Narrative:

The first indication of a problem occurred at 1500 ft, 25 NM (DME indication) southeast of check VOR (approximately 120 degree radial) on a westerly track. The left engine developed an intermittent roughness followed by an annunciation light informing of left alternator failure. The engine pressures and temperatures all indicated normal and fuel showed adequate with the selectors on appropriate main tanks, then, in sequence, the autoplt disconnected with the pertinent alert beeps and the radios and visible electronics began to flicker and shut down. An attempt to contact hnl approach was made just prior to a complete electrical system failure. The time frame of the aforementioned events is estimated to be between 15-30 seconds. Immediately after the electrical system failure, a visual inspection of the left engine revealed smoke trailing from the top left side of the cowling. Phase 1 of the emergency engine shutdown checklist was completed. However, the propeller would not go into feather. The checklist was reviewed and followed, still with no result in feathering the propeller. Determining that the electrical system failure and smoke from the left engine could be related, a decision to bring the engine back on line was made and minimum governing was set. The previous engine instruments positive indications as well as the potential of too large a drag component, which might have been created by a windmilling propeller, reinforced this decision. All pertinent circuit breakers, fuses, switches and system were isolated, pulled and shut down. The smoke from the left engine at that time was perceived to have ceased. However, the intermittent roughness was still occurring. Troubleshooting the roughness isolated the problem to the left magneto, by isolating the left magneto from the left engine the roughness decreased to an operable level. During the emergencys it was recognized that entering the hnl class B airspace unannounced would draw an intercept from the 'hawaii air guard,' being aware of the ramifications, hnl was still determined to provide the safest point of arrival. Attempts were made to contact hnl tower and 911 using a cell phone, however, a reliable connection was never established. At approximately 15 NM south of hnl, a direct track for runway 4R was established. 2 F15's came into view at approximately 10 NM south of hnl. Due to the C421C's slower speed the F15's were either unable or made no attempt to maintain a parallel path at equal speed for visual communication. The F15's executed at least 3 close (within 100 ft) passes/intercepts, visibly, along the sides and in front of the C421C. It was necessary to execute steep banks (greater than 45 degrees) to avoid jetwash and wake turbulence from the F15's. With the hope of indicating a peaceful landing intent to the guard pilots, a 360 degree right turn was initiated and landing gear extension was attempted. The landing gear failed to extend through normal procedures (attempted twice) therefore, the landing gear was extended using the pertinent emergency checklist and emergency landing gear extension handle. After completion of the 360 degree turn, the track to runway 4R was resumed and no flap landing was executed. A go around was anticipated due to lack of confirmation of landing gear 'down and locked,' however, was not required. Upon landing, the left engine was shut down and secured (not feathered) for precautionary measures and runway 4R was exited at taxiway east. The aircraft was parked and secured clear of all active txwys and runways. A visual inspection of the aircraft internally and externally revealed no obvious damage. Maintenance was informed and the aircraft was towed to the facility for further inspection. I believe the following actions would have created a universal knowledge chain resulting in less of a security breach as well as a higher level of preparedness for such a situation: 1) the filing and activation of at least a VFR flight plan. 2) maintaining at least VFR flight following with departure, center and approach. 3) carrying an operable handheld transceiver. 4) an auxiliary (separate power source) pwred transponder. 5) an ELT with cockpit activation capability. 6) ensuring cell phone range and charge prior to departure.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ARRIVING AT A MAJOR CLASS B ARPT WITH NO FLT PLAN AND A COMPLETE ELECTRICAL FAILURE AND ENG PROBS RESULTS IN AN INTERCEPT BY MIL ACFT.

