Narrative:

After checking wind conditions and runway analysis, my first officer and I (captain) requested a downwind departure from roc runway 28. This choice of runway resulted in short taxi, and a launch in the direction of departure. There were 2 other aircraft, a crj, and a B737 besides our arj-85 on the airport surface areas in taxi for takeoff mode. Active runway was 4, per ATIS. Unbeknownst, prior to runway incursion, the crj was planning to depart runway 10 for takeoff. We were planning to take off from opposite direction on runway 28, and the B737 was going to take off from yet another runway, runway 14. The B737 was not involved in runway incursion. During taxi out for takeoff, we were given winds 120 degrees at 10 KTS, visibility was 10 SM, ceilings were 4500 ft overcast (per ATIS), and it was nighttime. First officer and I accomplished our tasks and checklists during taxi. I recall taxi speeds to be slow, customary to my modus operandi, we were methodical in our procedures, and did not seem rushed. What followed next, resulted in runway incursion: both first officer and I do not recall the exact instruction from tower to our 'ready for takeoff runway 28' call. However, both first officer and I vividly recall the acknowledgement, 'position and hold runway 28' from the first officer on the radio. This readback 'position and hold' was read back so clearly by my first officer that it remained as the last impression on my mind, and therefore I proceeded accordingly to position the aircraft on runway 28. Since I knew that we had not been cleared for takeoff, I taxied slowly towards the approach end of runway 28. Runway 28/10 at roc is 5500 ft long, and it is also interesting to point out that it has a minor hump towards the middle of the runway so that under certain circumstances (visibility, darkness, short versus tall aircraft). An aircraft might not be visible to an observer from opposite ends. When our aircraft had proceeded about full length (to slightly under) beyond the runway hold short line, a query from tower 'xyz, are you holding short of runway 28?' prompted me to halt the taxi. My first officer replied 'no,' and expressed that he had just acknowledged position and hold runway 28, to which the tower replied 'I must have missed your transmission.' the next relevant transmission from the tower was to the crj and it was to abort the takeoff. At this point, I recall a set of lights in the distance to our right on the runway from the crj. The crj successfully aborted takeoff, and at approximately the half length of the runway completed a turn around and subsequently exited the runway. Thereafter, we were 'officially' cleared into position, and then cleared for takeoff. Though there was an obvious breakdown of good and safe communication practices, the crew and passenger of either aircraft involved in this incidence were never in danger of injury. Supplemental information from acn 572824: conditions were nighttime and VFR with good ground visibility. Our crew was on our 5TH leg and on about our 10TH hour of duty. Winds were 120 degrees at 10 KTS and the active runway was runway 4. 3 aircraft were active on the airfield. An air carrier X, B737, taxiing out on runway 4, a crj from air carrier Y taxiing out to runway 10, and our aircraft. We had requested runway 28 for our direction of flight back to ZZZ. I was not aware that air carrier Y aircraft was headed to runway 10 (opposite runway of our selected runway 28) and assumed they were on their way out to the active runway 4. While nearing the approach end of runway 28, I switched to tower frequency and heard air carrier Y call ready for departure. Tower replied with a clearance for takeoff, which in my mind was departing runway 4. At that time, I contacted tower and informed them we were ready holding short of runway 28. The tower replied, but I can't recall what was said. I know for sure though, that my response was 'roger, position and hold runway 28.' we were taxiing at a very slow speed, past the hold short line, and just as the tip of the nose was just over runway side lines, the tower asked us if we were still holding short. The captain immediately stopped the aircraft and I stated 'no.' the tower then called air carrier Y and told them to abort -- which was completed and the aircraft turned around approximately halfway down the 5500 ft runway. I then stated to tower that I had repeated back a position and hold clearance to which he replied 'I must not have heard you.' I told him we could do a 180 degrees and exit the runway, but he instead cleared us into position and after air carrier Y exited, we were cleared for takeoff. Supplemental information from acn 573059: air carrier Y cleared for takeoff runway 10. Air carrier X called ready to go runway 28. I told air carrier X to hold short, it will be about 30 seconds, departing traffic runway 10. Air carrier X shortly after that, taxied onto approach runway 28. I observed and aborted air carrier Y's takeoff roll. Both aircraft departed moments later.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN AVRO RJ85 FLT CREW HAS A RWY INCURSION RESULTING IN AN ACFT ABORTING ITS TKOF ON A NIGHT OP.

