Narrative:

ATC vectored us to a close-in left hand visual approach to runway 36R. Tower cleared us to land. Upon turning final, we were slightly high on VASI, but the descent appeared to be converging to the correct glidepath. Captain called for flight directors off and bring up the 'bird' and to set the inbound course. After reviewing the approach chart, I looked up to notice a light aircraft departing off the runway and was clear. As we passed through approximately 100 ft AGL, it occurred to me that the runway was farther from the terminal than the 10-9 chart depicted. At approximately 50 ft AGL, I became aware that we may actually be landing on runway 36L instead of runway 36R. As we began to flare, I couldn't decide which was the safer course of action, to startle the captain with a go around command or allow him to continue to land on a runway without conflicting traffic. We touched down and I told the captain we had landed on the wrong runway. Tower cleared us to cross runway 36R and C0NTACT ground. There was no mention made of this by any controller and the aircraft continued to the gate without further incident. Supplemental information from acn 571238: was being vectored by kmco approach control, for an approach to runway 36R. While on base to final, we were cleared for a visual approach. Aircraft was slightly high on profile, but was going to be in proper landing configuration at 1000 AGL. I called for 'FD's off, bring up the bird, set inbound track.' continued approach and made a normal landing. On roll out, tower cleared us to 'cross the right, contact ground.' we realized that we had landed on the wrong runway (runway 36L). No comment was made from ATC. In trying to analyze why this happened, it occurred to me that most of the landings I do to parallel runways are done to the outside runway and switching off the FD's for a visual approach are two things that may have contributed to this error. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter stated that the flight control unit (FCU) was selected to flight navigation vector mode when the flight was cleared for the visual approach as per company policy, but both he and the captain were 'heads out of cockpit' concentrating on the visual approach since they were high and in close and they were preoccupied with getting the aircraft down. Reporter stated that he did not think that the parallel taxiway to the left of 36L was a confusion factor, but the left base to the right runway was a factor because it seemed more normal for a left base to be for the left parallel. Reporter advised that he did not recall any cockpit briefing particularly related to the landing. Reporter stated that there were no communications from the tower after they were cleared to land while on the base leg. Reporter stated that he acknowledged the clearance and read back, runway '36R.' reporter stated that he heard an aircraft being cleared for takeoff on runway 36L and that reinforced his impression that runway 36L was the runway in use. Reporter stated that he and the captain had a good working relationship, that CRM was good, and that there were no schedule pressure, duty time, or fatigue factors involved. Reporter stated that this was the first flight of the day. Reporter advised that the airport traffic was very light at the time of the incident. Reporter stated that he has flown into this airport on three other occasions, but this was the first time the approach was from the south, landing north. Reporter stated that after he realized they were landing on runway 36L, he felt it would be safer to land than go around from the flare. Reporter stated the runway was clear and that after rollout tower advised them to cross runway 36R and contact ground. Reporter stated that there was no mention of the incident by any controller. Callback conversation with reporter acn 571328 revealed the following information: reporter stated the he had the FCU set to flight path vector mode as per company policy on visual apches and had the first officer set the inbound course with a three degree glide slope. Reporter stated that this causes the flight director bars to be replaced by the flight path director/flight path vector symbols. Reporter stated he glanced at the instruments a couple of times on the visual approach, but did not look at the localizer raw data. Reporter stated that the parallel taxiway to the left of runway 36L may have been a subconscious confusion factor. Reporter also stated that a left base to the right parallel was confusing. Reporter stated that the approach vector led to a slightly tight approach to the runway. Reporter stated that he heard the first officer mumbling something starting at about 100 ft above the runway.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A320 FLC LANDS ON THE WRONG RWY AT MCO.

