Narrative:

Our company contracts with another air carrier to provide pushback personnel and equipment at this airport. Communications with the tug driver were difficult before we left the gate. He asked me to talk louder, and it was difficult for me to hear him as well. Several times when he called me, he didn't hear or respond to me at all, and several times when I called him, he did not respond. During the pushback, after the right engine was started and we were monitoring the left engine start, I realized that we were starting to move forward. There had been no discussion with the tug driver about any need to pull forward after pushback, and company procedures prohibit pulling forward with engines running. I called him several times with no response, possibly due to the headset problem. I said 'stop the aircraft! Stop! Stop!' and he finally answered me, just as I was about to shut down the engines. He said that he had to keep going because there was an aircraft that needed to go behind us. I had to be very emphatic, telling him I didn't care about the other aircraft, and that we were prohibited from pulling forward with engines running, before he stopped pulling the aircraft. In retrospect, I should have shut down both engines immediately as soon as the driver started to pull us forward. At the time, since we were being pulled slowly, not accelerating, and I expected to stop any second, I was more concerned with the communications difficulty and what I perceived to be the driver's refusal to follow my commands. Procedure: our procedure simply states, 'aircraft shall not be pulled forward while any engines are running.' there is no further explanation, rationale, or guidance. In my mind, this was an 'engine starting' consideration -- I don't start them if I know I have to be pulled forward. I believe that the reason for the procedure involves the worst-case scenario of a lightwt tug being unable to prevent forward acceleration of the aircraft or to stop if the aircraft's engines are running. From now on, I will also think of this problem as an 'engine shutdown' consideration -- if I start getting pulled forward, I'll shut down both engines immediately. Time constraint/frustration: our arrival the night before had been delayed, and our departure had been rescheduled to depart more than 1 hour late due to contractual crew rest requirements. The new departure time was coincidental with the arrival F one of our other flts, so the station was handling 2 aircraft at once. Station personnel were under pressure to have the other aircraft quickly removed from its gate and remoted, and the other captain had declined a request to ride the brakes during that process. As a result, I had 2 different station personnel in person, and one by radio all ask me if we could push well before our scheduled departure time, to help them with their logistical problem. If the departure time had not been so critical, I would have called a halt to the operation at the first indication of communications difficulty, and asked for a new headset and/or a new tug driver well before pushback. I thought the problem had been resolved. I was frustrated with the headset situation and the constant interruptions of our preflight check. This frustration affected my handling of the pushback. Fatigue: on the night prior to the incident, I arrived in my hotel room about 7 hours prior to my wake-up call, and 3 hours prior to the time I had been going to sleep for the past several days. I finally went to sleep at about the same (domicile) time that I had for the previous several days. Getting to sleep had been difficult due to sirens, slamming hotel doors, and body cycle. When I woke up at XA00 (domicile time), I'd had about 4 hours of sleep. While I didn't feel too tired to safely operate the flight, that assessment was clouded by both fatigue and habit -- we've all flown so tired so often here that it has become routine to do so. I believe 3 symptoms of fatigue were present here. First, the more tired a person is, the less accurate his own assessment will be of his level of impairment due to fatigue. Second, fatigue predisposes a person towards preoccupation with a particular task or detail,to the exclusion of other, possibly more important events. And third, a fatigued person is more likely to accept irregularities (and avoid the hassle of confrontations) that would normally be rejected, and dealt with. Recommendations: 1) faulty or improperly used headset -- assess the driver's ability to use the headset before sending the headset out for repair. 2) the driver(south) should be trained in our procedures -- the tug driver was apparently unaware of our procedure prohibiting pulling forward with engines running. 3) the driver(south) should be trained in the importance of following the captain's command. 4) company operations manual statement should be reviewed for intent and clarity -- I was thinking of the procedure as proactive (don't start the engines if...) rather than reactive (shut down the engines immediately if...). Recommendations (for the industry): influence the FAA to get a flight/duty time regulation out that addresses the realities of today's operating environment. Operational problems will be with us forever, but a pilot's ability to deal with them effectively deteriorates with fatigue. As I see it, the best way to avoid having fatigued crews is to mandate schedules that provide an opportunity for enough sleep, and consider circadian rhythm. At my airline, many schedules result in a sleep opportunity of little more than 4 hours on a fairly regular basis. Some schedules have us switching duty times from 2000-0400 to 0400-1400 twice a week, which is far legal and contractual, but leads to fatigue. The recent enforcement of the 16 hour duty time rule has helped somewhat, but I till have to argue about the regulation with crew schedulers.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B757 PIC CHALLENGES GND CREW TO STOP TUG PUSHBACK, DISTR BY GND-COCKPIT COM PROB.

