Narrative:

Our arrival clearance was sat direct ela, then gland arrival, ela transition. ZHU started us down early from FL370 to FL240, then several mins later turned us 20 degrees or 30 degrees right for traffic. After several more mins, he told us to maintain FL250 and proceed direct to kawse. We had never heard of kawse, so we responded, 'that isn't on our route, please spell it,' and he responded with a sarcastic tone, 'it's on your chart,' and then spelled it for us. We put it on the legs page, saw it appear on our maps about 25 mi ahead and proceeded direct in LNAV. Then we began looking and found kawse on the gland arrival as another transition, and believing we were now cleared for the gland arrival from over kawse, we selected that transition from the arrs page. After several mins more, we were level at FL250 and approaching our top of descent point for crossing gland at 10000 ft and 250 KTS and began requesting lower. He responded 'unable lower' to each of our requests, and when we were about 10-15 mi past kawse, he asked us, 'are you going to enter the hold at kawse?' that was the first we had heard of any holding, so we said, 'you didn't clear us to hold,' and he responded, 'yes I did, I told you to hold as published.' we said, 'no you didn't,' and he said, ' yes I did, I'll pull the tapes.' then he vectored us around in a big r-hand box for spacing and cleared us on in. During this time period, we saw no other aircraft near us visually or on TCASII, and the WX, traffic, and communications seemed normal, except that the controller was sounding terse and irritated with all of his communications. We never heard a holding clearance for any aircraft, including ours, and certainly never read back any such clearance. We are wondering if he said or thought he said 'hold as published' immediately after he said 'proceed direct kawse,' but since he caught us off guard and we were asking each other 'go where?' we just never heard it. Most controllers will start by saying 'flight xyz, ZHU, holding clearance' first to get your attention. We clearly had a communication error between the crew and the controller. In his defense, he probably had just been told by approach not to send any more aircraft in over gland for a few mins, and he had to scramble to fit us all somewhere. Thinking back, neither of us is sure that he said 'direct kawse, gland arrival,' but that is what we both thought we were cleared to do, so it never crossed our minds to doublechk. We both are pretty certain that he did not say, 'direct kawse, hold west as published, expect further clearance at XA20,' but if it is acceptable for him to say no more than, 'hold as published,' he might have slipped that by us when we were wondering what kawse was, and we should have been aware that he said more we didn't hear. The most important thing for a crew in a busy traffic environment is to be sure of their lateral and vertical clrncs and comply promptly and fully. If there is any doubt about the clearance, they have to request clarification, no matter how overloaded the controller sounds. We probably should have realized from the controller's abruptness and irritation with everybody that there were traffic problems ahead and questioned his intent in sending us to kawse. It appears that we jumped to a conclusion or heard what we wanted to hear, and I definitely have added this kind of incident to my mental list of potential threats. The controllers need to ensure that they are not issuing unclr or partial clrncs and listen for readback to doublechk our understanding of their intentions -- especially when things are busy and crazy.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: HDG TRACK DEV AND NON COMPLIANCE WITH CLRNC AS A B737-500 FLC CONTINUE PAST THEIR ASSIGNED HOLDING AT KAWSE INTXN ON THE GLAND STAR INTO IAH, TX.

