F28 crew flew the aircraft with multiple MEL'ed items that required the other to be operative.

Attributes
ACN	555755
Time
Date	200207
Day	Sun
Local Time Of Day	1201 To 1800
Place
Locale Reference	airport : zzz.airport
State Reference	US
Altitude	agl single value : 0
Environment
Flight Conditions	VMC
Light	Daylight
Aircraft 1
Operator	common carrier : air carrier
Make Model Name	F28 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 121
Flight Plan	IFR
Person 1
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : captain oversight : pic
Qualification	pilot : atp pilot : flight engineer
Experience	flight time last 90 days : 100 flight time total : 20000 flight time type : 3000
ASRS Report	555755
Person 2
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : first officer
Events
Anomaly	aircraft equipment problem : critical maintenance problem : non compliance with mel non adherence : company policies non adherence : published procedure non adherence : far other anomaly other
Independent Detector	other other : 3-4
Resolutory Action	none taken : detected after the fact
Consequence	faa : assigned or threatened penalties faa : investigated other
Factors
Maintenance	contributing factor : schedule pressure performance deficiency : non compliance with legal requirements performance deficiency : repair
Supplementary
Problem Areas	Aircraft Company Flight Crew Human Performance
Primary Problem	Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative:

On approach into sea, the autoplt disconnected from the approach mode. The failure was written up and the autoplt was put on the MEL list, which also included an inoperative altitude alerting system. Given the items on the MEL list, the altitude alert system required that the altitude hold of the autoplt be operative. The autoplt system may be inoperative, but the altitude hold must be operative if the altitude alerting system is inoperative. Air carrier and the FAA believe I operated an aircraft in an unairworthy condition. I strongly disagreed. MEL required the altitude hold to be operational if the altitude alerting system was inoperative. It was, as I just flew the aircraft. MEL also stated in operating procedures 'any mode (pitch or roll) which is not deferred and functions normally may be used.' based on the above 2 statements, I, as captain, and with dispatch's and maintenance's approval, flew the aircraft for the rest of the day. The altitude hold, as required, functioned normally.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: F28 CREW FLEW THE ACFT WITH MULTIPLE MEL'ED ITEMS THAT REQUIRED THE OTHER TO BE OPERATIVE.

Narrative: ON APCH INTO SEA, THE AUTOPLT DISCONNECTED FROM THE APCH MODE. THE FAILURE WAS WRITTEN UP AND THE AUTOPLT WAS PUT ON THE MEL LIST, WHICH ALSO INCLUDED AN INOP ALT ALERTING SYS. GIVEN THE ITEMS ON THE MEL LIST, THE ALT ALERT SYS REQUIRED THAT THE ALT HOLD OF THE AUTOPLT BE OPERATIVE. THE AUTOPLT SYS MAY BE INOP, BUT THE ALT HOLD MUST BE OPERATIVE IF THE ALT ALERTING SYS IS INOP. ACR AND THE FAA BELIEVE I OPERATED AN ACFT IN AN UNAIRWORTHY CONDITION. I STRONGLY DISAGREED. MEL REQUIRED THE ALT HOLD TO BE OPERATIONAL IF THE ALT ALERTING SYS WAS INOP. IT WAS, AS I JUST FLEW THE ACFT. MEL ALSO STATED IN OPERATING PROCS 'ANY MODE (PITCH OR ROLL) WHICH IS NOT DEFERRED AND FUNCTIONS NORMALLY MAY BE USED.' BASED ON THE ABOVE 2 STATEMENTS, I, AS CAPT, AND WITH DISPATCH'S AND MAINT'S APPROVAL, FLEW THE ACFT FOR THE REST OF THE DAY. THE ALT HOLD, AS REQUIRED, FUNCTIONED NORMALLY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.