Narrative: AFTER CHKING WIND CONDITIONS AND RWY ANALYSIS, MY FO AND I (CAPT) REQUESTED A DOWNWIND DEP FROM ROC RWY 28. THIS CHOICE OF RWY RESULTED IN SHORT TAXI, AND A LAUNCH IN THE DIRECTION OF DEP. THERE WERE 2 OTHER ACFT, A CRJ, AND A B737 BESIDES OUR ARJ-85 ON THE ARPT SURFACE AREAS IN TAXI FOR TKOF MODE. ACTIVE RWY WAS 4, PER ATIS. UNBEKNOWNST, PRIOR TO RWY INCURSION, THE CRJ WAS PLANNING TO DEPART RWY 10 FOR TKOF. WE WERE PLANNING TO TAKE OFF FROM OPPOSITE DIRECTION ON RWY 28, AND THE B737 WAS GOING TO TAKE OFF FROM YET ANOTHER RWY, RWY 14. THE B737 WAS NOT INVOLVED IN RWY INCURSION. DURING TAXI OUT FOR TKOF, WE WERE GIVEN WINDS 120 DEGS AT 10 KTS, VISIBILITY WAS 10 SM, CEILINGS WERE 4500 FT OVCST (PER ATIS), AND IT WAS NIGHTTIME. FO AND I ACCOMPLISHED OUR TASKS AND CHKLISTS DURING TAXI. I RECALL TAXI SPDS TO BE SLOW, CUSTOMARY TO MY MODUS OPERANDI, WE WERE METHODICAL IN OUR PROCS, AND DID NOT SEEM RUSHED. WHAT FOLLOWED NEXT, RESULTED IN RWY INCURSION: BOTH FO AND I DO NOT RECALL THE EXACT INSTRUCTION FROM TWR TO OUR 'READY FOR TKOF RWY 28' CALL. HOWEVER, BOTH FO AND I VIVIDLY RECALL THE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT, 'POS AND HOLD RWY 28' FROM THE FO ON THE RADIO. THIS READBACK 'POS AND HOLD' WAS READ BACK SO CLRLY BY MY FO THAT IT REMAINED AS THE LAST IMPRESSION ON MY MIND, AND THEREFORE I PROCEEDED ACCORDINGLY TO POS THE ACFT ON RWY 28. SINCE I KNEW THAT WE HAD NOT BEEN CLRED FOR TKOF, I TAXIED SLOWLY TOWARDS THE APCH END OF RWY 28. RWY 28/10 AT ROC IS 5500 FT LONG, AND IT IS ALSO INTERESTING TO POINT OUT THAT IT HAS A MINOR HUMP TOWARDS THE MIDDLE OF THE RWY SO THAT UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES (VISIBILITY, DARKNESS, SHORT VERSUS TALL ACFT). AN ACFT MIGHT NOT BE VISIBLE TO AN OBSERVER FROM OPPOSITE ENDS. WHEN OUR ACFT HAD PROCEEDED ABOUT FULL LENGTH (TO SLIGHTLY UNDER) BEYOND THE RWY HOLD SHORT LINE, A QUERY FROM TWR 'XYZ, ARE YOU HOLDING SHORT OF RWY 28?' PROMPTED ME TO HALT THE TAXI. MY FO REPLIED 'NO,' AND EXPRESSED THAT HE HAD JUST ACKNOWLEDGED POS AND HOLD RWY 28, TO WHICH THE TWR REPLIED 'I MUST HAVE MISSED YOUR XMISSION.' THE NEXT RELEVANT XMISSION FROM THE TWR WAS TO THE CRJ AND IT WAS TO ABORT THE TKOF. AT THIS POINT, I RECALL A SET OF LIGHTS IN THE DISTANCE TO OUR R ON THE RWY FROM THE CRJ. THE