Narrative:

We left cvg via the todub 2 departure. After several vectors, ZID cleared us direct bkw VOR (beckley). The captain (PF) elected to hand fly the aircraft to altitude. ATC issued several intermediate altitudes, which were never reached before a higher altitude was assigned. Somewhere around FL120, the PF turned on the flight director. The aircraft was performing well (300 KIAS-320 KIAS and 1500 FPM) in the climb, much better than normal (290 KIAS and 500-1000 FPM), mostly due to being light and the cold WX. The flight director was set to a 500 FPM climb. The flight director bars gradually sank to 5 - 7 1/2 degrees below the horizon, while the plane was at 2 - 2 1/2 degrees above the horizon. The PF gradually let the plane drift several degrees left of course. The flight directors (set to 'navigation' model) began a gradual bank to the right until they were 25-30 degrees to the right, still showing 7 1/2 degree pitch. The conflicting messages (flight director buried and tanked versus the aircraft on course [mostly], and pitched up and climbing quite well) led to confusion of the PF, and a reluctance to engage the autoplt until the perceived 'flair' was straightened out. The PF began correcting course back to the right, but did so excessively, about 30 degrees too much. The flight director computer lagged and didn't reflect the course correction, as the PF thought it should. About that time, FL270 (highest assigned) was reached, and the PF began another course correction back left. The aircraft drifted up to 27300 ft. As soon as the aircraft left 27000 ft, a TCASII 'traffic, traffic' message sounded, the display showed an aircraft at our 3 O'clock position and 5-7 mi 700 ft above us crossing overhead. ATC asked us to verify altitude, which we did. In the midst of this confusion, the aircraft was allowed to drift 60 degrees left, ending up 30 degrees left of course now. PNF was still looking for traffic crossing overhead. The autoplt was engaged at FL270, and the FMS reset to indicate back direct bkw VOR. ATC queried us as to our navigation and we responded we were presently direct beckley. This problem resulted from a misunderstanding/lack of understanding about the flight director computer and its reasoning, calculations, and indications. Better CRM could have helped to prevent this problem (ie, the PNF should have been manipulating the flight control panel controling the flight director). Even if a pilot is smooth on the controls, it is difficult to control this jet that is entirely controled by hydraulics with artificial force feedback. At high speeds and high altitudes, pilots would be better off and have their workload reduced, by using the autoplt and leave 'proficiency flying' to the simulator.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CARJ FO RPTED AN ALTDEV AND TRACK HDG DEV APPROX 120 NM NW OF BKW VOR.

Narrative: WE LEFT CVG VIA THE TODUB 2 DEP. AFTER SEVERAL VECTORS, ZID CLRED US DIRECT BKW VOR (BECKLEY). THE CAPT (PF) ELECTED TO HAND FLY THE ACFT TO ALT. ATC ISSUED SEVERAL INTERMEDIATE ALTS, WHICH WERE NEVER REACHED BEFORE A HIGHER ALT WAS ASSIGNED. SOMEWHERE AROUND FL120, THE PF TURNED ON THE FLT DIRECTOR. THE ACFT WAS PERFORMING WELL (300 KIAS-320 KIAS AND 1500 FPM) IN THE CLB, MUCH BETTER THAN NORMAL (290 KIAS AND 500-1000 FPM), MOSTLY DUE TO BEING LIGHT AND THE COLD WX. THE FLT DIRECTOR WAS SET TO A 500 FPM CLB. THE FLT DIRECTOR BARS GRADUALLY SANK TO 5 - 7 1/2 DEGS BELOW THE HORIZON, WHILE THE PLANE WAS AT 2 - 2 1/2 DEGS ABOVE THE HORIZON. THE PF GRADUALLY LET THE PLANE DRIFT SEVERAL DEGS L OF COURSE. THE FLT DIRECTORS (SET TO 'NAV' MODEL) BEGAN A GRADUAL BANK TO THE R UNTIL THEY WERE 25-30 DEGS TO THE R, STILL SHOWING 7 1/2 DEG PITCH. THE CONFLICTING MESSAGES (FLT DIRECTOR BURIED AND TANKED VERSUS THE ACFT ON COURSE [MOSTLY], AND PITCHED UP AND CLBING QUITE WELL) LED TO CONFUSION OF THE PF, AND A RELUCTANCE TO ENGAGE THE AUTOPLT UNTIL THE PERCEIVED 'FLAIR' WAS STRAIGHTENED OUT. THE PF BEGAN CORRECTING COURSE BACK TO THE R, BUT DID SO EXCESSIVELY, ABOUT 30 DEGS TOO MUCH. THE FLT DIRECTOR COMPUTER LAGGED AND DIDN'T REFLECT THE COURSE CORRECTION, AS THE PF THOUGHT IT SHOULD. ABOUT THAT TIME, FL270 (HIGHEST ASSIGNED) WAS REACHED, AND THE PF BEGAN ANOTHER COURSE CORRECTION BACK L. THE ACFT DRIFTED UP TO 27300 FT. AS SOON AS THE ACFT LEFT 27000 FT, A TCASII 'TFC, TFC' MESSAGE SOUNDED, THE DISPLAY SHOWED AN ACFT AT OUR 3 O'CLOCK POS AND 5-7 MI 700 FT ABOVE US XING OVERHEAD. ATC ASKED US TO VERIFY ALT, WHICH WE DID. IN THE MIDST OF THIS CONFUSION, THE ACFT WAS ALLOWED TO DRIFT 60 DEGS L, ENDING UP 30 DEGS L OF COURSE NOW. PNF WAS STILL LOOKING FOR TFC XING OVERHEAD. THE AUTOPLT WAS ENGAGED AT FL270, AND THE FMS RESET TO INDICATE BACK DIRECT BKW VOR. ATC QUERIED US AS TO OUR NAV AND WE RESPONDED WE WERE PRESENTLY DIRECT BECKLEY. THIS PROB RESULTED FROM A MISUNDERSTANDING/LACK OF UNDERSTANDING ABOUT THE FLT DIRECTOR COMPUTER AND ITS REASONING, CALCULATIONS, AND INDICATIONS. BETTER CRM COULD HAVE HELPED TO PREVENT THIS PROB (IE, THE PNF SHOULD HAVE BEEN MANIPULATING THE FLT CTL PANEL CTLING THE FLT DIRECTOR). EVEN IF A PLT IS SMOOTH ON THE CTLS, IT IS DIFFICULT TO CTL THIS JET THAT IS ENTIRELY CTLED BY HYDRAULICS WITH ARTIFICIAL FORCE FEEDBACK. AT HIGH SPDS AND HIGH ALTS, PLTS WOULD BE BETTER OFF AND HAVE THEIR WORKLOAD REDUCED, BY USING THE AUTOPLT AND LEAVE 'PROFICIENCY FLYING' TO THE SIMULATOR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.