Narrative:

This incident occurred as aircraft were departure las using runway 7L and 7R and arriving via runway 1R. An aircraft cleared into position to hold (HS125) (runway 7L) halted a taxi operation, and an aircraft on final for an intersecting runway (B737) (runway 1R) executed a go around. A 737 on approach to runway 1R at las executed a go around when a conflict developed with our aircraft (HS125) after being cleared into position to hold on an intersecting runway, runway 7L. To complete this taxi, our aircraft was required to complete a 120 degree left turn and taxi several hundred feet to cross the approach end of intersecting runway 1L and runway 1R to reach the displaced threshold of runway 7L. My aircraft, a hawker (HS125-600) taxied via taxiway H to the hold line for runway 1L and runway 7L. Several aircraft landed in close succession on runway 1R during the period we were holding. My aircraft was cleared into position to hold runway 7L, with additional information that an aircraft was on final for runway 1R. Our aircraft began taxi at normal speed, proceeding around a turn to align with runway 7L and taxi to the displaced threshold line. During taxi the aircraft on final for runway 1R began to appear to be too close and the first officer queried tower, 'do you want us to cross runway 1R?' tower replied, 'yes you better hurry the aircraft is on short final.' during the exchange, I decided there was insufficient time to make a safe crossing and stopped the HS125. The first officer told the tower the captain is holding short. The HS125 stopped approximately 50-100 ft from runway 7R, but was inside the hold line for runway 7R. The 737 making an approach to runway 1R executed a go around. The tower then cleared the HS125 for takeoff. We did not hear the tower issue a go around instruction to the 737. We did not hear the 737 report he was go around. Analysis and comment: this intersection of 4 runways appears to be a high conflict area with takeoffs and lndgs occurring simultaneously on intersecting runways. The tower controller cleared our aircraft into position to hold, did not indicate the range of the 737. This additional information might have helped us determine how much time we had to taxi into position. The controller did not indicate we should taxi without delay, which also would have given us an indication that the time was constrained. We taxied at a normal taxi pace during which time it became increasingly apparent the 737 was too close and closing too fast to allow a safe crossing of the intersecting runway 1R. Lacking information about the range of the 737, it initially appeared visually there would be no problem with the instruction issued by the controller. After completing the turn to align with runway 7L the first officer visually re-evaluated closure and on that basis, he questioned the controller. It may not have been apparent from the controllers point of view, that a safe crossing was not longer possible when he instructed us to hurry, however, it was increasingly apparent that we could not continue at a normal pace. Accelerating the taxi to make the crossing was considered unsafe. I felt the safest course of action was to stop. It seems in retrospect, that the controller may have allowed insufficient time for our aircraft to complete a taxi from the hold position for runway 1L and runway 7L, into position to hold for runway 7L, which has a displaced threshold that is beyond the intersection of runway 1R and runway 7L. This could have been avoided by both providing our aircraft information regarding the range of the aircraft on final, and by increasing the minimum separation. This is particularly important because the distance an aircraft must taxi to clear runway 1R required a somewhat extended time. It must be remembered that during this period the departure crew is completing pre-departure final checks, and the captain has limited visibility of the final approach. I feel additional separation was required. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: pilot reports the taxiway area in the vicinity of runway 7L, taxiway H and west is very confusing. Its hard to tell where you are. Its just a morass of pavement. Aircraft were holding short of runway 7L on taxiway D, and were going into position from there. Pilot reports he thought he had to taxi to the displaced threshold to begin takeoff. He noted a hold short line for runway 7L, 1L. He also saw the hold line for runway 1R on runway 7L. He was not aware that the position clearance would have allowed him to hold at the end of runway 7L, on runway 1L. The tower controller did nothing to clarify the confusion. Pilot would like to see the confusion at this part of the airport cleared up before an accident occurs.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: HS125 CAPT DECLINED THE CLRNC INTO POSITION AND HOLD BECAUSE HE THOUGHT THE SPACING WITH A LNDG ACR WAS TOO CLOSE. THE ACR WAS SENT AROUND.

