Narrative:

On downwind to runway 16R, the first officer (PF) wanted to slow the aircraft to 200 KTS. Approach was assigning airspds to arriving aircraft, therefore, we tried to call and request slower. We were unable due to constant and rapid communication by approach control. By the time we were turned on base leg, we were going to be on a long enough final, I believed we would have time to decelerate and I did not request a slower airspeed. Approach turned us on a dogleg and slowed us to 200 KTS. They asked us if we had a visual on the field. When we called visual, we were cleared for a visual approach. Unfortunately, they did not call our interval until we rolled wings level on final. At that position they said we were 2.5 mi behind our interval and to slow down. The first officer had slowed to 200 KTS. He said this is not going to work. I was thinking we could if we dirtied the aircraft. I suggested that he get the flaps down and dirty the aircraft. Before we could start this, we began to receive a 'descend, descend' RA due to an airbus on final for runway 16L approximately .5 - 1 NM behind us. We complied with the RA. Now our rate of descent not only precluded us from decelerating to our approach speed, we were going below the glide path. Again we were unable to communicate with approach to inform them of our compliance with an RA due to their rapid and constant communication on the frequency. During this time we began getting the gear and flaps down. We received the clear of conflict and approach calls and said we could make s-turns to the right. This is the last transmission I remember receiving from approach. I am not even sure I acknowledged the transmission. I was now very uncomfortable with our position and feeling very behind the airplane. The first officer began a turn to the right. I suggested that we go around. I don't think he heard me so I said 'go around.' we accomplished the go around without communicating our intentions to approach because, again, of the constant and rapid verbiage from approach over the frequency. We were level at our missed approach altitude within .5 NM of the airport when I was finally able to inform approach of our missed approach. His response was to inform us we should be 'up' tower frequency. I switched to tower and they said we should be 'up' approach. I informed the tower controller that approach sent us to them and asked for a frequency for the missed approach. They gave us a departure frequency which we switched to and checked in. The second approach and landing was normal. First, this was a good lesson for me as it illustrated how quickly I could get behind this airplane because of its slow deceleration rate. As a new captain on the B737, and after almost 9 yrs on the fokker 100, I incorrectly assumed the airplane would decelerate better than it did. When the first officer said 'this is not going to work,' I should have believed him and commanded a go around at that point. Because I did not, I ended up behind the airplane and in a potentially unsafe situation. Second, I was thoroughly frustrated with our inability to communication with approach. It seemed to me they were trying to put 10 pounds in a 5 pound bag. I was never able to communication about our need for slower airspeed, the RA or the missed approach due to their nonstop communication on the frequency. In fact, the controller was operating out of a state of mind I consider synonymous with what we call 'rush to comply' in the cockpit. Why is it ok for ATC to operate in that mode yet it is considered unsafe for pilots? I think the hurried environment set by ATC was more precipitous to our go around than any operational shortcomings by me in the cockpit. Last, the controllers seemed to be more concerned with making accusations than being proactive. When I was finally able to communication our missed approach with approach his only concern was to inform me that I should have been 'up' tower. When I checked in with tower, it was the same. His only concern was to inform me I should have been 'up' with approach. It was as if no one had a clue about what should be accomplished with us. It took me giving the tower controller a hint by asking for a frequency before we received instruction following our missed approach. Pointing out any perceived error on my part without clear operational control is counterproductive and potentially unsafe to say the least.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DURING A BUSY TFC PERIOD AND FREQ ON APCH INTO SEA, A B737 CREW WERE UNABLE TO OBTAIN CLRNC TO SLOW DOWN AND CONSEQUENTLY MISSED APCH.