Narrative: OUR COMPANY CONTRACTS WITH ANOTHER ACR TO PROVIDE PUSHBACK PERSONNEL AND EQUIP AT THIS ARPT. COMS WITH THE TUG DRIVER WERE DIFFICULT BEFORE WE LEFT THE GATE. HE ASKED ME TO TALK LOUDER, AND IT WAS DIFFICULT FOR ME TO HEAR HIM AS WELL. SEVERAL TIMES WHEN HE CALLED ME, HE DIDN'T HEAR OR RESPOND TO ME AT ALL, AND SEVERAL TIMES WHEN I CALLED HIM, HE DID NOT RESPOND. DURING THE PUSHBACK, AFTER THE R ENG WAS STARTED AND WE WERE MONITORING THE L ENG START, I REALIZED THAT WE WERE STARTING TO MOVE FORWARD. THERE HAD BEEN NO DISCUSSION WITH THE TUG DRIVER ABOUT ANY NEED TO PULL FORWARD AFTER PUSHBACK, AND COMPANY PROCS PROHIBIT PULLING FORWARD WITH ENGS RUNNING. I CALLED HIM SEVERAL TIMES WITH NO RESPONSE, POSSIBLY DUE TO THE HEADSET PROB. I SAID 'STOP THE ACFT! STOP! STOP!' AND HE FINALLY ANSWERED ME, JUST AS I WAS ABOUT TO SHUT DOWN THE ENGS. HE SAID THAT HE HAD TO KEEP GOING BECAUSE THERE WAS AN ACFT THAT NEEDED TO GO BEHIND US. I HAD TO BE VERY EMPHATIC, TELLING HIM I DIDN'T CARE ABOUT THE OTHER ACFT, AND THAT WE WERE PROHIBITED FROM PULLING FORWARD WITH ENGS RUNNING, BEFORE HE STOPPED PULLING THE ACFT. IN RETROSPECT, I SHOULD HAVE SHUT DOWN BOTH ENGS IMMEDIATELY AS SOON AS THE DRIVER STARTED TO PULL US FORWARD. AT THE TIME, SINCE WE WERE BEING PULLED SLOWLY, NOT ACCELERATING, AND I EXPECTED TO STOP ANY SECOND, I WAS MORE CONCERNED WITH THE COMS DIFFICULTY AND WHAT I PERCEIVED TO BE THE DRIVER'S REFUSAL TO FOLLOW MY COMMANDS. PROC: OUR PROC SIMPLY STATES, 'ACFT SHALL NOT BE PULLED FORWARD WHILE ANY ENGS ARE RUNNING.' THERE IS NO FURTHER EXPLANATION, RATIONALE, OR GUIDANCE. IN MY MIND, THIS WAS AN 'ENG STARTING' CONSIDERATION -- I DON'T START THEM IF I KNOW I HAVE TO BE PULLED FORWARD. I BELIEVE THAT THE REASON FOR THE PROC INVOLVES THE WORST-CASE SCENARIO OF A LIGHTWT TUG BEING UNABLE TO PREVENT FORWARD ACCELERATION OF THE ACFT OR TO STOP IF THE ACFT'S ENGS ARE RUNNING. FROM NOW ON, I WILL ALSO THINK OF THIS PROB AS AN 'ENG SHUTDOWN' CONSIDERATION -- IF I START GETTING PULLED FORWARD, I'LL SHUT DOWN BOTH ENGS IMMEDIATELY. TIME CONSTRAINT/FRUSTRATION: OUR ARR THE NIGHT BEFORE HAD BEEN DELAYED, AND OUR DEP HAD BEEN RESCHEDULED TO DEPART MORE THAN 1 HR LATE DUE TO CONTRACTUAL CREW REST REQUIREMENTS. THE NEW DEP TIME WAS COINCIDENTAL WITH THE ARR F ONE OF OUR OTHER FLTS, SO THE STATION WAS HANDLING 2 ACFT AT ONCE. STATION PERSONNEL WERE UNDER PRESSURE TO HAVE THE OTHER ACFT QUICKLY REMOVED FROM ITS GATE AND REMOTED, AND THE OTHER CAPT HAD DECLINED A REQUEST TO RIDE THE BRAKES DURING THAT PROCESS. AS A RESULT, I HAD 2 DIFFERENT STATION PERSONNEL IN PERSON, AND ONE BY RADIO ALL ASK ME IF WE COULD PUSH WELL BEFORE OUR SCHEDULED DEP TIME, TO HELP THEM WITH THEIR LOGISTICAL PROB. IF THE DEP TIME HAD NOT BEEN SO CRITICAL, I WOULD HAVE CALLED A HALT TO THE OP AT THE FIRST INDICATION OF COMS DIFFICULTY, AND