Narrative:

During flight planning we noticed numerous entries for problems with the right engine bleed valve, including an entry on the previous flight, 'bleed off engine right during taxi, applied power bleed returned to normal. Maintenance replaced hpsov per MM operations normal.' at this point this item was cleared. Pushback and taxi were begun with all systems normal. Taxi was from gate to runway 1R. During taxi right engine bleed light and icas bleed off engine right came on. I asked relief first officer to contact maintenance control. During taxi to see if the problem could be solved contact was established and main control asked if we could run the engine up from idle to see if that solved the problem. As the taxi was progressing, I ran the right engine to approximately 55% N1. This had no effect. We cycled the right engine bleed switch off then on the valve opened, however, after a few seconds, the light came back on. This was done twice with the same result. We parked in the run up area for runway 1R. At this time dispatch joined us on the conference call and maintenance control sent 3 pages of MEL items for dispatch with 'right engine bleed off' to our printer. With the aircraft parked and the first officer monitoring the radio on ground control I joined the conference call. First officer, maintenance control, dispatch, and myself spoke on the conference call for several mins. Our conference call with dispatch and maintenance control led us to focus on part of the MEL that stated, 'dispatching beyond 120 min from a suitable airport with reduced anti-ice capabilities will normally be avoided unless flight conditions are acceptable to flight crew.' since our flight was dispatched under 180 mins ETOPS, we had a conversation about weather conditions and increased ETOPS critical fuel reserves. I felt that even if the right engine bleed valve did not open after take off, that the flight conditions were acceptable to continue. This position was agreed on by all. We then began the process of filling out the 'non-routine maintenance form' sticker. At this time, we felt we had complied with the required items to continue the flight. The conference call ended, we ran our before take off checklist, and proceeded to make a normal flaps 5 reduced thrust take off. The take off and climb out were all routine. After the power reduction to climb power we cycled the right engine bleed switch, the valve opened and remained open for the remainder of the flight. We notified dispatch of our 'all systems normal situation' and proceeded with a normal climb to altitude. Just after level off, I began to re-read the entire MEL item disp. It was a this time that I realized we had missed several items that the MEL operations. Placard directs to accomplish for take off. The operations placard says, 'APU must be used as air source for hydraulic center demand pumps for take off and landing. Reduced take off taxiway and performance limit weights by 17,300 pounds or use packs off take off procedure.' these two provisions were inadvertently missed and discovered after I re-read the MEL during cruise flight. First, we did not start the APU for take off, and with this take off weight penalty the reduced thrust that we used was appropriate to 501,000 pounds take off weight. Our actual take off weight was 510,665. After discussion with the two first officer's we felt possible cause for this deviation from the MEL procedure were as follows: 1) during the conference call with maintenance control and dispatch, first officer and I were focused on the safe conduct of the flight after take off assuming the valve did not open. During the conference call no one ever mentioned take off restrs. 2) the previous flight had the same problem and it resolved itself. 3)this aircraft had been flying with this problem for some time. We counted 11 write-ups on the log history. 4) the MEL was 3 page maintenance document with the operations placard at the end of page 3. Much of the preceding information didn't specifically apply to our current situation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B777 WAS DISPATCHED IN NON COMPLIANCE WITH THE R ENGINE BLEED VALVE INOPERATIVE PER THE MINIMUM EQUIP LIST BUT SPECIAL OPERATIONAL PROCS WERE NOT ACCOMPLISHED.

