Narrative:

We were ferrying from ith to teb we had been initially told to expect the ILS to runway 19 and configured the cockpit for that approach. We were then cleared to wanes intersection and to fly the VOR DME alpha circle to runway 19. We configured the cockpit for the new approach. We were told to maintain 3000 ft until wanes and cross jaymo at 1500 ft. After crossing jaymo at 3000 ft we started to descend to 1500 ft, tower then told us to descend to 1500 ft immediately (we did). We crossed teb at 1500 ft and started a left turn to downwind for runway 19. We were then told that we were number two to land and our traffic was an aztec at 11 O'clock. We located the aztec and though we were number 2 to follow him. However, it became apparent that we were to close to land behind the aztec and would probably have to go around. At about that time we were able to determine that the aztec was on final to runway 24. We evaluated our position and ability to continue and land runway 19 as cleared. We determined that we would probably be on the ground on runway 19 at the same time the aztec was on the rolling out on runway 24. We felt that presented an unsafe situation and elected to go around. We initiated the go around procedure and turned to fly down runway 19 and climb to 1000 ft since we knew that inbound traffic would be crossing the field at 1500 ft. Tower asked us what we were doing, instructed us to fly heading 190 degrees and climb to 1000 ft. Another aircraft crossing the field at 1500 ft reported a TCAS alert to the tower. We believe that the TCAS was valid since we were climbing and the TCAS in the other aircraft could not anticipate that we would level 500 ft below it. We were instructed to enter another downwind to runway 19 and did so landing without further confusion. On rollout we were asked to call the tower and obtained the number from ground control after clearing the runway. He did and the tower controller wanted to ascertain that we understood the teterboro procedures, limitations and constraints. The captain assured him that we did and discussed mis-communications concerning the aztec. The tower operation, who portrayed himself as the supervisor said the incident was closed, he just wanted to clear the confusion and make sure we understood the procedure. Supplemental information from acn 548170: I got ATIS and was told to expect ILS 19. When center handed us to approach they then told us to execute the VOR DME a. This approach involves flying over the field at 1500 ft then a left turn to fly downwind for runway 19. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: pilot reported that last min changes into teb are not that uncommon. The controller completely changes the charted approach however, the altitudes listed on the approach plate are not used, and the aircraft is directed to overfly the airport at 1500 ft before starting the circle. The actual missed approach procedure has nothing to do with the charted procedure. Pilot stated the language barrier in being able to understand the nyc controllers is worse than that at many foreign airports. The controllers have a ny accent and talk so fast as to be extremely hard to understand. On this particular occasion frequency interference and traffic density were very heavy. This was definitely contributing to the communication problem.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: H25C FLC WAS REQUIRED TO EXECUTE A GAR WHEN SPACE TOO CLOSE BEHIND A PA27 ON THE VOR/DME A APCH TO TEB.