ASKED FOR A NEW HEADSET AND/OR A NEW TUG DRIVER WELL BEFORE PUSHBACK. I THOUGHT THE PROB HAD BEEN RESOLVED. I WAS FRUSTRATED WITH THE HEADSET SIT AND THE CONSTANT INTERRUPTIONS OF OUR PREFLT CHK. THIS FRUSTRATION AFFECTED MY HANDLING OF THE PUSHBACK. FATIGUE: ON THE NIGHT PRIOR TO THE INCIDENT, I ARRIVED IN MY HOTEL ROOM ABOUT 7 HRS PRIOR TO MY WAKE-UP CALL, AND 3 HRS PRIOR TO THE TIME I HAD BEEN GOING TO SLEEP FOR THE PAST SEVERAL DAYS. I FINALLY WENT TO SLEEP AT ABOUT THE SAME (DOMICILE) TIME THAT I HAD FOR THE PREVIOUS SEVERAL DAYS. GETTING TO SLEEP HAD BEEN DIFFICULT DUE TO SIRENS, SLAMMING HOTEL DOORS, AND BODY CYCLE. WHEN I WOKE UP AT XA00 (DOMICILE TIME), I'D HAD ABOUT 4 HRS OF SLEEP. WHILE I DIDN'T FEEL TOO TIRED TO SAFELY OPERATE THE FLT, THAT ASSESSMENT WAS CLOUDED BY BOTH FATIGUE AND HABIT -- WE'VE ALL FLOWN SO TIRED SO OFTEN HERE THAT IT HAS BECOME ROUTINE TO DO SO. I BELIEVE 3 SYMPTOMS OF FATIGUE WERE PRESENT HERE. FIRST, THE MORE TIRED A PERSON IS, THE LESS ACCURATE HIS OWN ASSESSMENT WILL BE OF HIS LEVEL OF IMPAIRMENT DUE TO FATIGUE. SECOND, FATIGUE PREDISPOSES A PERSON TOWARDS PREOCCUPATION WITH A PARTICULAR TASK OR DETAIL,TO THE EXCLUSION OF OTHER, POSSIBLY MORE IMPORTANT EVENTS. AND THIRD, A FATIGUED PERSON IS MORE LIKELY TO ACCEPT IRREGULARITIES (AND AVOID THE HASSLE OF CONFRONTATIONS) THAT WOULD NORMALLY BE REJECTED, AND DEALT WITH. RECOMMENDATIONS: 1) FAULTY OR IMPROPERLY USED HEADSET -- ASSESS THE DRIVER'S ABILITY TO USE THE HEADSET BEFORE SENDING THE HEADSET OUT FOR REPAIR. 2) THE DRIVER(S) SHOULD BE TRAINED IN OUR PROCS -- THE TUG DRIVER WAS APPARENTLY UNAWARE OF OUR PROC PROHIBITING PULLING FORWARD WITH ENGS RUNNING. 3) THE DRIVER(S) SHOULD BE TRAINED IN THE IMPORTANCE OF FOLLOWING THE CAPT'S COMMAND. 4) COMPANY OPS MANUAL STATEMENT SHOULD BE REVIEWED FOR INTENT AND CLARITY -- I WAS THINKING OF THE PROC AS PROACTIVE (DON'T START THE ENGS IF...) RATHER THAN REACTIVE (SHUT DOWN THE ENGS IMMEDIATELY IF...). RECOMMENDATIONS (FOR THE INDUSTRY): INFLUENCE THE FAA TO GET A FLT/DUTY TIME REG OUT THAT ADDRESSES THE REALITIES OF TODAY'S OPERATING ENVIRONMENT. OPERATIONAL PROBS WILL BE WITH US FOREVER, BUT A PLT'S ABILITY TO DEAL WITH THEM EFFECTIVELY DETERIORATES WITH FATIGUE. AS I SEE IT, THE BEST WAY TO AVOID HAVING FATIGUED CREWS IS TO MANDATE SCHEDULES THAT PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR ENOUGH SLEEP, AND CONSIDER CIRCADIAN RHYTHM. AT MY AIRLINE, MANY SCHEDULES RESULT IN A SLEEP OPPORTUNITY OF LITTLE MORE THAN 4 HRS ON A FAIRLY REGULAR BASIS. SOME SCHEDULES HAVE US SWITCHING DUTY TIMES FROM 2000-0400 TO 0400-1400 TWICE A WK, WHICH IS FAR LEGAL AND CONTRACTUAL, BUT LEADS TO FATIGUE. THE RECENT ENFORCEMENT OF THE 16 HR DUTY TIME RULE HAS HELPED SOMEWHAT, BUT I TILL HAVE TO ARGUE ABOUT THE REG WITH CREW SCHEDULERS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.