Narrative:

High velocity tailwind descent into phl resulting in an altitude error. ATC clearance was to cross cofax at FL240. I discussed the parameters of the FMS being limited with a high tailwind (270 degrees, 130 KTS) when entering crossing altitude in the FMS and discussed how I would compensate for it. The first officer disagreed with my briefed solution and its limits to this FMS limit. He stated it was not a problem. I asked him how he would compensate for this FMS limit and he said with 'speed adjustment.' I agreed that would work as well. During the descent, I was off communication #1 getting WX and gate information and I noticed and I informed first officer he was high and informed ATC, whereupon ATC stated 'do your best.' first officer never attempted to change his descent profile as he had briefed prior to descent by compensating for tailwind with speed and he missed crossing restr by 600 ft (air was smooth without any in-flight PIREPS of turbulence) and stated 'that is his problem, not mine,' prior to the crossing fix. When informed of the need for paperwork, he shouted 'good' and he put his face closely in front of mine. I would describe his behavior as rage. I took control of the aircraft and performed PF duties such as entering FMS data. He disagreed with my entry and changed it and stated it is not a correct procedure. I directed first officer to accomplish PNF tasks, whereupon 'transition,' '180 for 170' callouts were missed, which may have caused an altitude error. I had to direct first officer to concentrate on assisting me when he was concentrating on taking notes. I told him to 'put away the notes.' below 10000 ft (critical phase of flight) he was reading the QRH (I had not called for nor was I informed of QRH need) due to a status message. I stated 'put away the QRH.' multiple callouts were absent and/or erroneous by first officer. I had to repeat my commands multiple times to have them accomplished, such as 'flaps 2 degrees' with the aircraft speed appropriate for the commanded flap setting and no callouts of 'speed.' contributing factors: fatigue was a factor (scheduling FLIP-flop). Current company and union employee relations (statements by ceo during a 'town hall' meeting and lack of contract negotiations progress, using tax money to 'bust our union,' etc, was discussed prior to departure.) prevention: my suggestion for this problem is additional CRM and simulator training (currently working with 'professional standards') for first officer. For better scheduling policy to reduce fatigue. ACARS WX would have assisted me in identing high condition earlier by not being off communication #1 to get WX and gate information. Updating FMS math co-processors to compensate for high tailwind/high ground speed dscnts. I noticed a 'temper' display from first officer at the gate in phx (beginning of the pairing) when gate agent wanted to place a 'must ride' pilot on the flight deck jump seat to make more room for additional 'must ride' pilots (full aircraft). He was shouting 'no way' and was verbally bashing scheduling. He was demonstrating 'his authority/authorized' that he was making the decision. We discussed the situation as well as having a 'secret service' man on board (according to flight operations bulletin) being allowed to occupy the jump seat without an available cabin seat and not requiring employee verification. Both of us were glad to have him up front with us, considering the nation is at war, and came to an agreement. Secret service agent stays up front while another deadheading captain remains up front in the cockpit as well. I should have questioned his mental state when he began shouting in phx and had him replaced at that time in phx. The contract negotiations between the management and pilots is becoming more of an adversarial relationship and is increasing stress levels. I am suggesting and will request a presidential emergency board resolve the dispute.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A319 CAPT AND FO DO NOT APPEAR TO BE GETTING ALONG AND ARE NOT ABLE TO WORK AS AN EFFECTIVE CREW.

