORDER) THAT WE WERE EVER CLRED TO THE L RWY. 3) ON A MODIFIED BASE LEG, WE WERE VECTORED TO A FINAL APCH INTERCEPT ANGLE OF 50 DEGS. THE POINT OF INTERCEPT WAS AT APPROX 7 MI, WHICH WAS OUTSIDE OF VISUAL RANGE OF THE RWY. NOTE: FAR AIM, CHAPTER 5-4-14, PARAGRAPH B1, STATES THAT 'ACFT WILL NOT BE VECTORED TO INTERCEPT THE FINAL APCH AT AN ANGLE GREATER THAN 30 DEGS.' 4) AT A CRITICAL POINT IN FLT (ON THE 50 DEG VECTOR) WE WERE SWITCHED (FREQ) TO TWR WITH AN OVERSHOOT IMMINENT. NOTE: FAR AIM MANUAL, CHAPTER 5-4-14, PARAGRAPH B4 STATES THAT THE RADAR MONITOR CTLR WILL PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING: 'ACFT OBSERVED TO OVERSHOOT THE TURN-ON OR TO CONTINUE ON A TRACK WHICH WILL PENETRATE THE NTZ (AN AREA OF 2000 FT WIDE LOCATED EQUIDISTANT BTWN PARALLEL FINAL APCH COURSES) WILL BE INSTRUCTED TO RETURN TO THE CORRECT FINAL APCH COURSE IMMEDIATELY.' NO SUCH CALL WAS MADE BY APCH CTL. INSTEAD, WE WERE SWITCHED TO TWR AFTER OVERSHOOTING ON AN APCH ASSIGNED HDG TO INTERCEPT THE LOC. CONCLUSION: THE FACTORS ARE THAT THE AIR CREW MISTAKENLY THOUGHT THEY WERE CLRED TO RWY 23R WHEN IN FACT THEY WERE CLRED FOR RWY 23L. FOR SAFELY OF FLT REASONS, THE CTLING AGENCY SHOULD RECEIVE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT FROM THE PLT (IN THE CASE OF SIMULTANEOUS PARALLEL APCHS) AS TO THE LNDG RWY. IF NO SUCH CONFIRMATION CALL HAS BEEN MADE, APCH CTL SHOULD QUERY THE PLT 'YOU ARE CLRED RWY 23L, ACKNOWLEDGE.' CONFIRMATION OF THE CORRECT RWY SHOULD BE A RESPONSIBILITY OF BOTH THE PLT AND THE APCH CTLR, ESPECIALLY DURING DUAL RWY OPS WITH OTHER ACFT LESS THAN 1 MI ABEAM.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.