Narrative:

We were west abeam the airport at 6000 ft, 210 KTS and heading 190 degrees. I was the PF. Approach control indicated that we should expect a short approach. We received a descent clearance to 3000 ft. I selected 180 KTS, activated the speed brakes momentarily and requested flaps 8 degrees. Shortly thereafter I requested flaps 15 degrees. I asked the first officer to advise approach control that the runway was in sight. The first officer complied. Approach control stated that a regional jet was at our 9 O'clock position. I could not find the traffic. Approach control stated that we should expect a left turn. This was followed almost immediately by another transmission directing us to turn left to 90 degrees along with a visual approach clearance. The autoplt was engaged as were, I believed, the automatic throttles. I turned my attention to the flight mode panel and dialed a left turn to 90 degrees. As I scanned the primary flight display, I saw a long decreasing airspeed trend line. The indicated airspeed was at or slightly below vma. I corrected by swiftly and smoothly adding power. Safe airspeed was achieved swiftly. I believe that alpha mode protection had engaged. The rest of the flight continued safely and normally. In my own review of what caused this event, several failures on my behalf became evident. I had disconnected the autothrottles in order to effect a smooth airspeed reduction from approximately 300 KTS back to 210 KTS. During the subsequent descent to 3000 ft, I selected the autothrottles back on by arming the autothrottles switch on the flight mode panel. I failed to ensure that the green select light under the indicated airspeed knob was illuminated. Because of this, I would not have been sure that the select mode was active. I was no longer flying the aircraft. I failed to adequately communicate with the first officer that the autothrottles were off when I intended them to be off. Likewise, I did not effectively communicate when I intended for them to be back on. I did not seek a confirmation from the first officer on either occasion. I allowed myself to be distracted. I failed to set priorities. I was overly indulged in spotting traffic. The traffic posed no threat to our safety. However, in a misplaced effort to get the job done I allowed my attention to digress from the real job of flying the aircraft. I placed an over-reliance on automation. I failed to confirm mode selection of the autothrottles. I failed to keep scanning. In analyzing the failures that led to this event, it has given me a greater awareness of the following: 1) prioritization of tasks. 2) CRM. Effective communication is speaking and receiving a response. 3) automation. Always confirm that the commanded mode is active. Continue to scan instrumentation.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PLT BECOMES DISTR DURING APCH AND FAILS TO NOTICE AUTOTHROTTLES ARE NOT ENGAGED. ACFT SLOWS BELOW MINIMUM APCH SPD.

Narrative: WE WERE W ABEAM THE ARPT AT 6000 FT, 210 KTS AND HDG 190 DEGS. I WAS THE PF. APCH CTL INDICATED THAT WE SHOULD EXPECT A SHORT APCH. WE RECEIVED A DSCNT CLRNC TO 3000 FT. I SELECTED 180 KTS, ACTIVATED THE SPD BRAKES MOMENTARILY AND REQUESTED FLAPS 8 DEGS. SHORTLY THEREAFTER I REQUESTED FLAPS 15 DEGS. I ASKED THE FO TO ADVISE APCH CTL THAT THE RWY WAS IN SIGHT. THE FO COMPLIED. APCH CTL STATED THAT A REGIONAL JET WAS AT OUR 9 O'CLOCK POS. I COULD NOT FIND THE TFC. APCH CTL STATED THAT WE SHOULD EXPECT A L TURN. THIS WAS FOLLOWED ALMOST IMMEDIATELY BY ANOTHER XMISSION DIRECTING US TO TURN L TO 90 DEGS ALONG WITH A VISUAL APCH CLRNC. THE AUTOPLT WAS ENGAGED AS WERE, I BELIEVED, THE AUTO THROTTLES. I TURNED MY ATTN TO THE FLT MODE PANEL AND DIALED A L TURN TO 90 DEGS. AS I SCANNED THE PRIMARY FLT DISPLAY, I SAW A LONG DECREASING AIRSPD TREND LINE. THE INDICATED AIRSPD WAS AT OR SLIGHTLY BELOW VMA. I CORRECTED BY SWIFTLY AND SMOOTHLY ADDING PWR. SAFE AIRSPD WAS ACHIEVED SWIFTLY. I BELIEVE THAT ALPHA MODE PROTECTION HAD ENGAGED. THE REST OF THE FLT CONTINUED SAFELY AND NORMALLY. IN MY OWN REVIEW OF WHAT CAUSED THIS EVENT, SEVERAL FAILURES ON MY BEHALF BECAME EVIDENT. I HAD DISCONNECTED THE AUTOTHROTTLES IN ORDER TO EFFECT A SMOOTH AIRSPD REDUCTION FROM APPROX 300 KTS BACK TO 210 KTS. DURING THE SUBSEQUENT DSCNT TO 3000 FT, I SELECTED THE AUTOTHROTTLES BACK ON BY ARMING THE AUTOTHROTTLES SWITCH ON THE FLT MODE PANEL. I FAILED TO ENSURE THAT THE GREEN SELECT LIGHT UNDER THE INDICATED AIRSPD KNOB WAS ILLUMINATED. BECAUSE OF THIS, I WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SURE THAT THE SELECT MODE WAS ACTIVE. I WAS NO LONGER FLYING THE ACFT. I FAILED TO ADEQUATELY COMMUNICATE WITH THE FO THAT THE AUTOTHROTTLES WERE OFF WHEN I INTENDED THEM TO BE OFF. LIKEWISE, I DID NOT EFFECTIVELY COMMUNICATE WHEN I INTENDED FOR THEM TO BE BACK ON. I DID NOT SEEK A CONFIRMATION FROM THE FO ON EITHER OCCASION. I ALLOWED MYSELF TO BE DISTRACTED. I FAILED TO SET PRIORITIES. I WAS OVERLY INDULGED IN SPOTTING TFC. THE TFC POSED NO THREAT TO OUR SAFETY. HOWEVER, IN A MISPLACED EFFORT TO GET THE JOB DONE I ALLOWED MY ATTN TO DIGRESS FROM THE REAL JOB OF FLYING THE ACFT. I PLACED AN OVER-RELIANCE ON AUTOMATION. I FAILED TO CONFIRM MODE SELECTION OF THE AUTOTHROTTLES. I FAILED TO KEEP SCANNING. IN ANALYZING THE FAILURES THAT LED TO THIS EVENT, IT HAS GIVEN ME A GREATER AWARENESS OF THE FOLLOWING: 1) PRIORITIZATION OF TASKS. 2) CRM. EFFECTIVE COM IS SPEAKING AND RECEIVING A RESPONSE. 3) AUTOMATION. ALWAYS CONFIRM THAT THE COMMANDED MODE IS ACTIVE. CONTINUE TO SCAN INSTRUMENTATION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.