Narrative:

Descending via the civet four arrival to lax. Prior to civet we were given a speed reduction to 250 KTS. This caused us to be high on our VNAV descent profile and ATC revised the civet crossing restr to at or above 14000 ft only and the arnes crossing restr at or above 10000 ft only. At this time we were descending in level change mode with LNAV engaged. The FMS was programmed with a fuelr crossing restr of 8000 ft, which was the altitude set in the MCP altitude window. Just prior to arnes intersection, ATC issued a clearance to maintain 10000 ft until advised. The MCP was not reset to 10000 ft, nor was the vertical mode changed from level change. The aircraft descended through 10000 ft to just below 9000 ft before the error was caught by the crew or ATC. Aircraft was aggressively returned to 10000 ft and remainder of STAR and ILS runway 25L was conducted normally. ATC advised that the problem was 'taken care of.' contributing factors to this incident were: failure of line check pilot to monitor the level of automation and the PF, while performing other duties (approach checklist). Unusual modifications to the standard arrival. Inexperience of first officer. First officer was the PF. He was on the 8TH leg of his first oe as an first officer, had come from B727 as so (flight engineer). Level of automation was appropriate for the phase of flight, but was not correctly programmed for the clearance. A higher level of situational awareness while descending in the terminal area and more timely completion of the approach checklist and less emphasis on training in the high density area would have prevented this incident. Supplemental information from acn 535082: line check pilot failed to appropriately monitor first officer in high workload environment.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B738 CREW, DSNDING INTO LAX, OVERSHOT ASSIGNED ALT.

Narrative: DSNDING VIA THE CIVET FOUR ARR TO LAX. PRIOR TO CIVET WE WERE GIVEN A SPD REDUCTION TO 250 KTS. THIS CAUSED US TO BE HIGH ON OUR VNAV DSCNT PROFILE AND ATC REVISED THE CIVET XING RESTR TO AT OR ABOVE 14000 FT ONLY AND THE ARNES XING RESTR AT OR ABOVE 10000 FT ONLY. AT THIS TIME WE WERE DSNDING IN LEVEL CHANGE MODE WITH LNAV ENGAGED. THE FMS WAS PROGRAMMED WITH A FUELR XING RESTR OF 8000 FT, WHICH WAS THE ALT SET IN THE MCP ALT WINDOW. JUST PRIOR TO ARNES INTXN, ATC ISSUED A CLRNC TO MAINTAIN 10000 FT UNTIL ADVISED. THE MCP WAS NOT RESET TO 10000 FT, NOR WAS THE VERT MODE CHANGED FROM LEVEL CHANGE. THE ACFT DSNDED THROUGH 10000 FT TO JUST BELOW 9000 FT BEFORE THE ERROR WAS CAUGHT BY THE CREW OR ATC. ACFT WAS AGGRESSIVELY RETURNED TO 10000 FT AND REMAINDER OF STAR AND ILS RWY 25L WAS CONDUCTED NORMALLY. ATC ADVISED THAT THE PROB WAS 'TAKEN CARE OF.' CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO THIS INCIDENT WERE: FAILURE OF LINE CHK PLT TO MONITOR THE LEVEL OF AUTOMATION AND THE PF, WHILE PERFORMING OTHER DUTIES (APCH CHKLIST). UNUSUAL MODIFICATIONS TO THE STANDARD ARR. INEXPERIENCE OF FO. FO WAS THE PF. HE WAS ON THE 8TH LEG OF HIS FIRST OE AS AN FO, HAD COME FROM B727 AS SO (FE). LEVEL OF AUTOMATION WAS APPROPRIATE FOR THE PHASE OF FLT, BUT WAS NOT CORRECTLY PROGRAMMED FOR THE CLRNC. A HIGHER LEVEL OF SITUATIONAL AWARENESS WHILE DSNDING IN THE TERMINAL AREA AND MORE TIMELY COMPLETION OF THE APCH CHKLIST AND LESS EMPHASIS ON TRAINING IN THE HIGH DENSITY AREA WOULD HAVE PREVENTED THIS INCIDENT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 535082: LINE CHK PLT FAILED TO APPROPRIATELY MONITOR FO IN HIGH WORKLOAD ENVIRONMENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.