Narrative:

I experienced a right engine flameout while en route to deming, NM. This occurred after a missed approach during low IFR conditions at silver city, NM. After following the checklist procedures for a failed engine, I flew the remaining distance to deming (dmn) and landed safely. After a flight to scottsdale, az, I was of the opinion that there was sufficient fuel on board to make the 1 hour return flight to silver city and leave the airplane with a normal summer capacity of approximately 1400 pounds of fuel. Contributing factors to the engine flameout include a nearly 20 min ground wait in scottsdale for IFR release. Another factor was an unanticipated departure route that added nearly 25 more mins to the flight-planned route. The WX forecast was marginal VFR conditions for the time of arrival in silver city. Once en route, I contacted flight watch for an update on the WX. I was informed that the latest automated observation included a thunderstorm in the area with a ceiling of about 6000 ft overcast and less than 2 mi visibility. Once the flight was 'in range' of silver city, I again received a WX update, this time from the local AWOS. The conditions were similar to the previous briefing, with the exception of a reduced visibility of 1-3/4 mi. The VOR-a requires only 1 mi visibility, so I decided to fly the approach. Upon reaching MDA, I realized that there was very little chance of seeing the runway environment, but continued the approach to the missed approach point. After flying the published missed and returning to visual conditions south of silver city, I advised ZAB that I would be proceeding visually to deming airport. Considering the improving WX conditions between silver city and deming, I canceled IFR approximately 25 mi from deming and began monitoring CTAF. The flameout occurred a few mins later. In hindsight, I realize that the final contributing factor was the unreliability of the fuel quantity indicators. At the time of the flameout, I strongly believed there to be at least 1200 pounds of fuel. A later full refueling showed that there was approximately 40 gals remaining in the left fuel system. I clearly understand that the responsibility of the flight is mine. It is now my responsibility to make sure that this is an isolated incident.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A BE9L PLT, AFTER MAKING A MISSED APCH AT SVC, EXPERIENCED A R ENG FLAMEOUT DUE TO FUEL STARVATION.

Narrative: I EXPERIENCED A R ENG FLAMEOUT WHILE ENRTE TO DEMING, NM. THIS OCCURRED AFTER A MISSED APCH DURING LOW IFR CONDITIONS AT SILVER CITY, NM. AFTER FOLLOWING THE CHKLIST PROCS FOR A FAILED ENG, I FLEW THE REMAINING DISTANCE TO DEMING (DMN) AND LANDED SAFELY. AFTER A FLT TO SCOTTSDALE, AZ, I WAS OF THE OPINION THAT THERE WAS SUFFICIENT FUEL ON BOARD TO MAKE THE 1 HR RETURN FLT TO SILVER CITY AND LEAVE THE AIRPLANE WITH A NORMAL SUMMER CAPACITY OF APPROX 1400 LBS OF FUEL. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO THE ENG FLAMEOUT INCLUDE A NEARLY 20 MIN GND WAIT IN SCOTTSDALE FOR IFR RELEASE. ANOTHER FACTOR WAS AN UNANTICIPATED DEP RTE THAT ADDED NEARLY 25 MORE MINS TO THE FLT-PLANNED RTE. THE WX FORECAST WAS MARGINAL VFR CONDITIONS FOR THE TIME OF ARR IN SILVER CITY. ONCE ENRTE, I CONTACTED FLT WATCH FOR AN UPDATE ON THE WX. I WAS INFORMED THAT THE LATEST AUTOMATED OBSERVATION INCLUDED A TSTM IN THE AREA WITH A CEILING OF ABOUT 6000 FT OVCST AND LESS THAN 2 MI VISIBILITY. ONCE THE FLT WAS 'IN RANGE' OF SILVER CITY, I AGAIN RECEIVED A WX UPDATE, THIS TIME FROM THE LCL AWOS. THE CONDITIONS WERE SIMILAR TO THE PREVIOUS BRIEFING, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF A REDUCED VISIBILITY OF 1-3/4 MI. THE VOR-A REQUIRES ONLY 1 MI VISIBILITY, SO I DECIDED TO FLY THE APCH. UPON REACHING MDA, I REALIZED THAT THERE WAS VERY LITTLE CHANCE OF SEEING THE RWY ENVIRONMENT, BUT CONTINUED THE APCH TO THE MISSED APCH POINT. AFTER FLYING THE PUBLISHED MISSED AND RETURNING TO VISUAL CONDITIONS S OF SILVER CITY, I ADVISED ZAB THAT I WOULD BE PROCEEDING VISUALLY TO DEMING ARPT. CONSIDERING THE IMPROVING WX CONDITIONS BTWN SILVER CITY AND DEMING, I CANCELED IFR APPROX 25 MI FROM DEMING AND BEGAN MONITORING CTAF. THE FLAMEOUT OCCURRED A FEW MINS LATER. IN HINDSIGHT, I REALIZE THAT THE FINAL CONTRIBUTING FACTOR WAS THE UNRELIABILITY OF THE FUEL QUANTITY INDICATORS. AT THE TIME OF THE FLAMEOUT, I STRONGLY BELIEVED THERE TO BE AT LEAST 1200 LBS OF FUEL. A LATER FULL REFUELING SHOWED THAT THERE WAS APPROX 40 GALS REMAINING IN THE L FUEL SYS. I CLRLY UNDERSTAND THAT THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE FLT IS MINE. IT IS NOW MY RESPONSIBILITY TO MAKE SURE THAT THIS IS AN ISOLATED INCIDENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.