Narrative:

I departed my tie-down spot and taxied to runway 8 outbound for st thomas. By the time I had taxied to runway 8, I had ascertained that there were 3 other aircraft on the unicom frequency. I felt that I had good situational awareness. 2 of the 3 aircraft had landed and cleared the runway and the third was 'over the coastline' about 2 mi east of the field inbound for landing. During my climb out to 3500 ft, I mentioned to the front seat passenger that the reason I was lowering my nose periodically was so that we could scan the sky ahead for inbound traffic that might be south of palomino. I did this several times. Because it was getting dark, I was concerned about inbound traffic. I added my wing mounted taxi and landing lights to my navigation, beacon, and strobe lights to improve my chances of being seen. About 4 or 5 mi east of the airport, I made a last call on 122.7 reporting my position and altitude and saying 'departing the traffic area to the east.' 30 seconds later, I was just ready to key the push-to-talk button to call sju control (for flight following and sequencing into tist) when an aircraft passed off my right side. The aircraft was just a white and red blur. It was opposite direction traffic and it was very close. I estimate that the aircraft was within 10-20 ft away horizontally and below my right wingtip. The thing that really makes this incident most notable, is that I was very cognizant of the potential for this to occur in this immediate vicinity and as such, was making every effort to see and be seen at the time. I believe that the following conditions contributed to the incident: 1) the lack of relative movement to one another whereby both aircraft were on a collision course for some time. 2) the time of day (dusk) reduced visibility some. 3) the fact that the other aircraft was south of the 'normal' inbound track (I was about 1 - 1 1/2 mi south of palomino island). The other pilot may not have been aware of this rule of thumb. 4) lack of local ATC. 5) lack of published transition procedures/VFR corridors. Contributing factors: 1) complacency and poor discipline on the part of pilots making multiple flts into and out of fajardo airport on a daily basis. For those pilots unable to speak spanish, situational awareness can be reduced significantly by the fact that unicom operator communications are made in spanish on a routine basis. 2) I believe that the other aircraft did not have anti-collision lights or landing lights on. 3) the near midair collision occurred in the communications radio transition area where a frequency change from san juan to fajardo unicom or vice versa would typically take place. Remedies: I believe that a control tower is necessary at fajardo airport, and some VFR corridors could be established. The traffic that uses this very valuable and convenient field is primarily concentrated in 1 area. Maybe some kind of deal could be made with roosevelt roads control tower.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: C206 PLT HAS NMAC SHORTLY AFTER DEPARTING HOME BASE, TUPJ (BEEF ISLAND ARPT) ENRTE TO TIST (ST THOMAS, PR).

Narrative: I DEPARTED MY TIE-DOWN SPOT AND TAXIED TO RWY 8 OUTBOUND FOR ST THOMAS. BY THE TIME I HAD TAXIED TO RWY 8, I HAD ASCERTAINED THAT THERE WERE 3 OTHER ACFT ON THE UNICOM FREQ. I FELT THAT I HAD GOOD SITUATIONAL AWARENESS. 2 OF THE 3 ACFT HAD LANDED AND CLRED THE RWY AND THE THIRD WAS 'OVER THE COASTLINE' ABOUT 2 MI E OF THE FIELD INBOUND FOR LNDG. DURING MY CLBOUT TO 3500 FT, I MENTIONED TO THE FRONT SEAT PAX THAT THE REASON I WAS LOWERING MY NOSE PERIODICALLY WAS SO THAT WE COULD SCAN THE SKY AHEAD FOR INBOUND TFC THAT MIGHT BE S OF PALOMINO. I DID THIS SEVERAL TIMES. BECAUSE IT WAS GETTING DARK, I WAS CONCERNED ABOUT INBOUND TFC. I ADDED MY WING MOUNTED TAXI AND LNDG LIGHTS TO MY NAV, BEACON, AND STROBE LIGHTS TO IMPROVE MY CHANCES OF BEING SEEN. ABOUT 4 OR 5 MI E OF THE ARPT, I MADE A LAST CALL ON 122.7 RPTING MY POS AND ALT AND SAYING 'DEPARTING THE TFC AREA TO THE E.' 30 SECONDS LATER, I WAS JUST READY TO KEY THE PUSH-TO-TALK BUTTON TO CALL SJU CTL (FOR FLT FOLLOWING AND SEQUENCING INTO TIST) WHEN AN ACFT PASSED OFF MY R SIDE. THE ACFT WAS JUST A WHITE AND RED BLUR. IT WAS OPPOSITE DIRECTION TFC AND IT WAS VERY CLOSE. I ESTIMATE THAT THE ACFT WAS WITHIN 10-20 FT AWAY HORIZLY AND BELOW MY R WINGTIP. THE THING THAT REALLY MAKES THIS INCIDENT MOST NOTABLE, IS THAT I WAS VERY COGNIZANT OF THE POTENTIAL FOR THIS TO OCCUR IN THIS IMMEDIATE VICINITY AND AS SUCH, WAS MAKING EVERY EFFORT TO SEE AND BE SEEN AT THE TIME. I BELIEVE THAT THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS CONTRIBUTED TO THE INCIDENT: 1) THE LACK OF RELATIVE MOVEMENT TO ONE ANOTHER WHEREBY BOTH ACFT WERE ON A COLLISION COURSE FOR SOME TIME. 2) THE TIME OF DAY (DUSK) REDUCED VISIBILITY SOME. 3) THE FACT THAT THE OTHER ACFT WAS S OF THE 'NORMAL' INBOUND TRACK (I WAS ABOUT 1 - 1 1/2 MI S OF PALOMINO ISLAND). THE OTHER PLT MAY NOT HAVE BEEN AWARE OF THIS RULE OF THUMB. 4) LACK OF LCL ATC. 5) LACK OF PUBLISHED TRANSITION PROCS/VFR CORRIDORS. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) COMPLACENCY AND POOR DISCIPLINE ON THE PART OF PLTS MAKING MULTIPLE FLTS INTO AND OUT OF FAJARDO ARPT ON A DAILY BASIS. FOR THOSE PLTS UNABLE TO SPEAK SPANISH, SITUATIONAL AWARENESS CAN BE REDUCED SIGNIFICANTLY BY THE FACT THAT UNICOM OPERATOR COMS ARE MADE IN SPANISH ON A ROUTINE BASIS. 2) I BELIEVE THAT THE OTHER ACFT DID NOT HAVE ANTI-COLLISION LIGHTS OR LNDG LIGHTS ON. 3) THE NMAC OCCURRED IN THE COMS RADIO TRANSITION AREA WHERE A FREQ CHANGE FROM SAN JUAN TO FAJARDO UNICOM OR VICE VERSA WOULD TYPICALLY TAKE PLACE. REMEDIES: I BELIEVE THAT A CTL TWR IS NECESSARY AT FAJARDO ARPT, AND SOME VFR CORRIDORS COULD BE ESTABLISHED. THE TFC THAT USES THIS VERY VALUABLE AND CONVENIENT FIELD IS PRIMARILY CONCENTRATED IN 1 AREA. MAYBE SOME KIND OF DEAL COULD BE MADE WITH ROOSEVELT ROADS CTL TWR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.