Narrative:

Landed visually with no ECAM alerts to runway 26 abq. Upon rollout, ATC tower cleared us to 'turn left at taxiway C and contact ground.' no mention to 'hold short' of runway 12/30. Just prior to turning off runway 26 at taxiway C, we received multiple ECAM alerts for the engine hp bleed valve and a flap fault while taxiing on taxiway C, the after landing checklist was being accomplished, and the ECAM items were being discussed. The first officer did not contact ground control. I was distraction by the ECAM, trying to determine if the flap advisory was for system #1 or system #2. The first officer's head was down running the checklist and looking at the ECAM. At this time we began to cross runway 12/30 at taxiway C. Approximately 1/2 way across the runway, I realized we were crossing the runway, and that we may not have been cleared to cross. I determined it was safer to continue rather than stop on the runway. We both thought we had been cleared to the ramp by tower. ATC ground asked us if we had been cleared to cross the runway, just as we cleared the runway. We asked ground if we had been cleared to the ramp. Ground advised us that was not the case. No loss of separation was noted. My policy in the cockpit is to repeat the hold short instructions to the first officer so that he knows I heard the hold short instructions as well as reinforcing them in my head. No hold short instructions were heard so nothing was said. We were not taxiing at a high rate of speed -- approximately 10 KTS. This seems to be a typical chain of events incident. The contributing factor in my mind is the fact that we were distraction at a critical point during taxi. I was concerned with giving a good write-up to maintenance because I believe the flap fault was on a system not previously written up (system #1 versus system #2). At the time it did not seem practical to stop the aircraft to work the problem because we had just completed the flight. If the hold short lines had been visible, they may have caught my attention and I would have stopped the aircraft or at least have asked to confirm cleared to cross. Supplemental information from acn 551414: prior to exiting runway, captain called for after landing checklist, prompting me to comply. At the same time, tower called to give clearance to exit runway, switch to ground and taxi to the ramp. While the captain taxied the jet, I continued with the after landing checklist and a discussion on troubleshooting commenced. The next thing that occurred was a runway incursion. We called ground to verify we were cleared to the ramp. Ground controller informed us we had not been cleared all the way to the ramp by tower.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN A310 CREW, AFTER LNDG AT ABQ, NEGLECTED TO CONTACT GND CTL AND CROSSED A RWY THEY WERE NOT CLRED TO CROSS.

Narrative: LANDED VISUALLY WITH NO ECAM ALERTS TO RWY 26 ABQ. UPON ROLLOUT, ATC TWR CLRED US TO 'TURN L AT TXWY C AND CONTACT GND.' NO MENTION TO 'HOLD SHORT' OF RWY 12/30. JUST PRIOR TO TURNING OFF RWY 26 AT TXWY C, WE RECEIVED MULTIPLE ECAM ALERTS FOR THE ENG HP BLEED VALVE AND A FLAP FAULT WHILE TAXIING ON TXWY C, THE AFTER LNDG CHKLIST WAS BEING ACCOMPLISHED, AND THE ECAM ITEMS WERE BEING DISCUSSED. THE FO DID NOT CONTACT GND CTL. I WAS DISTR BY THE ECAM, TRYING TO DETERMINE IF THE FLAP ADVISORY WAS FOR SYS #1 OR SYS #2. THE FO'S HEAD WAS DOWN RUNNING THE CHKLIST AND LOOKING AT THE ECAM. AT THIS TIME WE BEGAN TO CROSS RWY 12/30 AT TXWY C. APPROX 1/2 WAY ACROSS THE RWY, I REALIZED WE WERE XING THE RWY, AND THAT WE MAY NOT HAVE BEEN CLRED TO CROSS. I DETERMINED IT WAS SAFER TO CONTINUE RATHER THAN STOP ON THE RWY. WE BOTH THOUGHT WE HAD BEEN CLRED TO THE RAMP BY TWR. ATC GND ASKED US IF WE HAD BEEN CLRED TO CROSS THE RWY, JUST AS WE CLRED THE RWY. WE ASKED GND IF WE HAD BEEN CLRED TO THE RAMP. GND ADVISED US THAT WAS NOT THE CASE. NO LOSS OF SEPARATION WAS NOTED. MY POLICY IN THE COCKPIT IS TO REPEAT THE HOLD SHORT INSTRUCTIONS TO THE FO SO THAT HE KNOWS I HEARD THE HOLD SHORT INSTRUCTIONS AS WELL AS REINFORCING THEM IN MY HEAD. NO HOLD SHORT INSTRUCTIONS WERE HEARD SO NOTHING WAS SAID. WE WERE NOT TAXIING AT A HIGH RATE OF SPD -- APPROX 10 KTS. THIS SEEMS TO BE A TYPICAL CHAIN OF EVENTS INCIDENT. THE CONTRIBUTING FACTOR IN MY MIND IS THE FACT THAT WE WERE DISTR AT A CRITICAL POINT DURING TAXI. I WAS CONCERNED WITH GIVING A GOOD WRITE-UP TO MAINT BECAUSE I BELIEVE THE FLAP FAULT WAS ON A SYS NOT PREVIOUSLY WRITTEN UP (SYS #1 VERSUS SYS #2). AT THE TIME IT DID NOT SEEM PRACTICAL TO STOP THE ACFT TO WORK THE PROB BECAUSE WE HAD JUST COMPLETED THE FLT. IF THE HOLD SHORT LINES HAD BEEN VISIBLE, THEY MAY HAVE CAUGHT MY ATTN AND I WOULD HAVE STOPPED THE ACFT OR AT LEAST HAVE ASKED TO CONFIRM CLRED TO CROSS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 551414: PRIOR TO EXITING RWY, CAPT CALLED FOR AFTER LNDG CHKLIST, PROMPTING ME TO COMPLY. AT THE SAME TIME, TWR CALLED TO GIVE CLRNC TO EXIT RWY, SWITCH TO GND AND TAXI TO THE RAMP. WHILE THE CAPT TAXIED THE JET, I CONTINUED WITH THE AFTER LNDG CHKLIST AND A DISCUSSION ON TROUBLESHOOTING COMMENCED. THE NEXT THING THAT OCCURRED WAS A RWY INCURSION. WE CALLED GND TO VERIFY WE WERE CLRED TO THE RAMP. GND CTLR INFORMED US WE HAD NOT BEEN CLRED ALL THE WAY TO THE RAMP BY TWR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.