Narrative:

I participated in a bonanza pilot proficiency program in fresno, ca. Following ground school classes, I was scheduled to fly with a bonanza pilot proficiency program instructor saturday afternoon. The flight was to include a BFR and an instrument proficiency check. I accepted an offer to let me fly a 1979 V35B bonanza. The hotel where I stayed on thursday and friday nights was noisy, and I got only a couple hours of sleep each night. Feeling very tired, I considered canceling the saturday flight. I asked the V35B's owner to fly in my place, but apparently thinking I was only being polite, he insisted that I go ahead. I rationalized that flying with a bonanza pilot proficiency program instructor should be safe, even if my performance would not be up to what the instructor might expect from having flown with me before. I was also concerned about forfeiting the money I had paid to attend the bonanza pilot proficiency program course. The instructor was a bonanza pilot proficiency program faculty veteran, with thousands of flying hours. He had previously flown with me in 2001, during the insurance required chkout when I purchased my A36 bonanza. After the instructor and I took off from fat, tower handed us off to stockton approach for VFR flight following to lsn, I executed a practice GPS runway 32 approach to lsn, and after switching to the advisory frequency on instruction from stockton approach, made a full stop landing. Upon exiting the runway, the instructor told me to make a short field takeoff, remain in the pattern, and execute a spot landing on the second stripe of the runway 32 centerline. Abeam the runway 32 numbers on the downwind leg, I commenced a prelndg gumps check. At 'G,' I confirmed that we would remain on the right fuel tank, at 'U' I reached forward to the place on the panel where the landing gear switch is found on an A36, but where the cowl flaps control is located on the V35B. I closed the cowl flaps, but before I reached further right toward the V35B's landing gear switch, the instructor startled me by changing the communication radio back to stockton approach. He informed stockton approach that we were squawking VFR and remaining in the pattern. I switched the radio back to CTAF and announced our position. I proceeded to 'complete' the gumps check for mixture and propeller, lowered the flaps, turned onto base leg, then final, and adjusted power to ensure that we would touch down on the designated spot. I fixated on the spot landing target and failed to make my customary rechk of '3 green' position lights indicating landing gear down and locked. Evidently, the instructor distraction not only me, but himself as well when he made the radio call to stockton approach, because he did not catch my failure to lower the landing gear abeam the numbers. On final approach, he also must have fixated on the spot landing target, because he failed to notice the absence of '3 green' illuminated landing gear position lights, and said nothing. The airplane's gear up warning horn was inoperative and did not sound. The propeller struck the runway as the bonanza's belly settled onto the second stripe of the centerline. At that moment, a pilot waiting to take off called out on the CTAF, 'gear up!' the sound of metal striking concrete was horrible, but the actual landing was surprisingly soft, and the airplane slid to a halt on the runway centerline. Damage to the airframe was minimal, but the propeller strike created serious concerns about the engine and propeller. As we were removing the V35B from the runway, I used a cell phone to call my friend, who owned the airplane. Meanwhile, someone else called the FAA (fresno tower), so I described the incident to them. Subsequently, the fresno FSDO required me to retake the commercial flight test with an FAA examiner. Distraction, fixation, and motor memory confusion all played a role in this unfortunate incident, but the underlying cause was fatigue. My sleep-deprived mind focused reasonably well on one thing at a time, but it was thrown off by the relatively minor distraction of my instructor's unexpected call to stockton approach during my gumps check. I failed to handle the normal multi-tasking of an approach and landing that was slightly outside my usual routine. Neither the instructor nor the gear up warning horn alerted me, but they didn't cause the gear-up landing. Lowering the landing gear was my responsibility. The assumption that I could safely fly dual when I was too tired to fly solo was my basic mistake. The lesson I learned was that if one is too tired to fly solo, he shouldn't take the controls of an airplane, period.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: BE35 PLTS LANDS GEAR UP AT KLSN.

