Narrative:

I was conducting a practical test for an additional commercial (asel) rating on jan/fri/03. We had landed on runway 24 and took off for closed traffic. While on the downwind for runway 24, I saw the applicant extend the landing gear and observed 3 green illuminated landing gear lights. Applicant verbalized the prelndg checks and announced his position. As soon as he did so, another pilot of another plane announced that he was on downwind for runway 35. I diverted my attention to scan for the other aircraft. The pilot applicant began to turn base and I again viewed the 3 green illuminated landing gear lights. I asked if the applicant saw the traffic and he said 'no,' so I cautioned that he should not turn toward the field until traffic was in sight or not in a conflict area. The applicant extended the downwind, then later turned toward the field. There was a gusty crosswind and applicant had overshot for final and was correcting while the other aircraft was landing, or coming in to land on runway 35. I was not sure we would be in a position for a safe landing because of the runway 35 landing traffic and crosswind. I advised the pilot applicant to be ready for a go around. The other aircraft cleared runway 35 and announced it was clear of all active runways while we were on very short final and the pilot applicant was fighting the crosswind. Just after the runway 35 traffic cleared, the pilot applicant continued into his landing, still correcting for the crosswind and flared the aircraft. As I noticed the angle and situation to be irregular, I looked to the right and saw that we were too low to not have yet landed (assuming normal operations). I looked left, but as I did so, the plane scraped the runway and then the pilot applicant rode out the landing. The pilot applicant claimed he had the landing gear extended throughout the approach and landing but said his knee might have hit the landing gear selector. When I had viewed the selector, it appeared down and the landing gear lights were illuminated. Unfortunately, the pilot applicant ended up landing with the gear either collapsed or not extended. But since I did not see the pilot applicant retract the gear or move the gear handle after putting it 'down,' any further statement as to what happened would be speculation. I believe the contributing factors included the existing wind conditions and traffic using a runway oriented 110 degrees from the runway being used for the pilot applicant's flight. Additionally, the division of my attention to the crosswind correction and landing traffic meant that I was unable to again check, on short final, for proper gear indications. I also am instructed to refrain from 'giving instruction' during a test. The pilot applicant was already rated for amel operations and had over 100 hours PIC in multi-engine aircraft.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A DESIGNATED PLT EXAMINER, DURING A COMMERCIAL CHK RIDE, RPTED A GEAR UP LNDG AT L67.

Narrative: I WAS CONDUCTING A PRACTICAL TEST FOR AN ADDITIONAL COMMERCIAL (ASEL) RATING ON JAN/FRI/03. WE HAD LANDED ON RWY 24 AND TOOK OFF FOR CLOSED TFC. WHILE ON THE DOWNWIND FOR RWY 24, I SAW THE APPLICANT EXTEND THE LNDG GEAR AND OBSERVED 3 GREEN ILLUMINATED LNDG GEAR LIGHTS. APPLICANT VERBALIZED THE PRELNDG CHKS AND ANNOUNCED HIS POS. AS SOON AS HE DID SO, ANOTHER PLT OF ANOTHER PLANE ANNOUNCED THAT HE WAS ON DOWNWIND FOR RWY 35. I DIVERTED MY ATTN TO SCAN FOR THE OTHER ACFT. THE PLT APPLICANT BEGAN TO TURN BASE AND I AGAIN VIEWED THE 3 GREEN ILLUMINATED LNDG GEAR LIGHTS. I ASKED IF THE APPLICANT SAW THE TFC AND HE SAID 'NO,' SO I CAUTIONED THAT HE SHOULD NOT TURN TOWARD THE FIELD UNTIL TFC WAS IN SIGHT OR NOT IN A CONFLICT AREA. THE APPLICANT EXTENDED THE DOWNWIND, THEN LATER TURNED TOWARD THE FIELD. THERE WAS A GUSTY XWIND AND APPLICANT HAD OVERSHOT FOR FINAL AND WAS CORRECTING WHILE THE OTHER ACFT WAS LNDG, OR COMING IN TO LAND ON RWY 35. I WAS NOT SURE WE WOULD BE IN A POS FOR A SAFE LNDG BECAUSE OF THE RWY 35 LNDG TFC AND XWIND. I ADVISED THE PLT APPLICANT TO BE READY FOR A GAR. THE OTHER ACFT CLRED RWY 35 AND ANNOUNCED IT WAS CLR OF ALL ACTIVE RWYS WHILE WE WERE ON VERY SHORT FINAL AND THE PLT APPLICANT WAS FIGHTING THE XWIND. JUST AFTER THE RWY 35 TFC CLRED, THE PLT APPLICANT CONTINUED INTO HIS LNDG, STILL CORRECTING FOR THE XWIND AND FLARED THE ACFT. AS I NOTICED THE ANGLE AND SIT TO BE IRREGULAR, I LOOKED TO THE R AND SAW THAT WE WERE TOO LOW TO NOT HAVE YET LANDED (ASSUMING NORMAL OPS). I LOOKED L, BUT AS I DID SO, THE PLANE SCRAPED THE RWY AND THEN THE PLT APPLICANT RODE OUT THE LNDG. THE PLT APPLICANT CLAIMED HE HAD THE LNDG GEAR EXTENDED THROUGHOUT THE APCH AND LNDG BUT SAID HIS KNEE MIGHT HAVE HIT THE LNDG GEAR SELECTOR. WHEN I HAD VIEWED THE SELECTOR, IT APPEARED DOWN AND THE LNDG GEAR LIGHTS WERE ILLUMINATED. UNFORTUNATELY, THE PLT APPLICANT ENDED UP LNDG WITH THE GEAR EITHER COLLAPSED OR NOT EXTENDED. BUT SINCE I DID NOT SEE THE PLT APPLICANT RETRACT THE GEAR OR MOVE THE GEAR HANDLE AFTER PUTTING IT 'DOWN,' ANY FURTHER STATEMENT AS TO WHAT HAPPENED WOULD BE SPECULATION. I BELIEVE THE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS INCLUDED THE EXISTING WIND CONDITIONS AND TFC USING A RWY ORIENTED 110 DEGS FROM THE RWY BEING USED FOR THE PLT APPLICANT'S FLT. ADDITIONALLY, THE DIVISION OF MY ATTN TO THE XWIND CORRECTION AND LNDG TFC MEANT THAT I WAS UNABLE TO AGAIN CHK, ON SHORT FINAL, FOR PROPER GEAR INDICATIONS. I ALSO AM INSTRUCTED TO REFRAIN FROM 'GIVING INSTRUCTION' DURING A TEST. THE PLT APPLICANT WAS ALREADY RATED FOR AMEL OPS AND HAD OVER 100 HRS PIC IN MULTI-ENG ACFT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.