Narrative:

This is a runway incursion incident which involves the inadvertent crossing of an active runway at a controled airport, apparently without a clearance to do so. There was no known conflicting traffic or near miss. After clearing the primary active runway, we reversed course on the parallel taxiway and proceeded toward parking 'while' contacting ground control. This parallel taxiway crosses another (shorter) runway which is commonly active at the same time as the primary. There was no observed traffic of any concern on the ground or in-flight. The crew is very familiar with this airport. After 2 efforts to contact ground control to result in a reply, the tower controller was contacted for frequency verification (still taxiing). The tower controller advised that ground control was temporarily changed to an approach control frequency. This frequency was read back by the copilot incorrectly, but corrected by the controller and read back correctly before the next frequency change. The PIC was aware of the crossing runway approaching, and while aware of the communication confusion, slowed to check for traffic and verbally verified 'cleared to cross' with the copilot who was handling radio communication. Copilot responded in the affirmative, so we crossed. We were not aware of any wrongdoing, other than perhaps a delayed taxi clearance due to the frequency change confusion. On the ramp, we were asked to contact the tower by telephone and were then advised that we crossed the intervening runway without a clearance to do so. We were not advised of any concerns related to conflicting traffic. Further specifics were not immediately available from the controllers. After discussing and not remembering the final outcome of ground control communications, we checked the copilot's active radio and found 120.225 till tuned, rather than the temporarily assigned 120.25. I believe this was the second incorrect frequency tuned. We concluded from this, as was later verified by the controllers, that we had never successfully contacted ground control to receive a taxi clearance. Contributing factors: this was a short, 40 mi, 15 min trip in a complex, high-performance airplane with each phase of flight rushed. As a crew, these 2 pilots had not flown together recently and perhaps only once in the previous yr. Arriving ATIS was partially heard, but not fully understood and recorded. The temporary ground control frequency change would have been announced at the end of the ATIS broadcast. We believe that the arrival approach controller failed to verify that we had received ATIS (not to assign blame, however). Crew familiarity with the airport: with no traffic in sight, and with the crew so accustomed to being 'cleared to parking' by tower or ground controllers, we failed to recognize that we had not been so cleared, perhaps while distraction by after landing checklist items. I always announce, check and correspond with the second pilot concerning crossing runways. Although this was done, our brief discussion failed to reveal that a clearance to cross had never actually been received. Opportunities missed to prevent this incident: 1) arriving ATIS should have been more completely understood. 2) the aircraft should have been stopped until communications were complete regarding taxi clearance, especially after there was known confusion about the frequency and before crossing a potentially active runway.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AFTER LNDG, A DA20 CREW CROSS AN ACTIVE RWY WITHOUT OBTAINING A CLRNC.