Narrative: ON DOWNWIND TO RWY 16R, THE FO (PF) WANTED TO SLOW THE ACFT TO 200 KTS. APCH WAS ASSIGNING AIRSPDS TO ARRIVING ACFT, THEREFORE, WE TRIED TO CALL AND REQUEST SLOWER. WE WERE UNABLE DUE TO CONSTANT AND RAPID COM BY APCH CTL. BY THE TIME WE WERE TURNED ON BASE LEG, WE WERE GOING TO BE ON A LONG ENOUGH FINAL, I BELIEVED WE WOULD HAVE TIME TO DECELERATE AND I DID NOT REQUEST A SLOWER AIRSPD. APCH TURNED US ON A DOGLEG AND SLOWED US TO 200 KTS. THEY ASKED US IF WE HAD A VISUAL ON THE FIELD. WHEN WE CALLED VISUAL, WE WERE CLRED FOR A VISUAL APCH. UNFORTUNATELY, THEY DID NOT CALL OUR INTERVAL UNTIL WE ROLLED WINGS LEVEL ON FINAL. AT THAT POS THEY SAID WE WERE 2.5 MI BEHIND OUR INTERVAL AND TO SLOW DOWN. THE FO HAD SLOWED TO 200 KTS. HE SAID THIS IS NOT GOING TO WORK. I WAS THINKING WE COULD IF WE DIRTIED THE ACFT. I SUGGESTED THAT HE GET THE FLAPS DOWN AND DIRTY THE ACFT. BEFORE WE COULD START THIS, WE BEGAN TO RECEIVE A 'DSND, DSND' RA DUE TO AN AIRBUS ON FINAL FOR RWY 16L APPROX .5 - 1 NM BEHIND US. WE COMPLIED WITH THE RA. NOW OUR RATE OF DSCNT NOT ONLY PRECLUDED US FROM DECELERATING TO OUR APCH SPD, WE WERE GOING BELOW THE GLIDE PATH. AGAIN WE WERE UNABLE TO COMMUNICATE WITH APCH TO INFORM THEM OF OUR COMPLIANCE WITH AN RA DUE TO THEIR RAPID AND CONSTANT COM ON THE FREQ. DURING THIS TIME WE BEGAN GETTING THE GEAR AND FLAPS DOWN. WE RECEIVED THE CLR OF CONFLICT AND APCH CALLS AND SAID WE COULD MAKE S-TURNS TO THE R. THIS IS THE LAST XMISSION I REMEMBER RECEIVING FROM APCH. I AM NOT EVEN SURE I ACKNOWLEDGED THE XMISSION. I WAS NOW VERY UNCOMFORTABLE WITH OUR POS AND FEELING VERY BEHIND THE AIRPLANE. THE FO BEGAN A TURN TO THE R. I SUGGESTED THAT WE GO AROUND. I DON'T THINK HE HEARD ME SO I SAID 'GO AROUND.' WE ACCOMPLISHED THE GAR WITHOUT COMMUNICATING OUR INTENTIONS TO APCH BECAUSE, AGAIN, OF THE CONSTANT AND RAPID VERBIAGE FROM APCH OVER THE FREQ. WE WERE LEVEL AT OUR MISSED APCH ALT WITHIN .5 NM OF THE ARPT WHEN I WAS FINALLY ABLE TO INFORM APCH OF OUR MISSED APCH. HIS RESPONSE WAS TO INFORM US WE SHOULD BE 'UP' TWR FREQ. I SWITCHED TO TWR AND THEY SAID WE SHOULD BE 'UP' APCH. I INFORMED THE TWR CTLR THAT APCH SENT US TO THEM AND ASKED FOR A FREQ FOR THE MISSED APCH. THEY GAVE US A DEP FREQ WHICH WE SWITCHED TO AND CHKED IN. THE SECOND APCH AND LNDG WAS NORMAL. FIRST, THIS WAS A GOOD LESSON FOR ME AS IT ILLUSTRATED HOW QUICKLY I COULD GET BEHIND THIS AIRPLANE BECAUSE OF ITS SLOW DECELERATION RATE. AS A NEW CAPT ON THE B737, AND AFTER ALMOST 9 YRS ON THE FOKKER 100, I INCORRECTLY ASSUMED THE AIRPLANE WOULD DECELERATE BETTER THAN IT DID. WHEN THE FO SAID 'THIS IS NOT GOING TO WORK,' I SHOULD HAVE BELIEVED HIM AND COMMANDED A GAR AT THAT POINT. BECAUSE I DID NOT, I ENDED UP BEHIND THE AIRPLANE AND IN A POTENTIALLY UNSAFE SIT. SECOND, I WAS THOROUGHLY FRUSTRATED WITH OUR INABILITY TO COM WITH APCH. IT SEEMED TO ME THEY WERE TRYING TO PUT 10 LBS IN A 5 LB BAG. I WAS NEVER ABLE TO COM ABOUT OUR NEED FOR SLOWER AIRSPD, THE RA OR THE MISSED APCH DUE TO THEIR NONSTOP COM ON THE FREQ. IN FACT, THE CTLR WAS OPERATING OUT OF A STATE OF MIND I CONSIDER SYNONYMOUS WITH WHAT WE CALL 'RUSH TO COMPLY' IN THE COCKPIT. WHY IS IT OK FOR ATC TO OPERATE IN THAT MODE YET IT IS CONSIDERED UNSAFE FOR PLTS? I THINK THE HURRIED ENVIRONMENT SET BY ATC WAS MORE PRECIPITOUS TO OUR GAR THAN ANY OPERATIONAL SHORTCOMINGS BY ME IN THE COCKPIT. LAST, THE CTLRS SEEMED TO BE MORE CONCERNED WITH MAKING ACCUSATIONS THAN BEING PROACTIVE. WHEN I WAS FINALLY ABLE TO COM OUR MISSED APCH WITH APCH HIS ONLY CONCERN WAS TO INFORM ME THAT I SHOULD HAVE BEEN 'UP' TWR. WHEN I CHKED IN WITH TWR, IT WAS THE SAME. HIS ONLY CONCERN WAS TO INFORM ME I SHOULD HAVE BEEN 'UP' WITH APCH. IT WAS AS IF NO ONE HAD A CLUE ABOUT WHAT SHOULD BE ACCOMPLISHED WITH US. IT TOOK ME GIVING THE TWR CTLR A HINT BY ASKING FOR A FREQ BEFORE WE RECEIVED INSTRUCTION FOLLOWING OUR MISSED APCH. POINTING OUT ANY PERCEIVED ERROR ON MY PART WITHOUT CLR OPERATIONAL CTL IS COUNTERPRODUCTIVE AND POTENTIALLY UNSAFE TO SAY THE LEAST.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.