Narrative: HIGH VELOCITY TAILWIND DSCNT INTO PHL RESULTING IN AN ALT ERROR. ATC CLRNC WAS TO CROSS COFAX AT FL240. I DISCUSSED THE PARAMETERS OF THE FMS BEING LIMITED WITH A HIGH TAILWIND (270 DEGS, 130 KTS) WHEN ENTERING XING ALT IN THE FMS AND DISCUSSED HOW I WOULD COMPENSATE FOR IT. THE FO DISAGREED WITH MY BRIEFED SOLUTION AND ITS LIMITS TO THIS FMS LIMIT. HE STATED IT WAS NOT A PROB. I ASKED HIM HOW HE WOULD COMPENSATE FOR THIS FMS LIMIT AND HE SAID WITH 'SPD ADJUSTMENT.' I AGREED THAT WOULD WORK AS WELL. DURING THE DSCNT, I WAS OFF COM #1 GETTING WX AND GATE INFO AND I NOTICED AND I INFORMED FO HE WAS HIGH AND INFORMED ATC, WHEREUPON ATC STATED 'DO YOUR BEST.' FO NEVER ATTEMPTED TO CHANGE HIS DSCNT PROFILE AS HE HAD BRIEFED PRIOR TO DSCNT BY COMPENSATING FOR TAILWIND WITH SPD AND HE MISSED XING RESTR BY 600 FT (AIR WAS SMOOTH WITHOUT ANY INFLT PIREPS OF TURB) AND STATED 'THAT IS HIS PROB, NOT MINE,' PRIOR TO THE XING FIX. WHEN INFORMED OF THE NEED FOR PAPERWORK, HE SHOUTED 'GOOD' AND HE PUT HIS FACE CLOSELY IN FRONT OF MINE. I WOULD DESCRIBE HIS BEHAVIOR AS RAGE. I TOOK CTL OF THE ACFT AND PERFORMED PF DUTIES SUCH AS ENTERING FMS DATA. HE DISAGREED WITH MY ENTRY AND CHANGED IT AND STATED IT IS NOT A CORRECT PROC. I DIRECTED FO TO ACCOMPLISH PNF TASKS, WHEREUPON 'TRANSITION,' '180 FOR 170' CALLOUTS WERE MISSED, WHICH MAY HAVE CAUSED AN ALT ERROR. I HAD TO DIRECT FO TO CONCENTRATE ON ASSISTING ME WHEN HE WAS CONCENTRATING ON TAKING NOTES. I TOLD HIM TO 'PUT AWAY THE NOTES.' BELOW 10000 FT (CRITICAL PHASE OF FLT) HE WAS READING THE QRH (I HAD NOT CALLED FOR NOR WAS I INFORMED OF QRH NEED) DUE TO A STATUS MESSAGE. I STATED 'PUT AWAY THE QRH.' MULTIPLE CALLOUTS WERE ABSENT AND/OR ERRONEOUS BY FO. I HAD TO REPEAT MY COMMANDS MULTIPLE TIMES TO HAVE THEM ACCOMPLISHED, SUCH AS 'FLAPS 2 DEGS' WITH THE ACFT SPD APPROPRIATE FOR THE COMMANDED FLAP SETTING AND NO CALLOUTS OF 'SPD.' CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: FATIGUE WAS A FACTOR (SCHEDULING FLIP-FLOP). CURRENT COMPANY AND UNION EMPLOYEE RELATIONS (STATEMENTS BY CEO DURING A 'TOWN HALL' MEETING AND LACK OF CONTRACT NEGOTIATIONS PROGRESS, USING TAX MONEY TO 'BUST OUR UNION,' ETC, WAS DISCUSSED PRIOR TO DEP.) PREVENTION: MY SUGGESTION FOR THIS PROB IS ADDITIONAL CRM AND SIMULATOR TRAINING (CURRENTLY WORKING WITH 'PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS') FOR FO. FOR BETTER SCHEDULING POLICY TO REDUCE FATIGUE. ACARS WX WOULD HAVE ASSISTED ME IN IDENTING HIGH CONDITION EARLIER BY NOT BEING OFF COM #1 TO GET WX AND GATE INFO. UPDATING FMS MATH CO-PROCESSORS TO COMPENSATE FOR HIGH TAILWIND/HIGH GND SPD DSCNTS. I NOTICED A 'TEMPER' DISPLAY FROM FO AT THE GATE IN PHX (BEGINNING OF THE PAIRING) WHEN GATE AGENT WANTED TO PLACE A 'MUST RIDE' PLT ON THE FLT DECK JUMP SEAT TO MAKE MORE ROOM FOR ADDITIONAL 'MUST RIDE' PLTS (FULL ACFT). HE WAS SHOUTING 'NO WAY' AND WAS VERBALLY BASHING SCHEDULING. HE WAS DEMONSTRATING 'HIS AUTH' THAT HE WAS MAKING THE DECISION. WE DISCUSSED THE SIT AS WELL AS HAVING A 'SECRET SVC' MAN ON BOARD (ACCORDING TO FLT OPS BULLETIN) BEING ALLOWED TO OCCUPY THE JUMP SEAT WITHOUT AN AVAILABLE CABIN SEAT AND NOT REQUIRING EMPLOYEE VERIFICATION. BOTH OF US WERE GLAD TO HAVE HIM UP FRONT WITH US, CONSIDERING THE NATION IS AT WAR, AND CAME TO AN AGREEMENT. SECRET SVC AGENT STAYS UP FRONT WHILE ANOTHER DEADHEADING CAPT REMAINS UP FRONT IN THE COCKPIT AS WELL. I SHOULD HAVE QUESTIONED HIS MENTAL STATE WHEN HE BEGAN SHOUTING IN PHX AND HAD HIM REPLACED AT THAT TIME IN PHX. THE CONTRACT NEGOTIATIONS BTWN THE MGMNT AND PLTS IS BECOMING MORE OF AN ADVERSARIAL RELATIONSHIP AND IS INCREASING STRESS LEVELS. I AM SUGGESTING AND WILL REQUEST A PRESIDENTIAL EMER BOARD RESOLVE THE DISPUTE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.