Narrative: THIS INCIDENT OCCURRED AS ACFT WERE DEP LAS USING RWY 7L AND 7R AND ARRIVING VIA RWY 1R. AN ACFT CLRED INTO POSITION TO HOLD (HS125) (RWY 7L) HALTED A TAXI OP, AND AN ACFT ON FINAL FOR AN INTERSECTING RWY (B737) (RWY 1R) EXECUTED A GAR. A 737 ON APCH TO RWY 1R AT LAS EXECUTED A GAR WHEN A CONFLICT DEVELOPED WITH OUR ACFT (HS125) AFTER BEING CLRED INTO POSITION TO HOLD ON AN INTERSECTING RWY, RWY 7L. TO COMPLETE THIS TAXI, OUR ACFT WAS REQUIRED TO COMPLETE A 120 DEG L TURN AND TAXI SEVERAL HUNDRED FEET TO CROSS THE APCH END OF INTERSECTING RWY 1L AND RWY 1R TO REACH THE DISPLACED THRESHOLD OF RWY 7L. MY ACFT, A HAWKER (HS125-600) TAXIED VIA TXWY H TO THE HOLD LINE FOR RWY 1L AND RWY 7L. SEVERAL ACFT LANDED IN CLOSE SUCCESSION ON RWY 1R DURING THE PERIOD WE WERE HOLDING. MY ACFT WAS CLRED INTO POSITION TO HOLD RWY 7L, WITH ADDITIONAL INFO THAT AN ACFT WAS ON FINAL FOR RWY 1R. OUR ACFT BEGAN TAXI AT NORMAL SPEED, PROCEEDING AROUND A TURN TO ALIGN WITH RWY 7L AND TAXI TO THE DISPLACED THRESHOLD LINE. DURING TAXI THE ACFT ON FINAL FOR RWY 1R BEGAN TO APPEAR TO BE TOO CLOSE AND THE FO QUERIED TWR, 'DO YOU WANT US TO CROSS RWY 1R?' TWR REPLIED, 'YES YOU BETTER HURRY THE ACFT IS ON SHORT FINAL.' DURING THE EXCHANGE, I DECIDED THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT TIME TO MAKE A SAFE CROSSING AND STOPPED THE HS125. THE FO TOLD THE TWR THE CAPT IS HOLDING SHORT. THE HS125 STOPPED APPROX 50-100 FT FROM RWY 7R, BUT WAS INSIDE THE HOLD LINE FOR RWY 7R. THE 737 MAKING AN APCH TO RWY 1R EXECUTED A GAR. THE TWR THEN CLRED THE HS125 FOR TKOF. WE DID NOT HEAR THE TWR ISSUE A GAR INSTRUCTION TO THE 737. WE DID NOT HEAR THE 737 RPT HE WAS GAR. ANALYSIS AND COMMENT: THIS INTERSECTION OF 4 RWYS APPEARS TO BE A HIGH CONFLICT AREA WITH TAKEOFFS AND LNDGS OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY ON INTERSECTING RWYS. THE TWR CTLR CLRED OUR ACFT INTO POS TO HOLD, DID NOT INDICATE THE RANGE OF THE 737. THIS ADDITIONAL INFO MIGHT HAVE HELPED US DETERMINE HOW MUCH TIME WE HAD TO TAXI INTO POSITION. THE CTLR DID NOT INDICATE WE SHOULD TAXI WITHOUT DELAY, WHICH ALSO WOULD HAVE GIVEN US AN INDICATION THAT THE TIME WAS CONSTRAINED. WE TAXIED AT A NORMAL TAXI PACE DURING WHICH TIME IT BECAME INCREASINGLY APPARENT THE 737 WAS TOO CLOSE AND CLOSING TOO FAST TO ALLOW A SAFE CROSSING OF THE INTERSECTING RWY 1R. LACKING INFO ABOUT THE RANGE OF THE 737, IT INITIALLY APPEARED VISUALLY THERE WOULD BE NO PROB WITH THE INSTRUCTION ISSUED BY THE CTLR. AFTER COMPLETING THE TURN TO ALIGN WITH RWY 7L THE FO VISUALLY RE-EVALUATED CLOSURE AND ON THAT BASIS, HE QUESTIONED THE CTLR. IT MAY NOT HAVE BEEN APPARENT FROM THE CTLRS POINT OF VIEW, THAT A SAFE CROSSING WAS NOT LONGER POSSIBLE WHEN HE INSTRUCTED US TO HURRY, HOWEVER, IT WAS INCREASINGLY APPARENT THAT WE COULD NOT CONTINUE AT A NORMAL PACE. ACCELERATING THE TAXI TO MAKE THE CROSSING WAS CONSIDERED UNSAFE. I FELT THE SAFEST COURSE OF ACTION WAS TO STOP. IT SEEMS IN RETROSPECT, THAT THE CTLR MAY HAVE ALLOWED INSUFFICIENT TIME FOR OUR ACFT TO COMPLETE A TAXI FROM THE HOLD POSITION FOR RWY 1L AND RWY 7L, INTO POSITION TO HOLD FOR RWY 7L, WHICH HAS A DISPLACED THRESHOLD THAT IS BEYOND THE INTERSECTION OF RWY 1R AND RWY 7L. THIS COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED BY BOTH PROVIDING OUR ACFT INFO REGARDING THE RANGE OF THE ACFT ON FINAL, AND BY INCREASING THE MINIMUM SEPARATION. THIS IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT BECAUSE THE DISTANCE AN ACFT MUST TAXI TO CLR RWY 1R REQUIRED A SOMEWHAT EXTENDED TIME. IT MUST BE REMEMBERED THAT DURING THIS PERIOD THE DEP CREW IS COMPLETING PRE-DEP FINAL CHKS, AND THE CAPT HAS LIMITED VISIBILITY OF THE FINAL APCH. I FEEL ADDITIONAL SEPARATION WAS REQUIRED. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: PLT RPTS THE TXWY AREA IN THE VICINITY OF RWY 7L, TXWY H AND W IS VERY CONFUSING. ITS HARD TO TELL WHERE YOU ARE. ITS JUST A MORASS OF PAVEMENT. ACFT WERE HOLDING SHORT OF RWY 7L ON TXWY D, AND WERE GOING INTO POSITION FROM THERE. PLT RPTS HE THOUGHT HE HAD TO TAXI TO THE DISPLACED THRESHOLD TO BEGIN TKOF. HE NOTED A HOLD SHORT LINE FOR RWY 7L, 1L. HE ALSO SAW THE HOLD LINE FOR RWY 1R ON RWY 7L. HE WAS NOT AWARE THAT THE POSITION CLRNC WOULD HAVE ALLOWED HIM TO HOLD AT THE END OF RWY 7L, ON RWY 1L. THE TWR CTLR DID NOTHING TO CLARIFY THE CONFUSION. PLT WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE CONFUSION AT THIS PART OF THE ARPT CLRED UP BEFORE AN ACCIDENT OCCURS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.