B737-400 crew forgot to extend the flaps for takeoff.

Attributes
ACN	519070
Time
Date	200107
Day	Tue
Place
Locale Reference	airport : jnu.airport
State Reference	AK
Altitude	agl single value : 0
Environment
Flight Conditions	VMC
Light	Daylight
Aircraft 1
Controlling Facilities	tower : sts.tower
Make Model Name	B737-400
Flight Phase	ground : takeoff roll
Flight Plan	IFR
Person 1
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : captain oversight : pic
Qualification	pilot : atp pilot : instrument
Experience	flight time last 90 days : 130 flight time total : 7000 flight time type : 4500
ASRS Report	519070
Events
Anomaly	non adherence : company policies non adherence : far non adherence : published procedure
Resolutory Action	flight crew : rejected takeoff other
Supplementary
Problem Areas	Company Flight Crew Human Performance
Primary Problem	Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative:

After pushback and engine start at pajn, the first officer switched off ground frequency to get the takeoff data (loads, weight and balance, fuel) from operations. I was talking to ground and given taxi instructions to get out of the way of traffic behind us. The first officer was busy doing performance data and programming the FMC. I was getting our amended clearance from ground control. We were #1 for takeoff and switched to tower frequency before the first officer was ready for checklists. The taxi and takeoff checks were done in rapid succession and I responded to the flaps challenge with the normal response. We missed that the flaps were not in the takeoff position. The takeoff/confign warning horn sounded as we began our takeoff roll. The takeoff was immediately aborted. We obtained a ground speed of approximately 15 KTS and taxied clear of the runway. Per our company manuals, we repositioned the flaps and taxied back for the subsequent takeoff. We need to recognize and react to the warning sign of being rushed in our normal duties/flows/checklists and special departure procedures and then make the deliberate action of slowing down. I will physically verify every response by touching the lever, switch or gauge. This will not only ensure correct responses but also slow down the checklist.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-400 CREW FORGOT TO EXTEND THE FLAPS FOR TKOF.

Narrative: AFTER PUSHBACK AND ENG START AT PAJN, THE FO SWITCHED OFF GND FREQ TO GET THE TKOF DATA (LOADS, WT AND BAL, FUEL) FROM OPS. I WAS TALKING TO GND AND GIVEN TAXI INSTRUCTIONS TO GET OUT OF THE WAY OF TFC BEHIND US. THE FO WAS BUSY DOING PERFORMANCE DATA AND PROGRAMMING THE FMC. I WAS GETTING OUR AMENDED CLRNC FROM GND CTL. WE WERE #1 FOR TKOF AND SWITCHED TO TWR FREQ BEFORE THE FO WAS READY FOR CHKLISTS. THE TAXI AND TKOF CHKS WERE DONE IN RAPID SUCCESSION AND I RESPONDED TO THE FLAPS CHALLENGE WITH THE NORMAL RESPONSE. WE MISSED THAT THE FLAPS WERE NOT IN THE TKOF POS. THE TKOF/CONFIGN WARNING HORN SOUNDED AS WE BEGAN OUR TKOF ROLL. THE TKOF WAS IMMEDIATELY ABORTED. WE OBTAINED A GND SPD OF APPROX 15 KTS AND TAXIED CLR OF THE RWY. PER OUR COMPANY MANUALS, WE REPOSITIONED THE FLAPS AND TAXIED BACK FOR THE SUBSEQUENT TKOF. WE NEED TO RECOGNIZE AND REACT TO THE WARNING SIGN OF BEING RUSHED IN OUR NORMAL DUTIES/FLOWS/CHKLISTS AND SPECIAL DEP PROCS AND THEN MAKE THE DELIBERATE ACTION OF SLOWING DOWN. I WILL PHYSICALLY VERIFY EVERY RESPONSE BY TOUCHING THE LEVER, SWITCH OR GAUGE. THIS WILL NOT ONLY ENSURE CORRECT RESPONSES BUT ALSO SLOW DOWN THE CHKLIST.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.