Narrative: THE FIRST INDICATION OF A PROB OCCURRED AT 1500 FT, 25 NM (DME INDICATION) SE OF CHK VOR (APPROX 120 DEG RADIAL) ON A WESTERLY TRACK. THE L ENG DEVELOPED AN INTERMITTENT ROUGHNESS FOLLOWED BY AN ANNUNCIATION LIGHT INFORMING OF L ALTERNATOR FAILURE. THE ENG PRESSURES AND TEMPS ALL INDICATED NORMAL AND FUEL SHOWED ADEQUATE WITH THE SELECTORS ON APPROPRIATE MAIN TANKS, THEN, IN SEQUENCE, THE AUTOPLT DISCONNECTED WITH THE PERTINENT ALERT BEEPS AND THE RADIOS AND VISIBLE ELECTRONICS BEGAN TO FLICKER AND SHUT DOWN. AN ATTEMPT TO CONTACT HNL APCH WAS MADE JUST PRIOR TO A COMPLETE ELECTRICAL SYS FAILURE. THE TIME FRAME OF THE AFOREMENTIONED EVENTS IS ESTIMATED TO BE BTWN 15-30 SECONDS. IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE ELECTRICAL SYS FAILURE, A VISUAL INSPECTION OF THE L ENG REVEALED SMOKE TRAILING FROM THE TOP L SIDE OF THE COWLING. PHASE 1 OF THE EMER ENG SHUTDOWN CHKLIST WAS COMPLETED. HOWEVER, THE PROP WOULD NOT GO INTO FEATHER. THE CHKLIST WAS REVIEWED AND FOLLOWED, STILL WITH NO RESULT IN FEATHERING THE PROP. DETERMINING THAT THE ELECTRICAL SYS FAILURE AND SMOKE FROM THE L ENG COULD BE RELATED, A DECISION TO BRING THE ENG BACK ON LINE WAS MADE AND MINIMUM GOVERNING WAS SET. THE PREVIOUS ENG INSTS POSITIVE INDICATIONS AS WELL AS THE POTENTIAL OF TOO LARGE A DRAG COMPONENT, WHICH MIGHT HAVE BEEN CREATED BY A WINDMILLING PROP, REINFORCED THIS DECISION. ALL PERTINENT CIRCUIT BREAKERS, FUSES, SWITCHES AND SYS WERE ISOLATED, PULLED AND SHUT DOWN. THE SMOKE FROM THE L ENG AT THAT TIME WAS PERCEIVED TO HAVE CEASED. HOWEVER, THE INTERMITTENT ROUGHNESS WAS STILL OCCURRING. TROUBLESHOOTING THE ROUGHNESS ISOLATED THE PROB TO THE L MAGNETO, BY ISOLATING THE L MAGNETO FROM THE L ENG THE ROUGHNESS DECREASED TO AN OPERABLE LEVEL. DURING THE EMERS IT WAS RECOGNIZED THAT ENTERING THE HNL CLASS B AIRSPACE UNANNOUNCED WOULD DRAW AN INTERCEPT FROM THE 'HAWAII AIR GUARD,' BEING AWARE OF THE RAMIFICATIONS, HNL WAS STILL DETERMINED TO PROVIDE THE SAFEST POINT OF ARR. ATTEMPTS WERE MADE TO CONTACT HNL TWR AND 911 USING A CELL PHONE, HOWEVER, A RELIABLE CONNECTION WAS NEVER ESTABLISHED. AT APPROX 15 NM S OF HNL, A DIRECT TRACK FOR RWY 4R WAS ESTABLISHED. 2 F15'S CAME INTO VIEW AT APPROX 10 NM S OF HNL. DUE TO THE C421C'S SLOWER SPD THE F15'S WERE EITHER UNABLE OR MADE NO ATTEMPT TO MAINTAIN A PARALLEL PATH AT EQUAL SPD FOR VISUAL COM. THE F15'S EXECUTED AT LEAST 3 CLOSE (WITHIN 100 FT) PASSES/INTERCEPTS, VISIBLY, ALONG THE SIDES AND IN FRONT OF THE C421C. IT WAS NECESSARY TO EXECUTE STEEP BANKS (GREATER THAN 45 DEGS) TO AVOID JETWASH AND WAKE TURB FROM THE F15'S. WITH THE HOPE OF INDICATING A PEACEFUL LNDG INTENT TO THE GUARD PLTS, A 360 DEG R TURN WAS INITIATED AND LNDG GEAR EXTENSION WAS ATTEMPTED. THE LNDG GEAR FAILED TO EXTEND THROUGH NORMAL PROCS (ATTEMPTED TWICE) THEREFORE, THE LNDG GEAR WAS EXTENDED USING THE PERTINENT EMER CHKLIST AND EMER LNDG GEAR EXTENSION HANDLE. AFTER COMPLETION OF THE 360 DEG TURN, THE TRACK TO RWY 4R WAS RESUMED AND NO FLAP LNDG WAS EXECUTED. A GAR WAS ANTICIPATED DUE TO LACK OF CONFIRMATION OF LNDG GEAR 'DOWN AND LOCKED,' HOWEVER, WAS NOT REQUIRED. UPON LNDG, THE L ENG WAS SHUT DOWN AND SECURED (NOT FEATHERED) FOR PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES AND RWY 4R WAS EXITED AT TXWY E. THE ACFT WAS PARKED AND SECURED CLR OF ALL ACTIVE TXWYS AND RWYS. A VISUAL INSPECTION OF THE ACFT INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY REVEALED NO OBVIOUS DAMAGE. MAINT WAS INFORMED AND THE ACFT WAS TOWED TO THE FACILITY FOR FURTHER INSPECTION. I BELIEVE THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS WOULD HAVE CREATED A UNIVERSAL KNOWLEDGE CHAIN RESULTING IN LESS OF A SECURITY BREACH AS WELL AS A HIGHER LEVEL OF PREPAREDNESS FOR SUCH A SIT: 1) THE FILING AND ACTIVATION OF AT LEAST A VFR FLT PLAN. 2) MAINTAINING AT LEAST VFR FLT FOLLOWING WITH DEP, CTR AND APCH. 3) CARRYING AN OPERABLE HANDHELD TRANSCEIVER. 4) AN AUX (SEPARATE PWR SOURCE) PWRED XPONDER. 5) AN ELT WITH COCKPIT ACTIVATION CAPABILITY. 6) ENSURING CELL PHONE RANGE AND CHARGE PRIOR TO DEP.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.