Narrative:

On jun/xa/01, I was instructed to work on the nose landing gear replacement on aircraft. Previous shift had completed up to work step xya of air carrier work card nose landing gear replacement. I complied with work steps xyz to xyc to include attaching the nose landing gear activating cylinder, reinstalling nosewheel and servicing the nose landing gear strut along with lubrication of the nose landing gear assembly. When done with that, I assisted another technician with the cable rig of the ground sense control cables and the nose landing gear steering system by running for parts and verifying cable tension charts and work steps from the maintenance manual because of the confined work area in the nosewheel well area. Once the ground sense and the nose landing gear steering system rigging was completed, I moved on to the nose gear steering functional check. By this time it was the end of my work shift and I turned it over to the next shift mechanic verbally and with a written turnover. All that remained was to do a landing gear retract/extension functional check and reconnect the gear doors. The following day on the first flight out, the pilot had problems retracting the landing gear and with pressurizing the aircraft cabin. It was brought back and the ground sense system was rerigged and a functional check performed again. In my opinion the landing gear retraction problem never should have made it past the functional chkout and the rigging procedure for the ground shift/sense system in the aircraft maintenance manual leaves too much room for error. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter stated the maintenance manual has no clear and concise procedure for replacing the nose landing gear. The reporter said the manual skips to separate nose gear components and contains errors never corrected.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A DC9-10 AFTER TKOF RETURNED TO THE FIELD DUE TO UNABLE TO RETRACT THE NOSE LNDG GEAR. CAUSED BY CONFUSING AND ERROR PRONE MANUAL RIGGING AND TEST PROCS.

Narrative: ON JUN/XA/01, I WAS INSTRUCTED TO WORK ON THE NOSE LNDG GEAR REPLACEMENT ON ACFT. PREVIOUS SHIFT HAD COMPLETED UP TO WORK STEP XYA OF ACR WORK CARD NOSE LNDG GEAR REPLACEMENT. I COMPLIED WITH WORK STEPS XYZ TO XYC TO INCLUDE ATTACHING THE NOSE LNDG GEAR ACTIVATING CYLINDER, REINSTALLING NOSEWHEEL AND SVCING THE NOSE LNDG GEAR STRUT ALONG WITH LUBRICATION OF THE NOSE LNDG GEAR ASSEMBLY. WHEN DONE WITH THAT, I ASSISTED ANOTHER TECHNICIAN WITH THE CABLE RIG OF THE GND SENSE CTL CABLES AND THE NOSE LNDG GEAR STEERING SYS BY RUNNING FOR PARTS AND VERIFYING CABLE TENSION CHARTS AND WORK STEPS FROM THE MAINT MANUAL BECAUSE OF THE CONFINED WORK AREA IN THE NOSEWHEEL WELL AREA. ONCE THE GND SENSE AND THE NOSE LNDG GEAR STEERING SYS RIGGING WAS COMPLETED, I MOVED ON TO THE NOSE GEAR STEERING FUNCTIONAL CHK. BY THIS TIME IT WAS THE END OF MY WORK SHIFT AND I TURNED IT OVER TO THE NEXT SHIFT MECH VERBALLY AND WITH A WRITTEN TURNOVER. ALL THAT REMAINED WAS TO DO A LNDG GEAR RETRACT/EXTENSION FUNCTIONAL CHK AND RECONNECT THE GEAR DOORS. THE FOLLOWING DAY ON THE FIRST FLT OUT, THE PLT HAD PROBS RETRACTING THE LNDG GEAR AND WITH PRESSURIZING THE ACFT CABIN. IT WAS BROUGHT BACK AND THE GND SENSE SYS WAS RERIGGED AND A FUNCTIONAL CHK PERFORMED AGAIN. IN MY OPINION THE LNDG GEAR RETRACTION PROB NEVER SHOULD HAVE MADE IT PAST THE FUNCTIONAL CHKOUT AND THE RIGGING PROC FOR THE GND SHIFT/SENSE SYS IN THE ACFT MAINT MANUAL LEAVES TOO MUCH ROOM FOR ERROR. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THE MAINT MANUAL HAS NO CLR AND CONCISE PROC FOR REPLACING THE NOSE LNDG GEAR. THE RPTR SAID THE MANUAL SKIPS TO SEPARATE NOSE GEAR COMPONENTS AND CONTAINS ERRORS NEVER CORRECTED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.