Narrative: DURING FLT PLANNING WE NOTICED NUMEROUS ENTRIES FOR PROBS WITH THE R ENGINE BLEED VALVE, INCLUDING AN ENTRY ON THE PREVIOUS FLT, 'BLEED OFF ENG R DURING TAXI, APPLIED PWR BLEED RETURNED TO NORMAL. MAINT REPLACED HPSOV PER MM OPS NORMAL.' AT THIS POINT THIS ITEM WAS CLRED. PUSHBACK AND TAXI WERE BEGUN WITH ALL SYSTEMS NORMAL. TAXI WAS FROM GATE TO RWY 1R. DURING TAXI R ENG BLEED LIGHT AND ICAS BLEED OFF ENG R CAME ON. I ASKED RELIEF FO TO CONTACT MAINT CTL. DURING TAXI TO SEE IF THE PROB COULD BE SOLVED CONTACT WAS ESTABLISHED AND MAIN CTL ASKED IF WE COULD RUN THE ENGINE UP FROM IDLE TO SEE IF THAT SOLVED THE PROB. AS THE TAXI WAS PROGRESSING, I RAN THE R ENGINE TO APPROX 55% N1. THIS HAD NO EFFECT. WE CYCLED THE R ENGINE BLEED SWITCH OFF THEN ON THE VALVE OPENED, HOWEVER, AFTER A FEW SECONDS, THE LIGHT CAME BACK ON. THIS WAS DONE TWICE WITH THE SAME RESULT. WE PARKED IN THE RUN UP AREA FOR RWY 1R. AT THIS TIME DISPATCH JOINED US ON THE CONFERENCE CALL AND MAINT CTL SENT 3 PAGES OF MEL ITEMS FOR DISPATCH WITH 'R ENGINE BLEED OFF' TO OUR PRINTER. WITH THE ACFT PARKED AND THE FO MONITORING THE RADIO ON GND CTL I JOINED THE CONFERENCE CALL. FO, MAINT CTL, DISPATCH, AND MYSELF SPOKE ON THE CONFERENCE CALL FOR SEVERAL MINS. OUR CONFERENCE CALL WITH DISPATCH AND MAINT CTL LED US TO FOCUS ON PART OF THE MEL THAT STATED, 'DISPATCHING BEYOND 120 MIN FROM A SUITABLE AIRPORT WITH REDUCED ANTI-ICE CAPABILITIES WILL NORMALLY BE AVOIDED UNLESS FLT CONDITIONS ARE ACCEPTABLE TO FLT CREW.' SINCE OUR FLT WAS DISPATCHED UNDER 180 MINS ETOPS, WE HAD A CONVERSATION ABOUT WEATHER CONDITIONS AND INCREASED ETOPS CRITICAL FUEL RESERVES. I FELT THAT EVEN IF THE R ENG BLEED VALVE DID NOT OPEN AFTER TAKE OFF, THAT THE FLT CONDITIONS WERE ACCEPTABLE TO CONTINUE. THIS POSITION WAS AGREED ON BY ALL. WE THEN BEGAN THE PROCESS OF FILLING OUT THE 'NON-ROUTINE MAINT FORM' STICKER. AT THIS TIME, WE FELT WE HAD COMPLIED WITH THE REQUIRED ITEMS TO CONTINUE THE FLT. THE CONFERENCE CALL ENDED, WE RAN OUR BEFORE TAKE OFF CHKLIST, AND PROCEEDED TO MAKE A NORMAL FLAPS 5 REDUCED THRUST TAKE OFF. THE TAKE OFF AND CLIMB OUT WERE ALL ROUTINE. AFTER THE POWER REDUCTION TO CLIMB PWR WE CYCLED THE R ENG BLEED SWITCH, THE VALVE OPENED AND REMAINED OPEN FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE FLT. WE NOTIFIED DISPATCH OF OUR 'ALL SYSTEMS NORMAL SIT' AND PROCEEDED WITH A NORMAL CLIMB TO ALTITUDE. JUST AFTER LEVEL OFF, I BEGAN TO RE-READ THE ENTIRE MEL ITEM DISP. IT WAS A THIS TIME THAT I REALIZED WE HAD MISSED SEVERAL ITEMS THAT THE MEL OPS. PLACARD DIRECTS TO ACCOMPLISH FOR TAKE OFF. THE OPS PLACARD SAYS, 'APU MUST BE USED AS AIR SOURCE FOR HYDRAULIC CENTER DEMAND PUMPS FOR TAKE OFF AND LNDG. REDUCED TAKE OFF TXWY AND PERFORMANCE LIMIT WEIGHTS BY 17,300 LBS OR USE PACKS OFF TAKE OFF PROC.' THESE TWO PROVISIONS WERE INADVERTENTLY MISSED AND DISCOVERED AFTER I RE-READ THE MEL DURING CRUISE FLT. FIRST, WE DID NOT START THE APU FOR TAKE OFF, AND WITH THIS TAKE OFF WEIGHT PENALTY THE REDUCED THRUST THAT WE USED WAS APPROPRIATE TO 501,000 LBS TAKE OFF WEIGHT. OUR ACTUAL TAKE OFF WEIGHT WAS 510,665. AFTER DISCUSSION WITH THE TWO FO'S WE FELT POSSIBLE CAUSE FOR THIS DEVIATION FROM THE MEL PROC WERE AS FOLLOWS: 1) DURING THE CONFERENCE CALL WITH MAINT CTL AND DISPATCH, FO AND I WERE FOCUSED ON THE SAFE CONDUCT OF THE FLT AFTER TAKE OFF ASSUMING THE VALVE DID NOT OPEN. DURING THE CONFERENCE CALL NO ONE EVER MENTIONED TAKE OFF RESTRS. 2) THE PREVIOUS FLT HAD THE SAME PROB AND IT RESOLVED ITSELF. 3)THIS ACFT HAD BEEN FLYING WITH THIS PROB FOR SOME TIME. WE COUNTED 11 WRITE-UPS ON THE LOG HISTORY. 4) THE MEL WAS 3 PAGE MAINT DOCUMENT WITH THE OPS PLACARD AT THE END OF PAGE 3. MUCH OF THE PRECEDING INFO DIDN'T SPECIFICALLY APPLY TO OUR CURRENT SIT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.