Narrative:

The SJC8.moony departure SID at sjc requires an immediate right turn at 1.8 DME, so as to complete a nearly 180 degree heading change within 4.0 DME. With the airplane on autoplt during our initial climb to 5000 ft, the aircraft did not initiate its turn until approximately 2.3 DME. The result was that we were unable to complete the turn by 4.0 DME, and we overshot by .8 mi. ATC immediately noticed the overshoot and requested that we expedite our turn. I disconnected the autoplt and completed the turn manually, but was unable to tighten the turn to comply with the 4.0 DME restr. I should have taken more prompt corrective action rather than to rely solely on the FMC database and sluggish autoplt. Better callouts by the PNF could have helped to identify a potential deviation before it developed into an exceedence. The training we receive on the A319/A320 places heavy emphasis on the use of automation, and in fact discourages hand-flying the aircraft in some circumstances. In my opinion, this emphasis on reliance of the airplane's flight management/guidance system and autoplt may result in a reluctance of flight crew members to take positive corrective action (by hand-flying the plane) when a constraint or restr could be exceeded.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN A320 FLC IS SLOW TO DISCONNECT THEIR AUTOPLT SO AS TO COMPLETE THE TURN REQUIRED ON THE MOONY DEP PROC OUT OF SJC, CA.

Narrative: THE SJC8.MOONY DEP SID AT SJC REQUIRES AN IMMEDIATE R TURN AT 1.8 DME, SO AS TO COMPLETE A NEARLY 180 DEG HDG CHANGE WITHIN 4.0 DME. WITH THE AIRPLANE ON AUTOPLT DURING OUR INITIAL CLB TO 5000 FT, THE ACFT DID NOT INITIATE ITS TURN UNTIL APPROX 2.3 DME. THE RESULT WAS THAT WE WERE UNABLE TO COMPLETE THE TURN BY 4.0 DME, AND WE OVERSHOT BY .8 MI. ATC IMMEDIATELY NOTICED THE OVERSHOOT AND REQUESTED THAT WE EXPEDITE OUR TURN. I DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT AND COMPLETED THE TURN MANUALLY, BUT WAS UNABLE TO TIGHTEN THE TURN TO COMPLY WITH THE 4.0 DME RESTR. I SHOULD HAVE TAKEN MORE PROMPT CORRECTIVE ACTION RATHER THAN TO RELY SOLELY ON THE FMC DATABASE AND SLUGGISH AUTOPLT. BETTER CALLOUTS BY THE PNF COULD HAVE HELPED TO IDENT A POTENTIAL DEV BEFORE IT DEVELOPED INTO AN EXCEEDENCE. THE TRAINING WE RECEIVE ON THE A319/A320 PLACES HVY EMPHASIS ON THE USE OF AUTOMATION, AND IN FACT DISCOURAGES HAND-FLYING THE ACFT IN SOME CIRCUMSTANCES. IN MY OPINION, THIS EMPHASIS ON RELIANCE OF THE AIRPLANE'S FLT MGMNT/GUIDANCE SYS AND AUTOPLT MAY RESULT IN A RELUCTANCE OF FLC MEMBERS TO TAKE POSITIVE CORRECTIVE ACTION (BY HAND-FLYING THE PLANE) WHEN A CONSTRAINT OR RESTR COULD BE EXCEEDED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.