Narrative:

During the takeoff roll, at approximately 100 KIAS, I noticed an amber light immediately below and associated with the #1 engine instrument stack. I rejected the takeoff. By this time, the light had extinguished. After stopping the jet and clearing the runway, I asked the first officer if he had seen the light. He hadn't. There was no ECAM guidance, and at this point I wasn't sure which light I had seen. I flipped on the 'light test' switch and idented the light as the 'high oil pressure' light. We ran the rejected takeoff checklist and consulted the 'engine high oil pressure' checklist. According to the latter, a high oil pressure event would be idented by a chine, a master caution light, ECAM procedure and engine indication displays, and the light I had seen. We pushed the ECAM recall button to see if we had missed something but it was normal. We ran the power up while monitoring the engine indicators and all values remained in the normal range. At this point, we talked over our options. The rejected takeoff checklist didn't require a maintenance write-up or action and didn't preclude another takeoff attempt. The lack of any ECAM indications of a high oil pressure event and the normal values of the engine indications led us to believe a safe takeoff could be accomplished. We monitored the brake temperatures, re-accomplished the before takeoff checklist. The takeoff and flight were uneventful. Supplemental information from acn 573062: we figured it was cold outside and the quick taxi must not have allowed the oil to warm enough.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A REJECTED TKOF IN AN AIRBUS WAS INITIATED FOR AN ENG WARNING THAT COULD NOT LATER BE IDENTED FOR SURE.

Narrative: DURING THE TKOF ROLL, AT APPROX 100 KIAS, I NOTICED AN AMBER LIGHT IMMEDIATELY BELOW AND ASSOCIATED WITH THE #1 ENG INST STACK. I REJECTED THE TKOF. BY THIS TIME, THE LIGHT HAD EXTINGUISHED. AFTER STOPPING THE JET AND CLRING THE RWY, I ASKED THE FO IF HE HAD SEEN THE LIGHT. HE HADN'T. THERE WAS NO ECAM GUIDANCE, AND AT THIS POINT I WASN'T SURE WHICH LIGHT I HAD SEEN. I FLIPPED ON THE 'LIGHT TEST' SWITCH AND IDENTED THE LIGHT AS THE 'HIGH OIL PRESSURE' LIGHT. WE RAN THE REJECTED TKOF CHKLIST AND CONSULTED THE 'ENG HIGH OIL PRESSURE' CHKLIST. ACCORDING TO THE LATTER, A HIGH OIL PRESSURE EVENT WOULD BE IDENTED BY A CHINE, A MASTER CAUTION LIGHT, ECAM PROC AND ENG INDICATION DISPLAYS, AND THE LIGHT I HAD SEEN. WE PUSHED THE ECAM RECALL BUTTON TO SEE IF WE HAD MISSED SOMETHING BUT IT WAS NORMAL. WE RAN THE PWR UP WHILE MONITORING THE ENG INDICATORS AND ALL VALUES REMAINED IN THE NORMAL RANGE. AT THIS POINT, WE TALKED OVER OUR OPTIONS. THE REJECTED TKOF CHKLIST DIDN'T REQUIRE A MAINT WRITE-UP OR ACTION AND DIDN'T PRECLUDE ANOTHER TKOF ATTEMPT. THE LACK OF ANY ECAM INDICATIONS OF A HIGH OIL PRESSURE EVENT AND THE NORMAL VALUES OF THE ENG INDICATIONS LED US TO BELIEVE A SAFE TKOF COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED. WE MONITORED THE BRAKE TEMPS, RE-ACCOMPLISHED THE BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST. THE TKOF AND FLT WERE UNEVENTFUL. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 573062: WE FIGURED IT WAS COLD OUTSIDE AND THE QUICK TAXI MUST NOT HAVE ALLOWED THE OIL TO WARM ENOUGH.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.