Narrative:

On may/sat/02, I was the first officer on a flight from iah to shv. As we approached the shv area I told the captain (the PF) that I thought I had the field. After talking about it we decided that we did not think that was the field and that there was numerous airports in the area. ATC then informed us of the field location which matched the location of the field we were looking at. At that point ATC asked if we wanted a vector/turn to lose altitude. I asked the captain/PF and he said to tell them we had the field. Upon informing ATC we had the field, we were cleared for the approach. At that point, I do not recall our altitude however, it looked high. The captain commanded flaps and gear down. As we were within the speed limitation. I selected flaps and gear down. The captain then began what I would consider an aggressive descent. I do not recall the rate of descent as I was working on the before landing checklist. As we reached 2000 ft MSL the captain slowed the rate of descent and began turning towards the field. Around 4.5 mi DME on runway 14 localizer I called shv tower and received permission to land on runway 14. As I was uncomfortable with the initial high descent rate I told the captain I was uncomfortable with the approach and that 'I did not like this.' as the captain did not want to exceed 30 degrees of bank we overshot final a little and then he corrected back to final. Around this point both the captain's pfd and mfd went blank and the aural warning unit began to say 'terrain, terrain, bank angle, windshear.' as it was VFR and the approach was on localizer/GS at the time, we continued. The aural warning unit continued to say bank angle all the way to the gate during the taxi in. We landed on speed in the touchdown zone without incident. However, due to the initial high rate of descent and going through the localizer, I as the first officer felt the approach to be unstable. I also felt we could have used better CRM as the captain did not tell me what we were doing and did not respond to my questioning his approach. Better planning should have been executed and we should have taken a turn to lose altitude.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: UNSTABILIZED APCH.

Narrative: ON MAY/SAT/02, I WAS THE FO ON A FLT FROM IAH TO SHV. AS WE APCHED THE SHV AREA I TOLD THE CAPT (THE PF) THAT I THOUGHT I HAD THE FIELD. AFTER TALKING ABOUT IT WE DECIDED THAT WE DID NOT THINK THAT WAS THE FIELD AND THAT THERE WAS NUMEROUS ARPTS IN THE AREA. ATC THEN INFORMED US OF THE FIELD LOCATION WHICH MATCHED THE LOCATION OF THE FIELD WE WERE LOOKING AT. AT THAT POINT ATC ASKED IF WE WANTED A VECTOR/TURN TO LOSE ALT. I ASKED THE CAPT/PF AND HE SAID TO TELL THEM WE HAD THE FIELD. UPON INFORMING ATC WE HAD THE FIELD, WE WERE CLRED FOR THE APCH. AT THAT POINT, I DO NOT RECALL OUR ALT HOWEVER, IT LOOKED HIGH. THE CAPT COMMANDED FLAPS AND GEAR DOWN. AS WE WERE WITHIN THE SPD LIMITATION. I SELECTED FLAPS AND GEAR DOWN. THE CAPT THEN BEGAN WHAT I WOULD CONSIDER AN AGGRESSIVE DSCNT. I DO NOT RECALL THE RATE OF DSCNT AS I WAS WORKING ON THE BEFORE LNDG CHKLIST. AS WE REACHED 2000 FT MSL THE CAPT SLOWED THE RATE OF DSCNT AND BEGAN TURNING TOWARDS THE FIELD. AROUND 4.5 MI DME ON RWY 14 LOC I CALLED SHV TWR AND RECEIVED PERMISSION TO LAND ON RWY 14. AS I WAS UNCOMFORTABLE WITH THE INITIAL HIGH DSCNT RATE I TOLD THE CAPT I WAS UNCOMFORTABLE WITH THE APCH AND THAT 'I DID NOT LIKE THIS.' AS THE CAPT DID NOT WANT TO EXCEED 30 DEGS OF BANK WE OVERSHOT FINAL A LITTLE AND THEN HE CORRECTED BACK TO FINAL. AROUND THIS POINT BOTH THE CAPT'S PFD AND MFD WENT BLANK AND THE AURAL WARNING UNIT BEGAN TO SAY 'TERRAIN, TERRAIN, BANK ANGLE, WINDSHEAR.' AS IT WAS VFR AND THE APCH WAS ON LOC/GS AT THE TIME, WE CONTINUED. THE AURAL WARNING UNIT CONTINUED TO SAY BANK ANGLE ALL THE WAY TO THE GATE DURING THE TAXI IN. WE LANDED ON SPD IN THE TOUCHDOWN ZONE WITHOUT INCIDENT. HOWEVER, DUE TO THE INITIAL HIGH RATE OF DSCNT AND GOING THROUGH THE LOC, I AS THE FO FELT THE APCH TO BE UNSTABLE. I ALSO FELT WE COULD HAVE USED BETTER CRM AS THE CAPT DID NOT TELL ME WHAT WE WERE DOING AND DID NOT RESPOND TO MY QUESTIONING HIS APCH. BETTER PLANNING SHOULD HAVE BEEN EXECUTED AND WE SHOULD HAVE TAKEN A TURN TO LOSE ALT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.