Narrative: OUR ARR CLRNC WAS SAT DIRECT ELA, THEN GLAND ARR, ELA TRANSITION. ZHU STARTED US DOWN EARLY FROM FL370 TO FL240, THEN SEVERAL MINS LATER TURNED US 20 DEGS OR 30 DEGS R FOR TFC. AFTER SEVERAL MORE MINS, HE TOLD US TO MAINTAIN FL250 AND PROCEED DIRECT TO KAWSE. WE HAD NEVER HEARD OF KAWSE, SO WE RESPONDED, 'THAT ISN'T ON OUR RTE, PLEASE SPELL IT,' AND HE RESPONDED WITH A SARCASTIC TONE, 'IT'S ON YOUR CHART,' AND THEN SPELLED IT FOR US. WE PUT IT ON THE LEGS PAGE, SAW IT APPEAR ON OUR MAPS ABOUT 25 MI AHEAD AND PROCEEDED DIRECT IN LNAV. THEN WE BEGAN LOOKING AND FOUND KAWSE ON THE GLAND ARR AS ANOTHER TRANSITION, AND BELIEVING WE WERE NOW CLRED FOR THE GLAND ARR FROM OVER KAWSE, WE SELECTED THAT TRANSITION FROM THE ARRS PAGE. AFTER SEVERAL MINS MORE, WE WERE LEVEL AT FL250 AND APCHING OUR TOP OF DSCNT POINT FOR XING GLAND AT 10000 FT AND 250 KTS AND BEGAN REQUESTING LOWER. HE RESPONDED 'UNABLE LOWER' TO EACH OF OUR REQUESTS, AND WHEN WE WERE ABOUT 10-15 MI PAST KAWSE, HE ASKED US, 'ARE YOU GOING TO ENTER THE HOLD AT KAWSE?' THAT WAS THE FIRST WE HAD HEARD OF ANY HOLDING, SO WE SAID, 'YOU DIDN'T CLR US TO HOLD,' AND HE RESPONDED, 'YES I DID, I TOLD YOU TO HOLD AS PUBLISHED.' WE SAID, 'NO YOU DIDN'T,' AND HE SAID, ' YES I DID, I'LL PULL THE TAPES.' THEN HE VECTORED US AROUND IN A BIG R-HAND BOX FOR SPACING AND CLRED US ON IN. DURING THIS TIME PERIOD, WE SAW NO OTHER ACFT NEAR US VISUALLY OR ON TCASII, AND THE WX, TFC, AND COMS SEEMED NORMAL, EXCEPT THAT THE CTLR WAS SOUNDING TERSE AND IRRITATED WITH ALL OF HIS COMS. WE NEVER HEARD A HOLDING CLRNC FOR ANY ACFT, INCLUDING OURS, AND CERTAINLY NEVER READ BACK ANY SUCH CLRNC. WE ARE WONDERING IF HE SAID OR THOUGHT HE SAID 'HOLD AS PUBLISHED' IMMEDIATELY AFTER HE SAID 'PROCEED DIRECT KAWSE,' BUT SINCE HE CAUGHT US OFF GUARD AND WE WERE ASKING EACH OTHER 'GO WHERE?' WE JUST NEVER HEARD IT. MOST CTLRS WILL START BY SAYING 'FLT XYZ, ZHU, HOLDING CLRNC' FIRST TO GET YOUR ATTN. WE CLRLY HAD A COM ERROR BTWN THE CREW AND THE CTLR. IN HIS DEFENSE, HE PROBABLY HAD JUST BEEN TOLD BY APCH NOT TO SEND ANY MORE ACFT IN OVER GLAND FOR A FEW MINS, AND HE HAD TO SCRAMBLE TO FIT US ALL SOMEWHERE. THINKING BACK, NEITHER OF US IS SURE THAT HE SAID 'DIRECT KAWSE, GLAND ARR,' BUT THAT IS WHAT WE BOTH THOUGHT WE WERE CLRED TO DO, SO IT NEVER CROSSED OUR MINDS TO DOUBLECHK. WE BOTH ARE PRETTY CERTAIN THAT HE DID NOT SAY, 'DIRECT KAWSE, HOLD W AS PUBLISHED, EXPECT FURTHER CLRNC AT XA20,' BUT IF IT IS ACCEPTABLE FOR HIM TO SAY NO MORE THAN, 'HOLD AS PUBLISHED,' HE MIGHT HAVE SLIPPED THAT BY US WHEN WE WERE WONDERING WHAT KAWSE WAS, AND WE SHOULD HAVE BEEN AWARE THAT HE SAID MORE WE DIDN'T HEAR. THE MOST IMPORTANT THING FOR A CREW IN A BUSY TFC ENVIRONMENT IS TO BE SURE OF THEIR LATERAL AND VERT CLRNCS AND COMPLY PROMPTLY AND FULLY. IF THERE IS ANY DOUBT ABOUT THE CLRNC, THEY HAVE TO REQUEST CLARIFICATION, NO MATTER HOW OVERLOADED THE CTLR SOUNDS. WE PROBABLY SHOULD HAVE REALIZED FROM THE CTLR'S ABRUPTNESS AND IRRITATION WITH EVERYBODY THAT THERE WERE TFC PROBS AHEAD AND QUESTIONED HIS INTENT IN SENDING US TO KAWSE. IT APPEARS THAT WE JUMPED TO A CONCLUSION OR HEARD WHAT WE WANTED TO HEAR, AND I DEFINITELY HAVE ADDED THIS KIND OF INCIDENT TO MY MENTAL LIST OF POTENTIAL THREATS. THE CTLRS NEED TO ENSURE THAT THEY ARE NOT ISSUING UNCLR OR PARTIAL CLRNCS AND LISTEN FOR READBACK TO DOUBLECHK OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THEIR INTENTIONS -- ESPECIALLY WHEN THINGS ARE BUSY AND CRAZY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.