Narrative:

Climbing out of sna. Co-pilot flying airplane. Captain working radios and FMC. Departure control gave us an early turn. Quote 'turn left heading 120 degrees, direct bhose maintain 7000 ft.' I had trouble hearing the name of the intersection and asked ATC to repeat it. While I was looking at our departure plate, the copilot who was hand flying the plane put his head down and plugged the bhose intersection into the FMC. When I looked up, I found he was climbing through 7000 ft at 280 KTS. I took the plane from the copilot and returned to 7000 ft and 250 KTS. We had climbed 400 ft higher than assigned. At 7000 ft and 250 KTS, I gave the plane back to the copilot. While I had the airplane, we were given a new departure frequency. When we checked on them, we told them we were descending from 7400 ft back to 7000 ft and asked if we created a problem. ATC told us it was no problem, and we were cleared to 13000 ft. The problem was the copilot should have just flown the 120 degrees heading and maintained 7000 ft, and let the PNF work the radios and FMC. Also looking back, I the captain should have flown this departure and had the copilot do the non flying duties. With this noise abatement departure profile and the SID, this can be a complicated departure. Supplemental information from acn #566852: socal departure gave us a early turnout to a radar heading of 120 degrees and a climb to 7000 ft followed by clearance to proceed direct to hpsoe intersection on the SID. Captain did not clearly hear the intersection name. I had heard the clearance and recognized the intersection by looking down at the CDU. I proceeded to update the CDU while the captain was looking away from the instrument panel and talking to ATC. When the captain turned back to the instrument panel, he saw that the aircraft was climbing through 7000 ft and accelerating through 250 KTS. He took control of the aircraft at 7400 ft and 280 KTS and corrected aircraft back to assigned altitude and 250 KTS. Captain then returned control of the aircraft to me. He commented to me that I should have just continued to hand fly the aircraft in accordance with the heading and altitude assigned and let him perform the FMC/CDU work. I should not have been heads down while hand flying the aircraft. He also commented that he thought that this was a very difficult non-standard departure and that in the future he would more than likely fly it himself. Lesson learned the hard way. I failed to follow crew coordination SOP. Unprofessional procedure resulted in no one flying the aircraft in a critical flight regime.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B757-200 CREW HAD AN ALT OVERSHOOT AND SPD DEV IN SCT CLASS B WHILE DEPARTING SNA ON THE BCKBY 2.

Narrative: CLBING OUT OF SNA. CO-PLT FLYING AIRPLANE. CAPT WORKING RADIOS AND FMC. DEP CTL GAVE US AN EARLY TURN. QUOTE 'TURN L HDG 120 DEGS, DIRECT BHOSE MAINTAIN 7000 FT.' I HAD TROUBLE HEARING THE NAME OF THE INTXN AND ASKED ATC TO REPEAT IT. WHILE I WAS LOOKING AT OUR DEP PLATE, THE COPILOT WHO WAS HAND FLYING THE PLANE PUT HIS HEAD DOWN AND PLUGGED THE BHOSE INTXN INTO THE FMC. WHEN I LOOKED UP, I FOUND HE WAS CLBING THROUGH 7000 FT AT 280 KTS. I TOOK THE PLANE FROM THE COPILOT AND RETURNED TO 7000 FT AND 250 KTS. WE HAD CLBED 400 FT HIGHER THAN ASSIGNED. AT 7000 FT AND 250 KTS, I GAVE THE PLANE BACK TO THE COPILOT. WHILE I HAD THE AIRPLANE, WE WERE GIVEN A NEW DEP FREQ. WHEN WE CHKED ON THEM, WE TOLD THEM WE WERE DSNDING FROM 7400 FT BACK TO 7000 FT AND ASKED IF WE CREATED A PROB. ATC TOLD US IT WAS NO PROB, AND WE WERE CLRED TO 13000 FT. THE PROB WAS THE COPILOT SHOULD HAVE JUST FLOWN THE 120 DEGS HDG AND MAINTAINED 7000 FT, AND LET THE PNF WORK THE RADIOS AND FMC. ALSO LOOKING BACK, I THE CAPT SHOULD HAVE FLOWN THIS DEP AND HAD THE COPILOT DO THE NON FLYING DUTIES. WITH THIS NOISE ABATEMENT DEP PROFILE AND THE SID, THIS CAN BE A COMPLICATED DEP. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN #566852: SOCAL DEP GAVE US A EARLY TURNOUT TO A RADAR HDG OF 120 DEGS AND A CLB TO 7000 FT FOLLOWED BY CLRNC TO PROCEED DIRECT TO HPSOE INTXN ON THE SID. CAPT DID NOT CLRLY HEAR THE INTXN NAME. I HAD HEARD THE CLRNC AND RECOGNIZED THE INTXN BY LOOKING DOWN AT THE CDU. I PROCEEDED TO UPDATE THE CDU WHILE THE CAPT WAS LOOKING AWAY FROM THE INST PANEL AND TALKING TO ATC. WHEN THE CAPT TURNED BACK TO THE INST PANEL, HE SAW THAT THE ACFT WAS CLBING THROUGH 7000 FT AND ACCELERATING THROUGH 250 KTS. HE TOOK CTL OF THE ACFT AT 7400 FT AND 280 KTS AND CORRECTED ACFT BACK TO ASSIGNED ALT AND 250 KTS. CAPT THEN RETURNED CTL OF THE ACFT TO ME. HE COMMENTED TO ME THAT I SHOULD HAVE JUST CONTINUED TO HAND FLY THE ACFT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE HDG AND ALT ASSIGNED AND LET HIM PERFORM THE FMC/CDU WORK. I SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN HEADS DOWN WHILE HAND FLYING THE ACFT. HE ALSO COMMENTED THAT HE THOUGHT THAT THIS WAS A VERY DIFFICULT NON-STANDARD DEP AND THAT IN THE FUTURE HE WOULD MORE THAN LIKELY FLY IT HIMSELF. LESSON LEARNED THE HARD WAY. I FAILED TO FOLLOW CREW COORD SOP. UNPROFESSIONAL PROC RESULTED IN NO ONE FLYING THE ACFT IN A CRITICAL FLT REGIME.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.