CRJ SUCCESSFULLY ABORTED TKOF, AND AT APPROX THE HALF LENGTH OF THE RWY COMPLETED A TURN AROUND AND SUBSEQUENTLY EXITED THE RWY. THEREAFTER, WE WERE 'OFFICIALLY' CLRED INTO POS, AND THEN CLRED FOR TKOF. THOUGH THERE WAS AN OBVIOUS BREAKDOWN OF GOOD AND SAFE COM PRACTICES, THE CREW AND PAX OF EITHER ACFT INVOLVED IN THIS INCIDENCE WERE NEVER IN DANGER OF INJURY. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 572824: CONDITIONS WERE NIGHTTIME AND VFR WITH GOOD GND VISIBILITY. OUR CREW WAS ON OUR 5TH LEG AND ON ABOUT OUR 10TH HR OF DUTY. WINDS WERE 120 DEGS AT 10 KTS AND THE ACTIVE RWY WAS RWY 4. 3 ACFT WERE ACTIVE ON THE AIRFIELD. AN ACR X, B737, TAXIING OUT ON RWY 4, A CRJ FROM ACR Y TAXIING OUT TO RWY 10, AND OUR ACFT. WE HAD REQUESTED RWY 28 FOR OUR DIRECTION OF FLT BACK TO ZZZ. I WAS NOT AWARE THAT ACR Y ACFT WAS HEADED TO RWY 10 (OPPOSITE RWY OF OUR SELECTED RWY 28) AND ASSUMED THEY WERE ON THEIR WAY OUT TO THE ACTIVE RWY 4. WHILE NEARING THE APCH END OF RWY 28, I SWITCHED TO TWR FREQ AND HEARD ACR Y CALL READY FOR DEP. TWR REPLIED WITH A CLRNC FOR TKOF, WHICH IN MY MIND WAS DEPARTING RWY 4. AT THAT TIME, I CONTACTED TWR AND INFORMED THEM WE WERE READY HOLDING SHORT OF RWY 28. THE TWR REPLIED, BUT I CAN'T RECALL WHAT WAS SAID. I KNOW FOR SURE THOUGH, THAT MY RESPONSE WAS 'ROGER, POS AND HOLD RWY 28.' WE WERE TAXIING AT A VERY SLOW SPD, PAST THE HOLD SHORT LINE, AND JUST AS THE TIP OF THE NOSE WAS JUST OVER RWY SIDE LINES, THE TWR ASKED US IF WE WERE STILL HOLDING SHORT. THE CAPT IMMEDIATELY STOPPED THE ACFT AND I STATED 'NO.' THE TWR THEN CALLED ACR Y AND TOLD THEM TO ABORT -- WHICH WAS COMPLETED AND THE ACFT TURNED AROUND APPROX HALFWAY DOWN THE 5500 FT RWY. I THEN STATED TO TWR THAT I HAD REPEATED BACK A POS AND HOLD CLRNC TO WHICH HE REPLIED 'I MUST NOT HAVE HEARD YOU.' I TOLD HIM WE COULD DO A 180 DEGS AND EXIT THE RWY, BUT HE INSTEAD CLRED US INTO POS AND AFTER ACR Y EXITED, WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 573059: ACR Y CLRED FOR TKOF RWY 10. ACR X CALLED READY TO GO RWY 28. I TOLD ACR X TO HOLD SHORT, IT WILL BE ABOUT 30 SECONDS, DEPARTING TFC RWY 10. ACR X SHORTLY AFTER THAT, TAXIED ONTO APCH RWY 28. I OBSERVED AND ABORTED ACR Y'S TKOF ROLL. BOTH ACFT DEPARTED MOMENTS LATER.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.