Narrative:

I was acting as first officer and PNF on an airbus A319. Flight from ZZZ to pvu was a part 121 proving run for air carrier. On board was a crew of 2 pilots, 3 flight attendants, 6 FAA inspectors, and 2 observers. There were 2 FAA inspectors in the cockpit jumpseats. En route to pvu we conducted an exercise involving a simulated sick passenger. We contacted our dispatch office and received a phone patch to med-link for medical guidance. This exercise continued into the descent phase of the flight. The captain and I briefed a visual approach into provo, ut, runway 13, with a backup of the ILS approach to runway 13. At 14000 ft and approximately 10 DME from the pvu VOR, I asked for and received a vector to the ILS for runway 13 from slc approach control. The inspector on the center jump seat then said that he wanted us to fly the complete procedure using the FMS guidance. I asked for and received clearance to fly the full approach procedure. My attention was then diverted down to the mcdu to enter a holding pattern and the approach procedure. We received 2 TCASII TA's. I idented the traffic each time. I also made several TA's on the unicom CTAF frequency. We made the turn from the ffu 313 degree radial at 4 DME onto the pvu 14 DME arc. We began a descent on the approach and received a flap overspd warning. The captain was flying and immediately corrected the speed. Confign was flaps 2 degrees. Factors: the med-link exercise prevented the flight crew from completing a thorough approach briefing and setup prior to top of descent. The FAA inspector's late decision to ask for a full approach procedure. The crew's inexperience with the A319. The last min change of the approach and trying to enter the procedure in the FMS during a very busy time in the flight. Other options could have been: continue on the planned vector for an ILS approach as previously briefed. Enter a holding pattern to program the approach. Supplemental information from acn 512526: approximately 40 mins before scheduled departure from ZZZ, the FAA poi handed the captain (myself) an airworthiness directive notice stating that his boss said that 'if this airworthiness directive has not been complied with, that the proving runs are canceled.' this was the first mistake as I took it upon myself to contact maintenance control, the airbus representative, the chief pilot and dispatch to inform them of the situation and to have them resolve the question. My time was taken from the cockpit planning stage of the flight, to deal with a paperwork issue that I had no control over, this should have been dealt with at a management level. Approximately 15 mins into the flight, one of the flight attendants came to the cockpit stating that a passenger was ill, going in and out of consciousness. This was a simulated scenario setup by the flight attendant FAA inspector to observe how the crew handled the situation. Med link was given the same information (statistics of the victim) 3 times. The waste of time repeating the same information to different individuals leads me to question the true worth of this program. Due to the length of the scenario we did not complete a full briefing of the approach into provo. We asked for radar vectors to the ILS runway 13. The FAA inspector on the jump seat stated that he wanted to see a 'full approach.' unfortunately, I made the decision to proceed to the ffu VOR and comply with his request. The first officer then began to enter the various parts of the approach. Passing over the VOR, slc approach cleared us for the approach. I should have remained in the hold and waited for the first officer to complete the entries. I elected to accept the approach (poor CRM judgement on my part). As we were on the arc, I continually guided the aircraft heading with the heading knob to complete the arc. At this time we received another TA and my attention was diverted from the heading to outside the aircraft. When the traffic was idented, I put my hand back onto what I thought was the heading knob, and turned it clockwise (and must have pulled it) to bring the aircraft onto the localizer. My hand was, however, not on the heading knob but on the speed knob. This caused the aircraft to accelerate. Within a few seconds, the continuous repetitive chime and flap overspd warning ECAM message came on. I grabbed the speed knob and quickly turnedit counterclockwise and pulled it, immediately confirmed that the engines N1's (thrust) were decreasing. The aircraft was fully configured for landing at about 7000 ft MSL. Landing, rollout and parking were uneventful. Aircraft operational flight control exceedance was entered into the logbook and maintenance inspection was carried out with no abnormal findings. Contributing factors/causes: distrs and willingness to 'satisfy' the FAA. Initial distraction at the gate -- airworthiness compliance on a new 'factory aircraft' is above my pay grade. Med link scenario -- this went on far too long. I was mentally influenced by the fact that we had a passenger on board that was in and out of consciousness. I should have informed the FAA that our plan was the visual for runway 13 and that if they wanted to see the full approach I would be happy to comply after completing this flight, all they would have to do was to request that the company allow the aircraft to be used for training, or we could have used a simulator.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN A319 PIC CREATES A FLAP OVERSPD SIT DURING A PROVING RUN FLT WHILE ON AN ILS APCH INTO PROVO, UT.

