Narrative:

It was the captain's first time departing off of this runway for some time and my first ever. Before leaving the gate, the captain briefed me to be sure and assist him with the taxi directions. Due to a short taxi, the 'before takeoff checklist (above the line)' was not quite complete as we approached the end of the taxiway. We were still rolling when the tower controller queried if we were ready. The captain indicated he was, so I replied 'affirmative' and we were cleared for takeoff. The captain then called for the 'before takeoff checklist (below the line)' and began turning as I continued with the remainder of the checklist. As I was completing the checklist the captain stated that we must be on the taxiway portion of the displaced threshold. Unbeknownst to us, we had just turned onto a parallel taxiway instead of the runway. Not yet looking up, I completed the last 2 items on the checklist as the captain began a slow acceleration expecting to see the threshold. I looked up and saw only taxiway lights. The captain then brought the thrust levers up even higher to almost the takeoff thrust setting and I stated, 'we're on a taxiway, we are not on the runway, abort, abort, this is a taxiway!' the captain immediately brought the thrust levers to idle and began slowing. I advised the tower that we were aborting the takeoff and they inquired if we needed assistance. I said negative and we would like to taxi back for departure. The tower controller asked what the reason for the abort was and the captain answered that we were on the taxiway and not the runway. The tower controller reclred us for takeoff and we then verified that the 'before takeoff checklist' was complete and that we were indeed on the runway for the second takeoff attempt. The rest of the flight was uneventful. This was the last leg of a 4-DAY trip and there was a little 'get home' pressure present. I had flown with this senior captain before and his very professional attitude and careful manner had given me the utmost confidence in his abilities. I had let my vigilance decrease due to a sense that this captain didn't make such mistakes. In the future, I will make a concerted effort to avoid complacency. I will be more alert especially at new airports and I will study the airport diagrams better. I will not let my desire to get home interfere with the vigilance required. There were plenty of taxiway/runway markings/lights available, but in the distracting rush to take the runway, a seasoned captain somehow missed them. It is a team effort and the captain had requested my assistance in the taxi. Alertness and vigilance will not be replaced by complacency again.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CRJ200 FLC ABORTS THEIR TKOF AFTER ATTEMPTING A TKOF ON A TXWY DURING A NIGHT OP AT DFW, TX.

Narrative: IT WAS THE CAPT'S FIRST TIME DEPARTING OFF OF THIS RWY FOR SOME TIME AND MY FIRST EVER. BEFORE LEAVING THE GATE, THE CAPT BRIEFED ME TO BE SURE AND ASSIST HIM WITH THE TAXI DIRECTIONS. DUE TO A SHORT TAXI, THE 'BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST (ABOVE THE LINE)' WAS NOT QUITE COMPLETE AS WE APCHED THE END OF THE TXWY. WE WERE STILL ROLLING WHEN THE TWR CTLR QUERIED IF WE WERE READY. THE CAPT INDICATED HE WAS, SO I REPLIED 'AFFIRMATIVE' AND WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF. THE CAPT THEN CALLED FOR THE 'BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST (BELOW THE LINE)' AND BEGAN TURNING AS I CONTINUED WITH THE REMAINDER OF THE CHKLIST. AS I WAS COMPLETING THE CHKLIST THE CAPT STATED THAT WE MUST BE ON THE TXWY PORTION OF THE DISPLACED THRESHOLD. UNBEKNOWNST TO US, WE HAD JUST TURNED ONTO A PARALLEL TXWY INSTEAD OF THE RWY. NOT YET LOOKING UP, I COMPLETED THE LAST 2 ITEMS ON THE CHKLIST AS THE CAPT BEGAN A SLOW ACCELERATION EXPECTING TO SEE THE THRESHOLD. I LOOKED UP AND SAW ONLY TXWY LIGHTS. THE CAPT THEN BROUGHT THE THRUST LEVERS UP EVEN HIGHER TO ALMOST THE TKOF THRUST SETTING AND I STATED, 'WE'RE ON A TXWY, WE ARE NOT ON THE RWY, ABORT, ABORT, THIS IS A TXWY!' THE CAPT IMMEDIATELY BROUGHT THE THRUST LEVERS TO IDLE AND BEGAN SLOWING. I ADVISED THE TWR THAT WE WERE ABORTING THE TKOF AND THEY INQUIRED IF WE NEEDED ASSISTANCE. I SAID NEGATIVE AND WE WOULD LIKE TO TAXI BACK FOR DEP. THE TWR CTLR ASKED WHAT THE REASON FOR THE ABORT WAS AND THE CAPT ANSWERED THAT WE WERE ON THE TXWY AND NOT THE RWY. THE TWR CTLR RECLRED US FOR TKOF AND WE THEN VERIFIED THAT THE 'BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST' WAS COMPLETE AND THAT WE WERE INDEED ON THE RWY FOR THE SECOND TKOF ATTEMPT. THE REST OF THE FLT WAS UNEVENTFUL. THIS WAS THE LAST LEG OF A 4-DAY TRIP AND THERE WAS A LITTLE 'GET HOME' PRESSURE PRESENT. I HAD FLOWN WITH THIS SENIOR CAPT BEFORE AND HIS VERY PROFESSIONAL ATTITUDE AND CAREFUL MANNER HAD GIVEN ME THE UTMOST CONFIDENCE IN HIS ABILITIES. I HAD LET MY VIGILANCE DECREASE DUE TO A SENSE THAT THIS CAPT DIDN'T MAKE SUCH MISTAKES. IN THE FUTURE, I WILL MAKE A CONCERTED EFFORT TO AVOID COMPLACENCY. I WILL BE MORE ALERT ESPECIALLY AT NEW ARPTS AND I WILL STUDY THE ARPT DIAGRAMS BETTER. I WILL NOT LET MY DESIRE TO GET HOME INTERFERE WITH THE VIGILANCE REQUIRED. THERE WERE PLENTY OF TXWY/RWY MARKINGS/LIGHTS AVAILABLE, BUT IN THE DISTRACTING RUSH TO TAKE THE RWY, A SEASONED CAPT SOMEHOW MISSED THEM. IT IS A TEAM EFFORT AND THE CAPT HAD REQUESTED MY ASSISTANCE IN THE TAXI. ALERTNESS AND VIGILANCE WILL NOT BE REPLACED BY COMPLACENCY AGAIN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.