Narrative:

Departing mex, first officer flying. As we reached flap retract speed, first officer called for flaps up. Just as I moved the handle to the up position, the aircraft speed stagnated and did not increase. I did not hear the first officer call for climb power, because I was focused on avoiding any further loss of airspeed by a thrust reduction. In the mins that followed, we were cleared of the 15000 ft restr. I replied, and we continued a very slow climb. For some reason that I simply cannot explain, I did not select climb power on the thrust indicator computer. I did note none of the engine parameters were being exceeded. N1, N2, and egt indications were all below the yellow and amber arcs and radials. About 10 mins after application of maximum power for takeoff, I realized we were still into mode on the thrust indicator computer. It did not help having the sun shining on the thrust indicator computer, diffusing the power setting selected. We also had a stuck microphone situation, which helped distraction my attention. Once the discrepancy was discovered, I selected climb power. The first officer thought I had selected climb power after the flap retract call, because he experienced the temporary loss of performance on the climb. This was, after all, mexico city -- a warm day and a fairly heavy aircraft. Just another not too subtle reminder not only to get back to normal procedures after an unusual event, but to have both crew members verify the gauges at all times with an occasional xchk. I know I will be much more vigilant in the future.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MD80 CREW DID NOT REDUCE ENG PWR TO CLB THRUST AFTER TKOF AT MMMX.

Narrative: DEPARTING MEX, FO FLYING. AS WE REACHED FLAP RETRACT SPD, FO CALLED FOR FLAPS UP. JUST AS I MOVED THE HANDLE TO THE UP POS, THE ACFT SPD STAGNATED AND DID NOT INCREASE. I DID NOT HEAR THE FO CALL FOR CLB PWR, BECAUSE I WAS FOCUSED ON AVOIDING ANY FURTHER LOSS OF AIRSPD BY A THRUST REDUCTION. IN THE MINS THAT FOLLOWED, WE WERE CLRED OF THE 15000 FT RESTR. I REPLIED, AND WE CONTINUED A VERY SLOW CLB. FOR SOME REASON THAT I SIMPLY CANNOT EXPLAIN, I DID NOT SELECT CLB PWR ON THE THRUST INDICATOR COMPUTER. I DID NOTE NONE OF THE ENG PARAMETERS WERE BEING EXCEEDED. N1, N2, AND EGT INDICATIONS WERE ALL BELOW THE YELLOW AND AMBER ARCS AND RADIALS. ABOUT 10 MINS AFTER APPLICATION OF MAX PWR FOR TKOF, I REALIZED WE WERE STILL INTO MODE ON THE THRUST INDICATOR COMPUTER. IT DID NOT HELP HAVING THE SUN SHINING ON THE THRUST INDICATOR COMPUTER, DIFFUSING THE PWR SETTING SELECTED. WE ALSO HAD A STUCK MIKE SIT, WHICH HELPED DISTR MY ATTN. ONCE THE DISCREPANCY WAS DISCOVERED, I SELECTED CLB PWR. THE FO THOUGHT I HAD SELECTED CLB PWR AFTER THE FLAP RETRACT CALL, BECAUSE HE EXPERIENCED THE TEMPORARY LOSS OF PERFORMANCE ON THE CLB. THIS WAS, AFTER ALL, MEXICO CITY -- A WARM DAY AND A FAIRLY HVY ACFT. JUST ANOTHER NOT TOO SUBTLE REMINDER NOT ONLY TO GET BACK TO NORMAL PROCS AFTER AN UNUSUAL EVENT, BUT TO HAVE BOTH CREW MEMBERS VERIFY THE GAUGES AT ALL TIMES WITH AN OCCASIONAL XCHK. I KNOW I WILL BE MUCH MORE VIGILANT IN THE FUTURE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.