Narrative: I WAS ACTING AS FO AND PNF ON AN AIRBUS A319. FLT FROM ZZZ TO PVU WAS A PART 121 PROVING RUN FOR ACR. ON BOARD WAS A CREW OF 2 PLTS, 3 FLT ATTENDANTS, 6 FAA INSPECTORS, AND 2 OBSERVERS. THERE WERE 2 FAA INSPECTORS IN THE COCKPIT JUMPSEATS. ENRTE TO PVU WE CONDUCTED AN EXERCISE INVOLVING A SIMULATED SICK PAX. WE CONTACTED OUR DISPATCH OFFICE AND RECEIVED A PHONE PATCH TO MED-LINK FOR MEDICAL GUIDANCE. THIS EXERCISE CONTINUED INTO THE DSCNT PHASE OF THE FLT. THE CAPT AND I BRIEFED A VISUAL APCH INTO PROVO, UT, RWY 13, WITH A BACKUP OF THE ILS APCH TO RWY 13. AT 14000 FT AND APPROX 10 DME FROM THE PVU VOR, I ASKED FOR AND RECEIVED A VECTOR TO THE ILS FOR RWY 13 FROM SLC APCH CTL. THE INSPECTOR ON THE CTR JUMP SEAT THEN SAID THAT HE WANTED US TO FLY THE COMPLETE PROC USING THE FMS GUIDANCE. I ASKED FOR AND RECEIVED CLRNC TO FLY THE FULL APCH PROC. MY ATTN WAS THEN DIVERTED DOWN TO THE MCDU TO ENTER A HOLDING PATTERN AND THE APCH PROC. WE RECEIVED 2 TCASII TA'S. I IDENTED THE TFC EACH TIME. I ALSO MADE SEVERAL TA'S ON THE UNICOM CTAF FREQ. WE MADE THE TURN FROM THE FFU 313 DEG RADIAL AT 4 DME ONTO THE PVU 14 DME ARC. WE BEGAN A DSCNT ON THE APCH AND RECEIVED A FLAP OVERSPD WARNING. THE CAPT WAS FLYING AND IMMEDIATELY CORRECTED THE SPD. CONFIGN WAS FLAPS 2 DEGS. FACTORS: THE MED-LINK EXERCISE PREVENTED THE FLC FROM COMPLETING A THOROUGH APCH BRIEFING AND SETUP PRIOR TO TOP OF DSCNT. THE FAA INSPECTOR'S LATE DECISION TO ASK FOR A FULL APCH PROC. THE CREW'S INEXPERIENCE WITH THE A319. THE LAST MIN CHANGE OF THE APCH AND TRYING TO ENTER THE PROC IN THE FMS DURING A VERY BUSY TIME IN THE FLT. OTHER OPTIONS COULD HAVE BEEN: CONTINUE ON THE PLANNED VECTOR FOR AN ILS APCH AS PREVIOUSLY BRIEFED. ENTER A HOLDING PATTERN TO PROGRAM THE APCH. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 512526: APPROX 40 MINS BEFORE SCHEDULED DEP FROM ZZZ, THE FAA POI HANDED THE CAPT (MYSELF) AN AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE NOTICE STATING THAT HIS BOSS SAID THAT 'IF THIS AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE HAS NOT BEEN COMPLIED WITH, THAT THE PROVING RUNS ARE CANCELED.' THIS WAS THE FIRST MISTAKE AS I TOOK IT UPON MYSELF TO CONTACT MAINT CTL, THE AIRBUS REPRESENTATIVE, THE CHIEF PLT AND DISPATCH TO INFORM THEM OF THE SIT AND TO HAVE THEM RESOLVE THE QUESTION. MY TIME WAS TAKEN FROM THE COCKPIT PLANNING STAGE OF THE FLT, TO DEAL WITH A PAPERWORK ISSUE THAT I HAD NO CTL OVER, THIS SHOULD HAVE BEEN DEALT WITH AT A MGMNT LEVEL. APPROX 15 MINS INTO THE FLT, ONE OF THE FLT ATTENDANTS CAME TO THE COCKPIT