Narrative:

We departed atw at XA30Z. The takeoff, climb and cruise segments of flight were normal with all engine parameters within normal operating limits. In cruise flight (FL270) at approximately XB10Z, we experienced a rapid rollback on the #2 (right) engine with low oil pressure warnings. There was no adverse ctlability. A decision was made to declare an emergency and initiate a turn towards laf, approximately 60 NM east of our position. (During the remainder of the incident, captain flew the aircraft and was in contact with ATC. I ran all checklists, communicated with our dispatcher, briefed the flight attendant, and made general announcements to the passenger.) ATC was notified and the captain initiated a descent. We accomplished the 'single engine procedure' checklist. An engine relight was attempted as per the checklist. The engine failed to relight and we noted that there was zero rotation according to engine instruments. The procedure was checked again and the captain and I concurred that the restart failed. I then completed the 'single engine landing' checklist. Dispatch was contacted. Actual landing distance was calculated and arrangements were made for our arrival in laf. I discussed the situation with the flight attendant, and made a brief announcement to the passenger. We were given vectors to the ILS runway 10 at laf. Conditions were VFR. Perhaps due to a late handoff from approach, the tower seemed confused when we contacted them, asking us what runway we were landing and then asking us to report the OM inbound, which we had already passed. We asked twice if emergency equipment had been dispatched. We were assured that it had been, but it was not visible to us during approach and landing. During this confusion, the full 'before landing checklist' was not read. As a result, we landed without the thrust reverser armed on the operating engine. After an uneventful landing, we taxied to the ramp and parked the aircraft. In review: the safety of our passenger was our first priority and although we could not prevent the engine from failing, we took quick and decisive actions to reduce the possibilities of further problems. Checklists were used at all times and we did not stray from the concepts employed by company policy and training.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CL65 CREW HAD AN ENG FAILURE THAT RESULTED IN A DIVERSION TO AN INAPPROPRIATE ARPT.

Narrative: WE DEPARTED ATW AT XA30Z. THE TKOF, CLB AND CRUISE SEGMENTS OF FLT WERE NORMAL WITH ALL ENG PARAMETERS WITHIN NORMAL OPERATING LIMITS. IN CRUISE FLT (FL270) AT APPROX XB10Z, WE EXPERIENCED A RAPID ROLLBACK ON THE #2 (R) ENG WITH LOW OIL PRESSURE WARNINGS. THERE WAS NO ADVERSE CTLABILITY. A DECISION WAS MADE TO DECLARE AN EMER AND INITIATE A TURN TOWARDS LAF, APPROX 60 NM E OF OUR POS. (DURING THE REMAINDER OF THE INCIDENT, CAPT FLEW THE ACFT AND WAS IN CONTACT WITH ATC. I RAN ALL CHKLISTS, COMMUNICATED WITH OUR DISPATCHER, BRIEFED THE FLT ATTENDANT, AND MADE GENERAL ANNOUNCEMENTS TO THE PAX.) ATC WAS NOTIFIED AND THE CAPT INITIATED A DSCNT. WE ACCOMPLISHED THE 'SINGLE ENG PROC' CHKLIST. AN ENG RELIGHT WAS ATTEMPTED AS PER THE CHKLIST. THE ENG FAILED TO RELIGHT AND WE NOTED THAT THERE WAS ZERO ROTATION ACCORDING TO ENG INSTS. THE PROC WAS CHKED AGAIN AND THE CAPT AND I CONCURRED THAT THE RESTART FAILED. I THEN COMPLETED THE 'SINGLE ENG LNDG' CHKLIST. DISPATCH WAS CONTACTED. ACTUAL LNDG DISTANCE WAS CALCULATED AND ARRANGEMENTS WERE MADE FOR OUR ARR IN LAF. I DISCUSSED THE SIT WITH THE FLT ATTENDANT, AND MADE A BRIEF ANNOUNCEMENT TO THE PAX. WE WERE GIVEN VECTORS TO THE ILS RWY 10 AT LAF. CONDITIONS WERE VFR. PERHAPS DUE TO A LATE HDOF FROM APCH, THE TWR SEEMED CONFUSED WHEN WE CONTACTED THEM, ASKING US WHAT RWY WE WERE LNDG AND THEN ASKING US TO RPT THE OM INBOUND, WHICH WE HAD ALREADY PASSED. WE ASKED TWICE IF EMER EQUIP HAD BEEN DISPATCHED. WE WERE ASSURED THAT IT HAD BEEN, BUT IT WAS NOT VISIBLE TO US DURING APCH AND LNDG. DURING THIS CONFUSION, THE FULL 'BEFORE LNDG CHKLIST' WAS NOT READ. AS A RESULT, WE LANDED WITHOUT THE THRUST REVERSER ARMED ON THE OPERATING ENG. AFTER AN UNEVENTFUL LNDG, WE TAXIED TO THE RAMP AND PARKED THE ACFT. IN REVIEW: THE SAFETY OF OUR PAX WAS OUR FIRST PRIORITY AND ALTHOUGH WE COULD NOT PREVENT THE ENG FROM FAILING, WE TOOK QUICK AND DECISIVE ACTIONS TO REDUCE THE POSSIBILITIES OF FURTHER PROBS. CHKLISTS WERE USED AT ALL TIMES AND WE DID NOT STRAY FROM THE CONCEPTS EMPLOYED BY COMPANY POLICY AND TRAINING.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.