Narrative:

After the missed approach, we proceeded to our destination. En route, I was monitoring approach control, and becoming quite concerned. Airliners were detouring around level 2 and 3 precipitation around the area. Level 2 was on final at our alternate, and airliners were reporting light to moderate chop. Windshear was reported at 250 ft at the alternate and visibility was reported as 1 mi. Our destination was reported as 300 ft and 3 mi. Level 2 precipitation was reported building on either side of our route. As we neared our destination, I requested vectors to VOR final so as to expedite and simplify arrival as much as possible. At this time, we had spent nearly 2 hours in solid IMC, and fatigue was starting to be a consideration. The approach was normal. Before the FAF, tower said they were 300 ft and 2 1/2 mi. On about a 3-4 mi final, the student got about 60-80 ft below MDA, tower called a low altitude warning, and we climbed back up. At about 3 mi out, I took the aircraft, as I wanted to get us back on course (we were about 3 degrees left of course). I started correcting back, and at this time, recognized landmarks on the ground. I fly regularly out of this field. My attention was now focused on the ground, looking for the runway, my airspeed, and the VOR course. I paid way too little attention to the altitude, as I saw the ground and familiar landmarks below and in front of me. I finally saw the landing runway about 2 mi out, set up final and landed uneventfully. Although I wasn't checking altitude, I am pretty sure that I busted my MDA. Although I probably busted minimums, I feel it was approaching an emergency situation. I feel our alternate was no longer a viable option. Difficulties reported by heavy jets and approach control made it a non-player in my mind. Returning to the field we had shot approachs at or another field in the area was out due to increased activity en route, the fatigue factor, and unforecast deteriorating conditions in the area. I felt relatively comfortable with my departure field as I have flown out of there many times. As I re-live this incident, I can think of no safer alternatives to what I did. WX forecasts: I have always been skeptical of forecasts and keep 2-3 back-ups in mind. WX training in FAA, in my opinion, is misfocused. Hours are spent on theory, air masses, and charts that most pilots will never see. A more operations oriented approach including incidents such as mine might take WX training out of the theoretical realm and get it into the real world where pilots fly. Thank you for the opportunity to report this incident. I hope others may learn from it.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A PA28 INSTRUCTOR WITH STUDENT, ON APCH TO SSF, DSNDED BELOW THE MDA AND LANDED.

Narrative: AFTER THE MISSED APCH, WE PROCEEDED TO OUR DEST. ENRTE, I WAS MONITORING APCH CTL, AND BECOMING QUITE CONCERNED. AIRLINERS WERE DETOURING AROUND LEVEL 2 AND 3 PRECIP AROUND THE AREA. LEVEL 2 WAS ON FINAL AT OUR ALTERNATE, AND AIRLINERS WERE RPTING LIGHT TO MODERATE CHOP. WINDSHEAR WAS RPTED AT 250 FT AT THE ALTERNATE AND VISIBILITY WAS RPTED AS 1 MI. OUR DEST WAS RPTED AS 300 FT AND 3 MI. LEVEL 2 PRECIP WAS RPTED BUILDING ON EITHER SIDE OF OUR RTE. AS WE NEARED OUR DEST, I REQUESTED VECTORS TO VOR FINAL SO AS TO EXPEDITE AND SIMPLIFY ARR AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE. AT THIS TIME, WE HAD SPENT NEARLY 2 HRS IN SOLID IMC, AND FATIGUE WAS STARTING TO BE A CONSIDERATION. THE APCH WAS NORMAL. BEFORE THE FAF, TWR SAID THEY WERE 300 FT AND 2 1/2 MI. ON ABOUT A 3-4 MI FINAL, THE STUDENT GOT ABOUT 60-80 FT BELOW MDA, TWR CALLED A LOW ALT WARNING, AND WE CLBED BACK UP. AT ABOUT 3 MI OUT, I TOOK THE ACFT, AS I WANTED TO GET US BACK ON COURSE (WE WERE ABOUT 3 DEGS L OF COURSE). I STARTED CORRECTING BACK, AND AT THIS TIME, RECOGNIZED LANDMARKS ON THE GND. I FLY REGULARLY OUT OF THIS FIELD. MY ATTN WAS NOW FOCUSED ON THE GND, LOOKING FOR THE RWY, MY AIRSPD, AND THE VOR COURSE. I PAID WAY TOO LITTLE ATTN TO THE ALT, AS I SAW THE GND AND FAMILIAR LANDMARKS BELOW AND IN FRONT OF ME. I FINALLY SAW THE LNDG RWY ABOUT 2 MI OUT, SET UP FINAL AND LANDED UNEVENTFULLY. ALTHOUGH I WASN'T CHKING ALT, I AM PRETTY SURE THAT I BUSTED MY MDA. ALTHOUGH I PROBABLY BUSTED MINIMUMS, I FEEL IT WAS APCHING AN EMER SIT. I FEEL OUR ALTERNATE WAS NO LONGER A VIABLE OPTION. DIFFICULTIES RPTED BY HVY JETS AND APCH CTL MADE IT A NON-PLAYER IN MY MIND. RETURNING TO THE FIELD WE HAD SHOT APCHS AT OR ANOTHER FIELD IN THE AREA WAS OUT DUE TO INCREASED ACTIVITY ENRTE, THE FATIGUE FACTOR, AND UNFORECAST DETERIORATING CONDITIONS IN THE AREA. I FELT RELATIVELY COMFORTABLE WITH MY DEP FIELD AS I HAVE FLOWN OUT OF THERE MANY TIMES. AS I RE-LIVE THIS INCIDENT, I CAN THINK OF NO SAFER ALTERNATIVES TO WHAT I DID. WX FORECASTS: I HAVE ALWAYS BEEN SKEPTICAL OF FORECASTS AND KEEP 2-3 BACK-UPS IN MIND. WX TRAINING IN FAA, IN MY OPINION, IS MISFOCUSED. HRS ARE SPENT ON THEORY, AIR MASSES, AND CHARTS THAT MOST PLTS WILL NEVER SEE. A MORE OPS ORIENTED APCH INCLUDING INCIDENTS SUCH AS MINE MIGHT TAKE WX TRAINING OUT OF THE THEORETICAL REALM AND GET IT INTO THE REAL WORLD WHERE PLTS FLY. THANK YOU FOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO RPT THIS INCIDENT. I HOPE OTHERS MAY LEARN FROM IT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.