Narrative:

Seatbelt sign off on takeoff, altitude excursion. Departed the gate to a 1 hour 31 min WX hold, where we shut down and restarted engines. When #1 departures were restopped, I shut down 1 engine and turned off high load electrical items and the seatbelt sign. Upon release, restarted all engines and made PA to fasten seatbelts. Departed normally weaving around WX. While climbing, I made PA 'flight attendants remain in your seats.' approaching 15000 ft, received 3 calls from flight attendants about getting up. Was also evaluating the WX to find the promised 'hole.' flight attendant called to say 'turn on the seatbelt sign,' which I did. I assume I forgot to turn it on on the ground, as I didn't cycle the no smoke or touch the seatbelt sign. On leveloff at 15000 ft, the first officer was still hand flying and overshot to 15300 ft before I could intercede. He was using inappropriate FGS modes, and overshot the leveloff at 17000 ft to 17300 ft also, still hand flying. He then was puzzled about the controls and FGS. He eventually engaged the autoplt. I considered comments to help and almost took control of the aircraft, but did not choose to do so because of the tension in the cockpit caused by the month of conflict between us. I will detail this completely to professional standards. I felt his usual reaction to my inputs might delay returning the aircraft to assigned altitude. This is my first problem first officer and maybe I did not assume control quick enough. Factors include: extensive delays for WX the 2 days -- 9.59 layover at lga, flight attendant distrs, calls to hou approach the night before over messed up departure clearance day prior -- not our fault -- general poor crew interactions despite my efforts during the month.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MD80 CREW FORGOT TO TURN PAX SEATBELT SIGN ON BEFORE TKOF AND HAD 2 MINOR ALT OVERSHOOTS.

Narrative: SEATBELT SIGN OFF ON TKOF, ALT EXCURSION. DEPARTED THE GATE TO A 1 HR 31 MIN WX HOLD, WHERE WE SHUT DOWN AND RESTARTED ENGS. WHEN #1 DEPS WERE RESTOPPED, I SHUT DOWN 1 ENG AND TURNED OFF HIGH LOAD ELECTRICAL ITEMS AND THE SEATBELT SIGN. UPON RELEASE, RESTARTED ALL ENGS AND MADE PA TO FASTEN SEATBELTS. DEPARTED NORMALLY WEAVING AROUND WX. WHILE CLBING, I MADE PA 'FLT ATTENDANTS REMAIN IN YOUR SEATS.' APCHING 15000 FT, RECEIVED 3 CALLS FROM FLT ATTENDANTS ABOUT GETTING UP. WAS ALSO EVALUATING THE WX TO FIND THE PROMISED 'HOLE.' FLT ATTENDANT CALLED TO SAY 'TURN ON THE SEATBELT SIGN,' WHICH I DID. I ASSUME I FORGOT TO TURN IT ON ON THE GND, AS I DIDN'T CYCLE THE NO SMOKE OR TOUCH THE SEATBELT SIGN. ON LEVELOFF AT 15000 FT, THE FO WAS STILL HAND FLYING AND OVERSHOT TO 15300 FT BEFORE I COULD INTERCEDE. HE WAS USING INAPPROPRIATE FGS MODES, AND OVERSHOT THE LEVELOFF AT 17000 FT TO 17300 FT ALSO, STILL HAND FLYING. HE THEN WAS PUZZLED ABOUT THE CTLS AND FGS. HE EVENTUALLY ENGAGED THE AUTOPLT. I CONSIDERED COMMENTS TO HELP AND ALMOST TOOK CTL OF THE ACFT, BUT DID NOT CHOOSE TO DO SO BECAUSE OF THE TENSION IN THE COCKPIT CAUSED BY THE MONTH OF CONFLICT BTWN US. I WILL DETAIL THIS COMPLETELY TO PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS. I FELT HIS USUAL REACTION TO MY INPUTS MIGHT DELAY RETURNING THE ACFT TO ASSIGNED ALT. THIS IS MY FIRST PROB FO AND MAYBE I DID NOT ASSUME CTL QUICK ENOUGH. FACTORS INCLUDE: EXTENSIVE DELAYS FOR WX THE 2 DAYS -- 9.59 LAYOVER AT LGA, FLT ATTENDANT DISTRS, CALLS TO HOU APCH THE NIGHT BEFORE OVER MESSED UP DEP CLRNC DAY PRIOR -- NOT OUR FAULT -- GENERAL POOR CREW INTERACTIONS DESPITE MY EFFORTS DURING THE MONTH.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.