Narrative: WE WERE FERRYING FROM ITH TO TEB WE HAD BEEN INITIALLY TOLD TO EXPECT THE ILS TO RWY 19 AND CONFIGURED THE COCKPIT FOR THAT APCH. WE WERE THEN CLRED TO WANES INTERSECTION AND TO FLY THE VOR DME ALPHA CIRCLE TO RWY 19. WE CONFIGURED THE COCKPIT FOR THE NEW APCH. WE WERE TOLD TO MAINTAIN 3000 FT UNTIL WANES AND CROSS JAYMO AT 1500 FT. AFTER CROSSING JAYMO AT 3000 FT WE STARTED TO DESCEND TO 1500 FT, TWR THEN TOLD US TO DESCEND TO 1500 FT IMMEDIATELY (WE DID). WE CROSSED TEB AT 1500 FT AND STARTED A LEFT TURN TO DOWNWIND FOR RWY 19. WE WERE THEN TOLD THAT WE WERE NUMBER TWO TO LAND AND OUR TFC WAS AN AZTEC AT 11 O'CLOCK. WE LOCATED THE AZTEC AND THOUGH WE WERE NUMBER 2 TO FOLLOW HIM. HOWEVER, IT BECAME APPARENT THAT WE WERE TO CLOSE TO LAND BEHIND THE AZTEC AND WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO GAR. AT ABOUT THAT TIME WE WERE ABLE TO DETERMINE THAT THE AZTEC WAS ON FINAL TO RWY 24. WE EVALUATED OUR POSITION AND ABILITY TO CONTINUE AND LAND RWY 19 AS CLRED. WE DETERMINED THAT WE WOULD PROBABLY BE ON THE GND ON RWY 19 AT THE SAME TIME THE AZTEC WAS ON THE ROLLING OUT ON RWY 24. WE FELT THAT PRESENTED AN UNSAFE SIT AND ELECTED TO GAR. WE INITIATED THE GAR PROC AND TURNED TO FLY DOWN RWY 19 AND CLIMB TO 1000 FT SINCE WE KNEW THAT INBOUND TFC WOULD BE CROSSING THE FIELD AT 1500 FT. TWR ASKED US WHAT WE WERE DOING, INSTRUCTED US TO FLY HEADING 190 DEGS AND CLIMB TO 1000 FT. ANOTHER ACFT CROSSING THE FIELD AT 1500 FT RPTED A TCAS ALERT TO THE TWR. WE BELIEVE THAT THE TCAS WAS VALID SINCE WE WERE CLIMBING AND THE TCAS IN THE OTHER ACFT COULD NOT ANTICIPATE THAT WE WOULD LEVEL 500 FT BELOW IT. WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO ENTER ANOTHER DOWNWIND TO RWY 19 AND DID SO LNDG WITHOUT FURTHER CONFUSION. ON ROLLOUT WE WERE ASKED TO CALL THE TWR AND OBTAINED THE NUMBER FROM GND CTL AFTER CLRING THE RWY. HE DID AND THE TWR CTLR WANTED TO ASCERTAIN THAT WE UNDERSTOOD THE TETERBORO PROCS, LIMITATIONS AND CONSTRAINTS. THE CAPT ASSURED HIM THAT WE DID AND DISCUSSED MIS-COMS CONCERNING THE AZTEC. THE TWR OP, WHO PORTRAYED HIMSELF AS THE SUPVR SAID THE INCIDENT WAS CLOSED, HE JUST WANTED TO CLR THE CONFUSION AND MAKE SURE WE UNDERSTOOD THE PROC. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 548170: I GOT ATIS AND WAS TOLD TO EXPECT ILS 19. WHEN CTR HANDED US TO APCH THEY THEN TOLD US TO EXECUTE THE VOR DME A. THIS APCH INVOLVES FLYING OVER THE FIELD AT 1500 FT THEN A LEFT TURN TO FLY DOWNWIND FOR RWY 19. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: PLT RPTED THAT LAST MIN CHANGES INTO TEB ARE NOT THAT UNCOMMON. THE CTLR COMPLETELY CHANGES THE CHARTED APCH HOWEVER, THE ALTITUDES LISTED ON THE APCH PLATE ARE NOT USED, AND THE ACFT IS DIRECTED TO OVERFLY THE ARPT AT 1500 FT BEFORE STARTING THE CIRCLE. THE ACTUAL MISSED APCH PROC HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH THE CHARTED PROC. PLT STATED THE LANGUAGE BARRIER IN BEING ABLE TO UNDERSTAND THE NYC CTLRS IS WORSE THAN THAT AT MANY FOREIGN ARPTS. THE CTLRS HAVE A NY ACCENT AND TALK SO FAST AS TO BE EXTREMELY HARD TO UNDERSTAND. ON THIS PARTICULAR OCCASION FREQUENCY INTERFERENCE AND TFC DENSITY WERE VERY HEAVY. THIS WAS DEFINITELY CONTRIBUTING TO THE COM PROB.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.