STATING THAT A PAX WAS ILL, GOING IN AND OUT OF CONSCIOUSNESS. THIS WAS A SIMULATED SCENARIO SETUP BY THE FLT ATTENDANT FAA INSPECTOR TO OBSERVE HOW THE CREW HANDLED THE SIT. MED LINK WAS GIVEN THE SAME INFO (STATISTICS OF THE VICTIM) 3 TIMES. THE WASTE OF TIME REPEATING THE SAME INFO TO DIFFERENT INDIVIDUALS LEADS ME TO QUESTION THE TRUE WORTH OF THIS PROGRAM. DUE TO THE LENGTH OF THE SCENARIO WE DID NOT COMPLETE A FULL BRIEFING OF THE APCH INTO PROVO. WE ASKED FOR RADAR VECTORS TO THE ILS RWY 13. THE FAA INSPECTOR ON THE JUMP SEAT STATED THAT HE WANTED TO SEE A 'FULL APCH.' UNFORTUNATELY, I MADE THE DECISION TO PROCEED TO THE FFU VOR AND COMPLY WITH HIS REQUEST. THE FO THEN BEGAN TO ENTER THE VARIOUS PARTS OF THE APCH. PASSING OVER THE VOR, SLC APCH CLRED US FOR THE APCH. I SHOULD HAVE REMAINED IN THE HOLD AND WAITED FOR THE FO TO COMPLETE THE ENTRIES. I ELECTED TO ACCEPT THE APCH (POOR CRM JUDGEMENT ON MY PART). AS WE WERE ON THE ARC, I CONTINUALLY GUIDED THE ACFT HDG WITH THE HDG KNOB TO COMPLETE THE ARC. AT THIS TIME WE RECEIVED ANOTHER TA AND MY ATTN WAS DIVERTED FROM THE HDG TO OUTSIDE THE ACFT. WHEN THE TFC WAS IDENTED, I PUT MY HAND BACK ONTO WHAT I THOUGHT WAS THE HDG KNOB, AND TURNED IT CLOCKWISE (AND MUST HAVE PULLED IT) TO BRING THE ACFT ONTO THE LOC. MY HAND WAS, HOWEVER, NOT ON THE HDG KNOB BUT ON THE SPD KNOB. THIS CAUSED THE ACFT TO ACCELERATE. WITHIN A FEW SECONDS, THE CONTINUOUS REPETITIVE CHIME AND FLAP OVERSPD WARNING ECAM MESSAGE CAME ON. I GRABBED THE SPD KNOB AND QUICKLY TURNEDIT COUNTERCLOCKWISE AND PULLED IT, IMMEDIATELY CONFIRMED THAT THE ENGS N1'S (THRUST) WERE DECREASING. THE ACFT WAS FULLY CONFIGURED FOR LNDG AT ABOUT 7000 FT MSL. LNDG, ROLLOUT AND PARKING WERE UNEVENTFUL. ACFT OPERATIONAL FLT CTL EXCEEDANCE WAS ENTERED INTO THE LOGBOOK AND MAINT INSPECTION WAS CARRIED OUT WITH NO ABNORMAL FINDINGS. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS/CAUSES: DISTRS AND WILLINGNESS TO 'SATISFY' THE FAA. INITIAL DISTR AT THE GATE -- AIRWORTHINESS COMPLIANCE ON A NEW 'FACTORY ACFT' IS ABOVE MY PAY GRADE. MED LINK SCENARIO -- THIS WENT ON FAR TOO LONG. I WAS MENTALLY INFLUENCED BY THE FACT THAT WE HAD A PAX ON BOARD THAT WAS IN AND OUT OF CONSCIOUSNESS. I SHOULD HAVE INFORMED THE FAA THAT OUR PLAN WAS THE VISUAL FOR RWY 13 AND THAT IF THEY WANTED TO SEE THE FULL APCH I WOULD BE HAPPY TO COMPLY AFTER COMPLETING THIS FLT, ALL THEY WOULD HAVE TO DO WAS TO REQUEST THAT THE COMPANY ALLOW THE ACFT TO BE USED FOR TRAINING, OR WE COULD HAVE USED A SIMULATOR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.