Narrative:

We were descending through approximately FL360; 30 mi west of verni intersection on the jasen 4. We received an ECAM for 'hydraulic G reservoir low level.' the captain was acting as PNF and the first officer as PF due to an earlier failure of the captain's navigation display. The first officer assumed the communication duties while the captain handled the ECAM. The action steps for the ECAM were accomplished; securing the ptu and green engine driven hydraulic pump. The hydraulic system page was displayed; and also indicated a low level for the green hydraulic reservoir. The airplane flight manual was also consulted for any additional information. Once all of the action items were complete; we discussed the scenario and what we needed to accomplish. We reviewed the checklist for gravity gear extension; and discussed other system degradations that would affect our arrival; including the use of alternate brakes; slow slat/flap operation; loss of the #1 engine reverser; and loss of nosewheel steering; which would require us to stop on the runway. The captain then established communication with dispatch; informing them of our situation; our intentions; and discussing what assistance we would need. We were approaching druzz intersection on the arrival; and advised ATC that we would like to hold for a few mins to make sure we had accomplished all checklists and were prepared for an approach. We declared an emergency; and advised ATC that when we landed we would have to stop on the runway and be towed clear. The captain also communicated with the purser; relaying the information about our situation and advised that it would be a cabin advisory for landing; and that we did not expect anything unusual other than having to stop on the runway and having to be towed to our gate. The captain then made a PA announcement to the passenger; explaining what had happened; and what we would be doing. We held for approximately 15 mins; completing our review of checklists; as well as waiting for a runway ready for our arrival. We were cleared inbound for a visual approach to runway 1R. Other than configuring earlier than normal; we flew a normal approach and landing; stopping straight ahead on the runway. The emergency crews chocked the nose gear and proceeded to inspect the airplane; and reported leaking hydraulic fluid in the vicinity of the right main landing gear. They reported no other abnormalities. A tug was hooked up to the aircraft; and we were towed to a gate.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A320 FLT CREW HAS A HYD Y SYS MALFUNCTION; PERFORMS THE ECAM PROCS; DECLARES AN EMER AND LANDS UNEVENTFULLY.

Narrative: WE WERE DSNDING THROUGH APPROX FL360; 30 MI W OF VERNI INTXN ON THE JASEN 4. WE RECEIVED AN ECAM FOR 'HYD G RESERVOIR LOW LEVEL.' THE CAPT WAS ACTING AS PNF AND THE FO AS PF DUE TO AN EARLIER FAILURE OF THE CAPT'S NAV DISPLAY. THE FO ASSUMED THE COM DUTIES WHILE THE CAPT HANDLED THE ECAM. THE ACTION STEPS FOR THE ECAM WERE ACCOMPLISHED; SECURING THE PTU AND GREEN ENG DRIVEN HYD PUMP. THE HYD SYS PAGE WAS DISPLAYED; AND ALSO INDICATED A LOW LEVEL FOR THE GREEN HYD RESERVOIR. THE AIRPLANE FLT MANUAL WAS ALSO CONSULTED FOR ANY ADDITIONAL INFO. ONCE ALL OF THE ACTION ITEMS WERE COMPLETE; WE DISCUSSED THE SCENARIO AND WHAT WE NEEDED TO ACCOMPLISH. WE REVIEWED THE CHKLIST FOR GRAVITY GEAR EXTENSION; AND DISCUSSED OTHER SYS DEGRADATIONS THAT WOULD AFFECT OUR ARR; INCLUDING THE USE OF ALTERNATE BRAKES; SLOW SLAT/FLAP OP; LOSS OF THE #1 ENG REVERSER; AND LOSS OF NOSEWHEEL STEERING; WHICH WOULD REQUIRE US TO STOP ON THE RWY. THE CAPT THEN ESTABLISHED COM WITH DISPATCH; INFORMING THEM OF OUR SITUATION; OUR INTENTIONS; AND DISCUSSING WHAT ASSISTANCE WE WOULD NEED. WE WERE APCHING DRUZZ INTXN ON THE ARR; AND ADVISED ATC THAT WE WOULD LIKE TO HOLD FOR A FEW MINS TO MAKE SURE WE HAD ACCOMPLISHED ALL CHKLISTS AND WERE PREPARED FOR AN APCH. WE DECLARED AN EMER; AND ADVISED ATC THAT WHEN WE LANDED WE WOULD HAVE TO STOP ON THE RWY AND BE TOWED CLR. THE CAPT ALSO COMMUNICATED WITH THE PURSER; RELAYING THE INFO ABOUT OUR SITUATION AND ADVISED THAT IT WOULD BE A CABIN ADVISORY FOR LNDG; AND THAT WE DID NOT EXPECT ANYTHING UNUSUAL OTHER THAN HAVING TO STOP ON THE RWY AND HAVING TO BE TOWED TO OUR GATE. THE CAPT THEN MADE A PA ANNOUNCEMENT TO THE PAX; EXPLAINING WHAT HAD HAPPENED; AND WHAT WE WOULD BE DOING. WE HELD FOR APPROX 15 MINS; COMPLETING OUR REVIEW OF CHKLISTS; AS WELL AS WAITING FOR A RWY READY FOR OUR ARR. WE WERE CLRED INBOUND FOR A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 1R. OTHER THAN CONFIGURING EARLIER THAN NORMAL; WE FLEW A NORMAL APCH AND LNDG; STOPPING STRAIGHT AHEAD ON THE RWY. THE EMER CREWS CHOCKED THE NOSE GEAR AND PROCEEDED TO INSPECT THE AIRPLANE; AND RPTED LEAKING HYD FLUID IN THE VICINITY OF THE R MAIN LNDG GEAR. THEY RPTED NO OTHER ABNORMALITIES. A TUG WAS HOOKED UP TO THE ACFT; AND WE WERE TOWED TO A GATE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.