Narrative: ATC VECTORED US TO A CLOSE-IN L HAND VISUAL APCH TO RWY 36R. TWR CLRED US TO LAND. UPON TURNING FINAL, WE WERE SLIGHTLY HIGH ON VASI, BUT THE DESCENT APPEARED TO BE CONVERGING TO THE CORRECT GLIDEPATH. CAPT CALLED FOR FLT DIRECTORS OFF AND BRING UP THE 'BIRD' AND TO SET THE INBOUND COURSE. AFTER REVIEWING THE APCH CHART, I LOOKED UP TO NOTICE A LIGHT ACFT DEPARTING OFF THE RWY AND WAS CLR. AS WE PASSED THROUGH APPROX 100 FT AGL, IT OCCURRED TO ME THAT THE RWY WAS FARTHER FROM THE TERMINAL THAN THE 10-9 CHART DEPICTED. AT APPROX 50 FT AGL, I BECAME AWARE THAT WE MAY ACTUALLY BE LNDG ON RWY 36L INSTEAD OF RWY 36R. AS WE BEGAN TO FLARE, I COULDN'T DECIDE WHICH WAS THE SAFER COURSE OF ACTION, TO STARTLE THE CAPT WITH A GAR COMMAND OR ALLOW HIM TO CONTINUE TO LAND ON A RWY WITHOUT CONFLICTING TFC. WE TOUCHED DOWN AND I TOLD THE CAPT WE HAD LANDED ON THE WRONG RWY. TWR CLRED US TO CROSS RWY 36R AND C0NTACT GND. THERE WAS NO MENTION MADE OF THIS BY ANY CTLR AND THE ACFT CONTINUED TO THE GATE WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 571238: WAS BEING VECTORED BY KMCO APCH CTL, FOR AN APCH TO RWY 36R. WHILE ON BASE TO FINAL, WE WERE CLRED FOR A VISUAL APCH. ACFT WAS SLIGHTLY HIGH ON PROFILE, BUT WAS GOING TO BE IN PROPER LNDG CONFIGURATION AT 1000 AGL. I CALLED FOR 'FD'S OFF, BRING UP THE BIRD, SET INBOUND TRACK.' CONTINUED APCH AND MADE A NORMAL LNDG. ON ROLL OUT, TWR CLRED US TO 'CROSS THE RIGHT, CONTACT GND.' WE REALIZED THAT WE HAD LANDED ON THE WRONG RWY (RWY 36L). NO COMMENT WAS MADE FROM ATC. IN TRYING TO ANALYZE WHY THIS HAPPENED, IT OCCURRED TO ME THAT MOST OF THE LANDINGS I DO TO PARALLEL RWYS ARE DONE TO THE OUTSIDE RWY AND SWITCHING OFF THE FD'S FOR A VISUAL APCH ARE TWO THINGS THAT MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THIS ERROR. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THAT THE FLT CTL UNIT (FCU) WAS SELECTED TO FLT NAV VECTOR MODE WHEN THE FLT WAS CLRED FOR THE VISUAL APCH AS PER COMPANY POLICY, BUT BOTH HE AND THE CAPT WERE 'HEADS OUT OF COCKPIT' CONCENTRATING ON THE VISUAL APCH SINCE THEY WERE HIGH AND IN CLOSE AND THEY WERE PREOCCUPIED WITH GETTING THE ACFT DOWN. RPTR STATED THAT HE DID NOT THINK THAT THE PARALLEL TXWY TO THE LEFT OF 36L WAS A CONFUSION FACTOR, BUT THE LEFT BASE TO THE RIGHT RWY WAS A FACTOR BECAUSE IT SEEMED MORE NORMAL FOR A LEFT BASE TO BE FOR THE LEFT PARALLEL. RPTR ADVISED THAT HE DID NOT RECALL ANY COCKPIT BRIEFING PARTICULARLY RELATED TO THE LNDG. RPTR STATED THAT THERE WERE NO COMS FROM THE TWR AFTER THEY WERE CLRED TO LAND WHILE ON THE BASE LEG. RPTR STATED THAT HE ACKNOWLEDGED THE CLRNC AND READ BACK, RWY '36R.' RPTR STATED THAT HE HEARD AN ACFT BEING CLRED FOR TKOF ON RWY 36L AND THAT REINFORCED HIS IMPRESSION THAT RWY 36L WAS THE RWY IN USE. RPTR STATED THAT HE AND THE CAPT HAD A GOOD WORKING RELATIONSHIP, THAT CRM WAS GOOD, AND THAT THERE WERE NO SCHEDULE PRESSURE, DUTY TIME, OR FATIGUE FACTORS INVOLVED. RPTR STATED THAT THIS WAS THE FIRST FLT OF THE DAY. RPTR ADVISED THAT THE ARPT TFC WAS VERY LIGHT AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT. RPTR STATED THAT HE HAS FLOWN INTO THIS ARPT ON THREE OTHER OCCASIONS, BUT THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME THE APCH WAS FROM THE S, LNDG N. RPTR STATED THAT AFTER HE REALIZED THEY WERE LNDG ON RWY 36L, HE FELT IT WOULD BE SAFER TO LAND THAN GO AROUND FROM THE FLARE. RPTR STATED THE RWY WAS CLEAR AND THAT AFTER ROLLOUT TWR ADVISED THEM TO CROSS RWY 36R AND CONTACT GND. RPTR STATED THAT THERE WAS NO MENTION OF THE INCIDENT BY ANY CTLR. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR ACN 571328 REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THE HE HAD THE FCU SET TO FLT PATH VECTOR MODE AS PER COMPANY POLICY ON VISUAL APCHES AND HAD THE FO SET THE INBOUND COURSE WITH A THREE DEG GLIDE SLOPE. RPTR STATED THAT THIS CAUSES THE FLT DIRECTOR BARS TO BE REPLACED BY THE FLT PATH DIRECTOR/FLT PATH VECTOR SYMBOLS. RPTR STATED HE GLANCED AT THE INSTRUMENTS A COUPLE OF TIMES ON THE VISUAL APCH, BUT DID NOT LOOK AT THE LOC RAW DATA. RPTR STATED THAT THE PARALLEL TXWY TO THE LEFT OF RWY 36L MAY HAVE BEEN A SUBCONSCIOUS CONFUSION FACTOR. RPTR ALSO STATED THAT A LEFT BASE TO THE RIGHT PARALLEL WAS CONFUSING. RPTR STATED THAT THE APCH VECTOR LED TO A SLIGHTLY TIGHT APCH TO THE RWY. RPTR STATED THAT HE HEARD THE FO MUMBLING SOMETHING STARTING AT ABOUT 100 FT ABOVE THE RWY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.