Narrative:

Flight lax-psp. Saab 340B model aircraft. I was the dispatcher. I normally work ord/dfw hubs. Flight abcd was assigned to my desk because company failed to adequately cover the shift. While calculating the flight release, the computer returned this message 'terrain check bypassed to destination.' this message concerned me. I was concerned about driftdown performance. I held release, and started asking other dispatchers what the computer message referred to, as well as asking management. Management, as usual, either did not know or were unavailable. Other dispatchers did not know. Approaching departure time and still no answers. Finally, management contacted a person in engineering operations. The engineer assured me the message could be ignored. Flight released on following route: lax.SLI3.sli.V64.trm..psp. While flight en route, engineer calls back and says he is not so sure now about the message. Upon further review, it appeared flight was in violation of drift-down standards. For 19 NM (5 NM east of hemet or 5 NM east of baldi) the flight was in violation of driftdown performance. Poor company training and management a direct cause of this violation. I was being cautious, yet the violation occurred. In the future, I will redouble my efforts at caution, as well as not trusting management. I had a feeling something was not right. My unfamiliarity with the lax operation was a factor. I could have rerouted the flight or lowered fuel or payload. I will not make this mistake again.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A DISPATCHER RPT ON TERRAIN CLRNC PROBS AND DRIFTDOWN ACFT PERFORMANCE ISSUES ENCOUNTERED IN ROUTING FLTS IN PROX OF DESIGNATED MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN BTWN LAX AND PSP, CA.

Narrative: FLT LAX-PSP. SAAB 340B MODEL ACFT. I WAS THE DISPATCHER. I NORMALLY WORK ORD/DFW HUBS. FLT ABCD WAS ASSIGNED TO MY DESK BECAUSE COMPANY FAILED TO ADEQUATELY COVER THE SHIFT. WHILE CALCULATING THE FLT RELEASE, THE COMPUTER RETURNED THIS MESSAGE 'TERRAIN CHK BYPASSED TO DEST.' THIS MESSAGE CONCERNED ME. I WAS CONCERNED ABOUT DRIFTDOWN PERFORMANCE. I HELD RELEASE, AND STARTED ASKING OTHER DISPATCHERS WHAT THE COMPUTER MESSAGE REFERRED TO, AS WELL AS ASKING MGMNT. MGMNT, AS USUAL, EITHER DID NOT KNOW OR WERE UNAVAILABLE. OTHER DISPATCHERS DID NOT KNOW. APCHING DEP TIME AND STILL NO ANSWERS. FINALLY, MGMNT CONTACTED A PERSON IN ENGINEERING OPS. THE ENGINEER ASSURED ME THE MESSAGE COULD BE IGNORED. FLT RELEASED ON FOLLOWING RTE: LAX.SLI3.SLI.V64.TRM..PSP. WHILE FLT ENRTE, ENGINEER CALLS BACK AND SAYS HE IS NOT SO SURE NOW ABOUT THE MESSAGE. UPON FURTHER REVIEW, IT APPEARED FLT WAS IN VIOLATION OF DRIFT-DOWN STANDARDS. FOR 19 NM (5 NM E OF HEMET OR 5 NM E OF BALDI) THE FLT WAS IN VIOLATION OF DRIFTDOWN PERFORMANCE. POOR COMPANY TRAINING AND MGMNT A DIRECT CAUSE OF THIS VIOLATION. I WAS BEING CAUTIOUS, YET THE VIOLATION OCCURRED. IN THE FUTURE, I WILL REDOUBLE MY EFFORTS AT CAUTION, AS WELL AS NOT TRUSTING MGMNT. I HAD A FEELING SOMETHING WAS NOT RIGHT. MY UNFAMILIARITY WITH THE LAX OP WAS A FACTOR. I COULD HAVE REROUTED THE FLT OR LOWERED FUEL OR PAYLOAD. I WILL NOT MAKE THIS MISTAKE AGAIN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.