Narrative: THIS IS A RWY INCURSION INCIDENT WHICH INVOLVES THE INADVERTENT XING OF AN ACTIVE RWY AT A CTLED ARPT, APPARENTLY WITHOUT A CLRNC TO DO SO. THERE WAS NO KNOWN CONFLICTING TFC OR NEAR MISS. AFTER CLRING THE PRIMARY ACTIVE RWY, WE REVERSED COURSE ON THE PARALLEL TXWY AND PROCEEDED TOWARD PARKING 'WHILE' CONTACTING GND CTL. THIS PARALLEL TXWY CROSSES ANOTHER (SHORTER) RWY WHICH IS COMMONLY ACTIVE AT THE SAME TIME AS THE PRIMARY. THERE WAS NO OBSERVED TFC OF ANY CONCERN ON THE GND OR INFLT. THE CREW IS VERY FAMILIAR WITH THIS ARPT. AFTER 2 EFFORTS TO CONTACT GND CTL TO RESULT IN A REPLY, THE TWR CTLR WAS CONTACTED FOR FREQ VERIFICATION (STILL TAXIING). THE TWR CTLR ADVISED THAT GND CTL WAS TEMPORARILY CHANGED TO AN APCH CTL FREQ. THIS FREQ WAS READ BACK BY THE COPLT INCORRECTLY, BUT CORRECTED BY THE CTLR AND READ BACK CORRECTLY BEFORE THE NEXT FREQ CHANGE. THE PIC WAS AWARE OF THE XING RWY APCHING, AND WHILE AWARE OF THE COM CONFUSION, SLOWED TO CHK FOR TFC AND VERBALLY VERIFIED 'CLRED TO CROSS' WITH THE COPLT WHO WAS HANDLING RADIO COM. COPLT RESPONDED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE, SO WE CROSSED. WE WERE NOT AWARE OF ANY WRONGDOING, OTHER THAN PERHAPS A DELAYED TAXI CLRNC DUE TO THE FREQ CHANGE CONFUSION. ON THE RAMP, WE WERE ASKED TO CONTACT THE TWR BY TELEPHONE AND WERE THEN ADVISED THAT WE CROSSED THE INTERVENING RWY WITHOUT A CLRNC TO DO SO. WE WERE NOT ADVISED OF ANY CONCERNS RELATED TO CONFLICTING TFC. FURTHER SPECIFICS WERE NOT IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE FROM THE CTLRS. AFTER DISCUSSING AND NOT REMEMBERING THE FINAL OUTCOME OF GND CTL COMS, WE CHKED THE COPLT'S ACTIVE RADIO AND FOUND 120.225 TILL TUNED, RATHER THAN THE TEMPORARILY ASSIGNED 120.25. I BELIEVE THIS WAS THE SECOND INCORRECT FREQ TUNED. WE CONCLUDED FROM THIS, AS WAS LATER VERIFIED BY THE CTLRS, THAT WE HAD NEVER SUCCESSFULLY CONTACTED GND CTL TO RECEIVE A TAXI CLRNC. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: THIS WAS A SHORT, 40 MI, 15 MIN TRIP IN A COMPLEX, HIGH-PERFORMANCE AIRPLANE WITH EACH PHASE OF FLT RUSHED. AS A CREW, THESE 2 PLTS HAD NOT FLOWN TOGETHER RECENTLY AND PERHAPS ONLY ONCE IN THE PREVIOUS YR. ARRIVING ATIS WAS PARTIALLY HEARD, BUT NOT FULLY UNDERSTOOD AND RECORDED. THE TEMPORARY GND CTL FREQ CHANGE WOULD HAVE BEEN ANNOUNCED AT THE END OF THE ATIS BROADCAST. WE BELIEVE THAT THE ARR APCH CTLR FAILED TO VERIFY THAT WE HAD RECEIVED ATIS (NOT TO ASSIGN BLAME, HOWEVER). CREW FAMILIARITY WITH THE ARPT: WITH NO TFC IN SIGHT, AND WITH THE CREW SO ACCUSTOMED TO BEING 'CLRED TO PARKING' BY TWR OR GND CTLRS, WE FAILED TO RECOGNIZE THAT WE HAD NOT BEEN SO CLRED, PERHAPS WHILE DISTR BY AFTER LNDG CHKLIST ITEMS. I ALWAYS ANNOUNCE, CHK AND CORRESPOND WITH THE SECOND PLT CONCERNING XING RWYS. ALTHOUGH THIS WAS DONE, OUR BRIEF DISCUSSION FAILED TO REVEAL THAT A CLRNC TO CROSS HAD NEVER ACTUALLY BEEN RECEIVED. OPPORTUNITIES MISSED TO PREVENT THIS INCIDENT: 1) ARRIVING ATIS SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE COMPLETELY UNDERSTOOD. 2) THE ACFT SHOULD HAVE BEEN STOPPED UNTIL COMS WERE COMPLETE REGARDING TAXI CLRNC, ESPECIALLY AFTER THERE WAS KNOWN CONFUSION ABOUT THE FREQ AND BEFORE XING A POTENTIALLY ACTIVE RWY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.