Narrative:

We were on the panoche 2 arrival to hayward executive airport california in the vicinity of bushy intersection. Bay approach cleared us to brien intersection (D11.9 on the hayward localizer). After passing bushy, bay approach requested our present speed to brien, which at the time was approximately 180 KIAS. As we arrived at brien we received our approach clearance. As we intercepted the localizer we were at 3900 ft and began our descent to 2600 ft. At the same time the PIC (PF) began slowing to vref +30 KTS (131 KIAS). I was the sic (PNF) but I do have more experience in the king air 200 than the PIC had. The approach requires an altitude loss of 3500 ft between brien intersection and the missed approach point (11.0 NM). As we slowed to 131 KTS we did not establish a sink rate adequate to meet the profile. Hayward tower advised us that we appeared high on the approach and I concurred. Further attempt to continue would have resulted in an unstable approach and we elected to execute the missed. Prior to us announcing our intentions hayward tower 'very correctly' advised us to turn right and to climb and maintain 3000 ft MSL, and to contact bay approach. The PF initiated the right turn and began climbing to what I thought he understood to be 3000 ft. By the time I changed back to bay approach and called out the missed approach checklist I did not see that the PIC (PF) had climbed to 3500 ft. Bay approach advised us to descend back to 3000 ft and vectored us back for a 2ND localizer DME approach. This approach was satisfactory. Factors that contributed to this situation was the crew's acceptance of an initial approach speed that was excessive for the PF. It was a reasonable request from approach, but from a human performance standpoint better risk analysis on our part considering the pilot's (PF) experience, would have suggested a more conservative speed. The descent profile was not managed adequately which resulted in a missed approach. Normally we confirm altitude assignments to each other verbally, as well as entering the altitude on the alerter. The communication between PF and PNF was lost. The PNF assumed the PF heard the altitude assignment correctly instead of verifying it verbally. In retrospect I believe the decision to execute a missed approach by the crew much earlier in the approach would have resulted in a slower, more manageable pace, in the cockpit. Our debrief with each other was extensive and will result in refined CRM.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A KING AIR FLT CREW OVERSHOT THE ASSIGNED ALT DURING A MISSED APCH.

Narrative: WE WERE ON THE PANOCHE 2 ARR TO HAYWARD EXECUTIVE ARPT CALIFORNIA IN THE VICINITY OF BUSHY INTXN. BAY APCH CLRED US TO BRIEN INTXN (D11.9 ON THE HAYWARD LOC). AFTER PASSING BUSHY, BAY APCH REQUESTED OUR PRESENT SPD TO BRIEN, WHICH AT THE TIME WAS APPROX 180 KIAS. AS WE ARRIVED AT BRIEN WE RECEIVED OUR APCH CLRNC. AS WE INTERCEPTED THE LOC WE WERE AT 3900 FT AND BEGAN OUR DSCNT TO 2600 FT. AT THE SAME TIME THE PIC (PF) BEGAN SLOWING TO VREF +30 KTS (131 KIAS). I WAS THE SIC (PNF) BUT I DO HAVE MORE EXPERIENCE IN THE KING AIR 200 THAN THE PIC HAD. THE APCH REQUIRES AN ALT LOSS OF 3500 FT BTWN BRIEN INTXN AND THE MISSED APCH POINT (11.0 NM). AS WE SLOWED TO 131 KTS WE DID NOT ESTABLISH A SINK RATE ADEQUATE TO MEET THE PROFILE. HAYWARD TWR ADVISED US THAT WE APPEARED HIGH ON THE APCH AND I CONCURRED. FURTHER ATTEMPT TO CONTINUE WOULD HAVE RESULTED IN AN UNSTABLE APCH AND WE ELECTED TO EXECUTE THE MISSED. PRIOR TO US ANNOUNCING OUR INTENTIONS HAYWARD TWR 'VERY CORRECTLY' ADVISED US TO TURN R AND TO CLB AND MAINTAIN 3000 FT MSL, AND TO CONTACT BAY APCH. THE PF INITIATED THE R TURN AND BEGAN CLBING TO WHAT I THOUGHT HE UNDERSTOOD TO BE 3000 FT. BY THE TIME I CHANGED BACK TO BAY APCH AND CALLED OUT THE MISSED APCH CHKLIST I DID NOT SEE THAT THE PIC (PF) HAD CLBED TO 3500 FT. BAY APCH ADVISED US TO DSND BACK TO 3000 FT AND VECTORED US BACK FOR A 2ND LOC DME APCH. THIS APCH WAS SATISFACTORY. FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THIS SIT WAS THE CREW'S ACCEPTANCE OF AN INITIAL APCH SPD THAT WAS EXCESSIVE FOR THE PF. IT WAS A REASONABLE REQUEST FROM APCH, BUT FROM A HUMAN PERFORMANCE STANDPOINT BETTER RISK ANALYSIS ON OUR PART CONSIDERING THE PLT'S (PF) EXPERIENCE, WOULD HAVE SUGGESTED A MORE CONSERVATIVE SPD. THE DSCNT PROFILE WAS NOT MANAGED ADEQUATELY WHICH RESULTED IN A MISSED APCH. NORMALLY WE CONFIRM ALT ASSIGNMENTS TO EACH OTHER VERBALLY, AS WELL AS ENTERING THE ALT ON THE ALERTER. THE COM BTWN PF AND PNF WAS LOST. THE PNF ASSUMED THE PF HEARD THE ALT ASSIGNMENT CORRECTLY INSTEAD OF VERIFYING IT VERBALLY. IN RETROSPECT I BELIEVE THE DECISION TO EXECUTE A MISSED APCH BY THE CREW MUCH EARLIER IN THE APCH WOULD HAVE RESULTED IN A SLOWER, MORE MANAGEABLE PACE, IN THE COCKPIT. OUR DEBRIEF WITH EACH OTHER WAS EXTENSIVE AND WILL RESULT IN REFINED CRM.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.