Narrative:

The captain began his taxi from spot X towards runway 12. We were then told to change our departure runway to runway 9L, 'taxi to runway 9L via taxiway P.' I briefed the captain on the taxi route, 'continue ahead to taxiway P and turn right, that is this side of runway 12 and that takes us to the end.' he had heard ATC, my instruction, and had his diagram out. His response of 'uhuh' and his familiarity of the airport made me think he understood. I went heads down to reprogram the FMS to runway 9L and prepare for the next checklist as to be ready at the end of the runway (approximately 10 seconds). As I looked up to see our position, I did not see the all blue taxi light -- it was a mixture of blue and white. I thought it might be runway 12. As I looked to the right the runway edge lights disappeared from my aft right window. I also saw an aircraft at the arrival end of runway 12 in position with all its lights on. I started to move my hand towards the throttles to apply power if it appeared the other aircraft was moving. At this same time I said to the captain, 'no, no, no, we are on the runway we were supposed to turn.' I did not apply brakes, as if the other aircraft was moving I wanted the momentum to move quickly -- it was not. At this near same time, ATC advised us we had crossed an active runway. The captain then understood his mistake. We were then instructed to proceed to runway 9R for departure. ATC then advised us that because the other aircraft was position and hold that no conflict had resulted. The captain advised me that while he heard my and ATC instructions he had it in his mind that runway 9L was runway 9R. Runway 9R had been our arrival runway and so he gravitated toward it. He had heard 'taxi to' and saw the aircraft on runway 12, so he thought he was cleared to cross runway 12 and was watching the holding traffic. He stated that something did not seem right, but it did not become noticed. The captain's performance suffered because he did not use all available resources when he felt uneasy. Those being ATC, his diagram and his first officer. My performance suffered because I was overconfident in my captain based on his usual great performance and backgnd. I felt that he knew the airport and direction to proceed and that I would be free to perform my duties. Corrective actions would be for ATC to not use the term 'taxi to' unless it was used in specific to cross a runway. The captain should use the first officer as a living progressive taxi. Only to be released for other duties when no turn or crossing of runways is required. The first officer should treat the captain with the attitude that the captain could always be unaware of instructions or location. And only go heads down with no turns or runway crossing to be performed.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B717-200 CREW, TAXIING FOR TKOF AT MIA, TAXIED ONTO AN ACTIVE RWY WITHOUT A CLRNC.

Narrative: THE CAPT BEGAN HIS TAXI FROM SPOT X TOWARDS RWY 12. WE WERE THEN TOLD TO CHANGE OUR DEP RWY TO RWY 9L, 'TAXI TO RWY 9L VIA TXWY P.' I BRIEFED THE CAPT ON THE TAXI RTE, 'CONTINUE AHEAD TO TXWY P AND TURN R, THAT IS THIS SIDE OF RWY 12 AND THAT TAKES US TO THE END.' HE HAD HEARD ATC, MY INSTRUCTION, AND HAD HIS DIAGRAM OUT. HIS RESPONSE OF 'UHUH' AND HIS FAMILIARITY OF THE ARPT MADE ME THINK HE UNDERSTOOD. I WENT HEADS DOWN TO REPROGRAM THE FMS TO RWY 9L AND PREPARE FOR THE NEXT CHKLIST AS TO BE READY AT THE END OF THE RWY (APPROX 10 SECONDS). AS I LOOKED UP TO SEE OUR POS, I DID NOT SEE THE ALL BLUE TAXI LIGHT -- IT WAS A MIXTURE OF BLUE AND WHITE. I THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE RWY 12. AS I LOOKED TO THE R THE RWY EDGE LIGHTS DISAPPEARED FROM MY AFT R WINDOW. I ALSO SAW AN ACFT AT THE ARR END OF RWY 12 IN POS WITH ALL ITS LIGHTS ON. I STARTED TO MOVE MY HAND TOWARDS THE THROTTLES TO APPLY PWR IF IT APPEARED THE OTHER ACFT WAS MOVING. AT THIS SAME TIME I SAID TO THE CAPT, 'NO, NO, NO, WE ARE ON THE RWY WE WERE SUPPOSED TO TURN.' I DID NOT APPLY BRAKES, AS IF THE OTHER ACFT WAS MOVING I WANTED THE MOMENTUM TO MOVE QUICKLY -- IT WAS NOT. AT THIS NEAR SAME TIME, ATC ADVISED US WE HAD CROSSED AN ACTIVE RWY. THE CAPT THEN UNDERSTOOD HIS MISTAKE. WE WERE THEN INSTRUCTED TO PROCEED TO RWY 9R FOR DEP. ATC THEN ADVISED US THAT BECAUSE THE OTHER ACFT WAS POS AND HOLD THAT NO CONFLICT HAD RESULTED. THE CAPT ADVISED ME THAT WHILE HE HEARD MY AND ATC INSTRUCTIONS HE HAD IT IN HIS MIND THAT RWY 9L WAS RWY 9R. RWY 9R HAD BEEN OUR ARR RWY AND SO HE GRAVITATED TOWARD IT. HE HAD HEARD 'TAXI TO' AND SAW THE ACFT ON RWY 12, SO HE THOUGHT HE WAS CLRED TO CROSS RWY 12 AND WAS WATCHING THE HOLDING TFC. HE STATED THAT SOMETHING DID NOT SEEM RIGHT, BUT IT DID NOT BECOME NOTICED. THE CAPT'S PERFORMANCE SUFFERED BECAUSE HE DID NOT USE ALL AVAILABLE RESOURCES WHEN HE FELT UNEASY. THOSE BEING ATC, HIS DIAGRAM AND HIS FO. MY PERFORMANCE SUFFERED BECAUSE I WAS OVERCONFIDENT IN MY CAPT BASED ON HIS USUAL GREAT PERFORMANCE AND BACKGND. I FELT THAT HE KNEW THE ARPT AND DIRECTION TO PROCEED AND THAT I WOULD BE FREE TO PERFORM MY DUTIES. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS WOULD BE FOR ATC TO NOT USE THE TERM 'TAXI TO' UNLESS IT WAS USED IN SPECIFIC TO CROSS A RWY. THE CAPT SHOULD USE THE FO AS A LIVING PROGRESSIVE TAXI. ONLY TO BE RELEASED FOR OTHER DUTIES WHEN NO TURN OR XING OF RWYS IS REQUIRED. THE FO SHOULD TREAT THE CAPT WITH THE ATTITUDE THAT THE CAPT COULD ALWAYS BE UNAWARE OF INSTRUCTIONS OR LOCATION. AND ONLY GO HEADS DOWN WITH NO TURNS OR RWY XING TO BE PERFORMED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.