Narrative: I PARTICIPATED IN A BONANZA PLT PROFICIENCY PROGRAM IN FRESNO, CA. FOLLOWING GND SCHOOL CLASSES, I WAS SCHEDULED TO FLY WITH A BONANZA PLT PROFICIENCY PROGRAM INSTRUCTOR SATURDAY AFTERNOON. THE FLT WAS TO INCLUDE A BFR AND AN INST PROFICIENCY CHK. I ACCEPTED AN OFFER TO LET ME FLY A 1979 V35B BONANZA. THE HOTEL WHERE I STAYED ON THURSDAY AND FRIDAY NIGHTS WAS NOISY, AND I GOT ONLY A COUPLE HRS OF SLEEP EACH NIGHT. FEELING VERY TIRED, I CONSIDERED CANCELING THE SATURDAY FLT. I ASKED THE V35B'S OWNER TO FLY IN MY PLACE, BUT APPARENTLY THINKING I WAS ONLY BEING POLITE, HE INSISTED THAT I GO AHEAD. I RATIONALIZED THAT FLYING WITH A BONANZA PLT PROFICIENCY PROGRAM INSTRUCTOR SHOULD BE SAFE, EVEN IF MY PERFORMANCE WOULD NOT BE UP TO WHAT THE INSTRUCTOR MIGHT EXPECT FROM HAVING FLOWN WITH ME BEFORE. I WAS ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT FORFEITING THE MONEY I HAD PAID TO ATTEND THE BONANZA PLT PROFICIENCY PROGRAM COURSE. THE INSTRUCTOR WAS A BONANZA PLT PROFICIENCY PROGRAM FACULTY VETERAN, WITH THOUSANDS OF FLYING HRS. HE HAD PREVIOUSLY FLOWN WITH ME IN 2001, DURING THE INSURANCE REQUIRED CHKOUT WHEN I PURCHASED MY A36 BONANZA. AFTER THE INSTRUCTOR AND I TOOK OFF FROM FAT, TWR HANDED US OFF TO STOCKTON APCH FOR VFR FLT FOLLOWING TO LSN, I EXECUTED A PRACTICE GPS RWY 32 APCH TO LSN, AND AFTER SWITCHING TO THE ADVISORY FREQ ON INSTRUCTION FROM STOCKTON APCH, MADE A FULL STOP LNDG. UPON EXITING THE RWY, THE INSTRUCTOR TOLD ME TO MAKE A SHORT FIELD TKOF, REMAIN IN THE PATTERN, AND EXECUTE A SPOT LNDG ON THE SECOND STRIPE OF THE RWY 32 CTRLINE. ABEAM THE RWY 32 NUMBERS ON THE DOWNWIND LEG, I COMMENCED A PRELNDG GUMPS CHK. AT 'G,' I CONFIRMED THAT WE WOULD REMAIN ON THE R FUEL TANK, AT 'U' I REACHED FORWARD TO THE PLACE ON THE PANEL WHERE THE LNDG GEAR SWITCH IS FOUND ON AN A36, BUT WHERE THE COWL FLAPS CTL IS LOCATED ON THE V35B. I CLOSED THE COWL FLAPS, BUT BEFORE I REACHED FURTHER R TOWARD THE V35B'S LNDG GEAR SWITCH, THE INSTRUCTOR STARTLED ME BY CHANGING THE COM RADIO BACK TO STOCKTON APCH. HE INFORMED STOCKTON APCH THAT WE WERE SQUAWKING VFR AND REMAINING IN THE PATTERN. I SWITCHED THE RADIO BACK TO CTAF AND ANNOUNCED OUR POS. I PROCEEDED TO 'COMPLETE' THE GUMPS CHK FOR MIXTURE AND PROP, LOWERED THE FLAPS, TURNED ONTO BASE LEG, THEN FINAL, AND ADJUSTED PWR TO ENSURE THAT WE WOULD TOUCH DOWN ON THE DESIGNATED SPOT. I FIXATED ON THE SPOT LNDG TARGET AND FAILED TO MAKE MY CUSTOMARY RECHK OF '3 GREEN' POS LIGHTS INDICATING LNDG GEAR DOWN AND LOCKED. EVIDENTLY, THE INSTRUCTOR DISTR NOT ONLY ME, BUT HIMSELF AS WELL WHEN HE MADE THE RADIO CALL TO STOCKTON APCH, BECAUSE HE DID NOT CATCH MY FAILURE TO LOWER THE LNDG GEAR ABEAM THE NUMBERS. ON FINAL APCH, HE ALSO MUST HAVE FIXATED ON THE SPOT LNDG TARGET, BECAUSE HE FAILED TO NOTICE THE ABSENCE OF '3 GREEN' ILLUMINATED LNDG GEAR POS LIGHTS, AND SAID NOTHING. THE AIRPLANE'S GEAR UP WARNING HORN WAS INOP AND DID NOT SOUND. THE PROP STRUCK THE RWY AS THE BONANZA'S BELLY SETTLED ONTO THE SECOND STRIPE OF THE CTRLINE. AT THAT MOMENT, A PLT WAITING TO TAKE OFF CALLED OUT ON THE CTAF, 'GEAR UP!' THE SOUND OF METAL STRIKING CONCRETE WAS HORRIBLE, BUT THE ACTUAL LNDG WAS SURPRISINGLY SOFT, AND THE AIRPLANE SLID TO A HALT ON THE RWY CTRLINE. DAMAGE TO THE AIRFRAME WAS MINIMAL, BUT THE PROP STRIKE CREATED SERIOUS CONCERNS ABOUT THE ENG AND PROP. AS WE WERE REMOVING THE V35B FROM THE RWY, I USED A CELL PHONE TO CALL MY FRIEND, WHO OWNED THE AIRPLANE. MEANWHILE, SOMEONE ELSE CALLED THE FAA (FRESNO TWR), SO I DESCRIBED THE INCIDENT TO THEM. SUBSEQUENTLY, THE FRESNO FSDO REQUIRED ME TO RETAKE THE COMMERCIAL FLT TEST WITH AN FAA EXAMINER. DISTR, FIXATION, AND MOTOR MEMORY CONFUSION ALL PLAYED A ROLE IN THIS UNFORTUNATE INCIDENT, BUT THE UNDERLYING CAUSE WAS FATIGUE. MY SLEEP-DEPRIVED MIND FOCUSED REASONABLY WELL ON ONE THING AT A TIME, BUT IT WAS THROWN OFF BY THE RELATIVELY MINOR DISTR OF MY INSTRUCTOR'S UNEXPECTED CALL TO STOCKTON APCH DURING MY GUMPS CHK. I FAILED TO HANDLE THE NORMAL MULTI-TASKING OF AN APCH AND LNDG THAT WAS SLIGHTLY OUTSIDE MY USUAL ROUTINE. NEITHER THE INSTRUCTOR NOR THE GEAR UP WARNING HORN ALERTED ME, BUT THEY DIDN'T CAUSE THE GEAR-UP LNDG. LOWERING THE LNDG GEAR WAS MY RESPONSIBILITY. THE ASSUMPTION THAT I COULD SAFELY FLY DUAL WHEN I WAS TOO TIRED TO FLY SOLO WAS MY BASIC MISTAKE. THE LESSON I LEARNED WAS THAT IF ONE IS TOO TIRED TO FLY SOLO, HE SHOULDN'T TAKE THE CTLS OF AN AIRPLANE, PERIOD.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.